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For Susie

Most young men and women at the century s end
grow up in a sort ofpermanent present lacking any organic relation to the
public past of the times they live in.
Eric Hobsbawm.

Today our schools of rationality balk at having their history written,
which is no doubt significant.
Michel Foucault.
Struggle amounts to an awful thinking,
Its discoveries remain limited
only because its course is interrupted.
Roberto Mangaberia Unger.
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Preface
This thesis is an investigation into the dominant ways of coming to understand
conflict in the new millenniwn. Further, this thesis penetrates deeper into social
theory to question the dominant methodology and the common understanding of what
constitutes reality and the methods whereby Realism and Neorealism have retained a
monopoly of truth claims despite prolific criticism. This thesis seeks, by using recent
postmodern literature in IR, to reframe both reality as conceptualised and the methods
and questions that should be directed towards understanding and creating reality. In
reframing and reconceptualising reality it becomes possible to have an alternative and
equally realistic understanding of the causes of conflict.
Therefore, the point of this thesis is not so much to provide a whole ream of
conclusive answers to contemporary issues, so much as to offer more productive
avenues of research in the hope that the determinism and pessimism of mainstream
theorising in IR might be eschewed indefinitely.
This thesis also seeks to understand why mainstream theorists have come to
rely upon their own theory of reality for so long and how it became engrained as the
only realistic theory of IR.
I argue that the first part of the answer resides in a modern preoccupation with
shedding responsibility through objectivity, the second part concerns shedding history
in the name of science, and thirdly of presupposing reality s intransigence to further
an understanding of reality which has consequently served to entrench its
imperfections. Each of these three elements can be seen in the implicit normative
5

concerns of Realism, Neorealism, Neoclassical Political Economy, Enlightenment
philosophy and the practice that these ideologies have spawned. Their obviously
glaring irregularities bloat in daily current affairs where people die as a result of the
modem deterministic doctrines of power politics and/or economic rationalism, most
obviously in the form of mass consumption producing mass waste and global
warming; the first a cause of modem political economy, the second its effect.
Moreover, concerted international efforts to remedy this pollution get bogged down in
the discourse of state sovereignty, of economic (ir)rationalism, and a blind faith m
science; the very (circular) logic that precipitated the initial catastrophes.
This thesis has finished up as a critique of the presumed sovereign impotence
of the state . Moreover, it is a critique of the presumed intransigent but largely
illusory aspect of the state, which comes under the heading of metaphysics , or so I
shall argue. It is a critique of the scientific philosophy that elevates reality to the
deterministic level of factuality ; this thesis is also a critique of the broader modem
discourse within which this image of reality fits. Finally, this thesis is an attempt to
relocate people -for better or for worse -ffi the making and shaping of our social,
cultural, economic, and political environment, to achieve a deeper understanding of the
causes of our global calamities and of the source of a possible cure.
I would like to propose that nothing, not even change, is beyond concerted
effort. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the primary cause of apathy and disaster
are human beings, but we are also the only remedy.

6
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Introduction
My Dear Sir John,
The armistice has been signed and the statesmen of the nations will soon
assemble to undertake the task of concluding the pact of Peace, which we all
ardently hope will herald in a new world, freed from the menace of war. Out of
their deliberations our supreme desire is to see established a League of Free
Peoples for maintenance of international right and the enforcement of
international duty. Beyond all material reparations and all territorial adjustments
this foundation of a righteous peace among civilized states may prove to be the
most permanent and most valuable result of the war. The plenipotentiaries at the
Peace Conference can lay the foundation of the League of Free Peoples but they
cannot rear the Temple of Peace. This is the task of the coming generation, and
for its achievement we shall need consecrated energy, goodwill, knowledge, and
enlightened public opinion in all countries. Old problems must be confronted in
a new spirit; insular and vested prejudices must be removed; understanding and
toleration need to be greatly developed. It is an immense task and a myriad
agencies will be required to discharge it. Among these must be our Universities
and our own University of Wales, whose sons have so freely laid down their lives
in the morning of their days, and whose memory our little Nation will wish to
cherish for all time.
It has occurred to my sisters and myself that the University of Wales and
the Council of the College may be willing to allow us to found a chair of
International Politics at Aberystwyth, in memory of the fallen students of our
University, for the study of those related problems of law and politics, of ethics
and economics, which are raised by the project of the League of Nations, and for
the encouragement of a truer understanding of civilization other than our own. We
are prepared to contribute for this object the sum of twenty thousand pounds, and
we should be glad, if our proposal is accepted, that the Chair should be
associated with the illustrious name of President Wilson.
With kind regards,
Believe me to be
Yours sincerely,
1
David Davies.

Lord Davies - like many ofiis Welsh contemporaries -sought to make sense
of a senseless slaughter in establishing the first academic department devoted entirely
to the study of international politics. The study of international relations (IR) was
defined as political science in its application to international relations with special
reference to the best means of promoting peace between nations

2

and the League

of Nations was pronounced to be the most fruitful area of study and research.

3

1

University of Wales Council minute dated 13 December 1918. The proposal was accepted.
See Clause 13 of the endowment fund deeds dated 2/12/1992.
3
The League of Nations was the focus Lord Daviess idealism. However Brian Porter notes, [t]o
[his] surprise and vexation, none of the professors appointed to the Woodrow Wilson Chair had shown
much enthusiasm for [his somewhat elaborate] ideas Porter tells the somewhat ironic history
2

9

Lord David Davies s personal solution to war revolved around an allpowerful International Police force, using the latest in modem weaponry, and capable
of crushing any aggressor with speed and determination.

4

The sovereign centre of

authority was to be the League of Nations, though the sovereign to whom Lord Davies
had to appeal was the British parliament --in which he was a Liberal Member -and
eventually to the House of Lords after being awarded a peerage in 1932. Needless to
say the above, less academic proposals, never saw the light of day.
However, at the outset the Department of International Politics at
Aberystwyth did resemble the normative concerns of its founder. Ieuan John et al.
have argued that the department aimed to strive for
the moral and political aim of improving the human condition, and the academic
obligation to understand, explain and illuminate the complex phenomena of
political relations between states
It might be conceded that the prescriptive
element was predominant, that the moral obligations of the scholar and the
central concerns of the holder of the [Woodrow Wilson] Chair, should be to
exhort and teach the need for action, and suggest the policies by which an
international organization, the League of Nations in this specific case, could be
made effective and even gain the acceptance of nations. 5

Study at Aberystwyth centred on questions of International Law, the study of
institutions, and how states acted in relation to these norms . 6 As such it became a
scientific pursuit in the study of the actions of states and institutions. Moreover,
[t]he overwhelming aim which dominated the pioneers of the new subject was to
prevent war -regarded as the disease of the international body politic.

7

Jim George

surrounding the inception of the department and the politics and turmoil that surrounded the
appointment of Professors.
4
B Porter E.H Carr: The Aberystwyth Years. 1936-1947. (Forthcoming) p2. These ideas are fully
worked out in Lord Daviess The Problem of the Twentieth Century published in 1930, which
received respectful reviews from both The Times Literary Supplement and International Affairs. Ibid.
5
Ieuan John, Moorhead Wright and John Garnett, International Politics at Aberystwyth, 1919-1969
pp. 88-89. In Brian Porter (ed) International Politics 1919-1969. London, Oxford University Press,
1972.
6
Ibid, p. 91.
7
Ibid, p. 93 .

10

has dubbed this initial approach to the discipline

neo-Kantianism .

8

Neo-

Kantianism involved a concern with normalising interstate relations along Enlightened
Liberal, Republican and institutionalist lines always with a concern for the ought

of

International Relations as a discipline and a concern for the ought of the discourse s
object of study, namely, international relations.
With the appointment of E. H. Carr to the Wilson Chair of International
Politics in 1936 all this was to change. Though, I would argue, not due to any radical
break in scientific method or discovery, but due to the dichotomous political currents
of the day, the way in which Carr successfully disseminated his ideas throughout the
body politique , and how this body politique, in tum, attributed his ideas a sovereign
voice. 9
Lord Davies opposed Carr s appointment to the Chair from the outset,
believing that someone who held beliefs more in common with his own would have
been more suited. His preferred candidate was W. Arnold-Forster -a painter by
profession, though he published widely in the field of International Relations.
Forster s views mirrored those of Lord Davies in that he was an ardent supporter of
the League and this obviously made him an excellent candidate for the Chair. Despite
his poor academic background Arnold-Forster was a more favoured candidate than
Herbert Butterfield of Peterhouse, Cambridge. 10

8

Jim George. Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (re)Introduction to International Relations.
1994. pp. 74 - 77.
9
Stefano Guzzini calls this the Kissinger effect whereby the very real links between academia and the
policy elites of the host states merge to prove the validity of one theoretical orientation over
another. (Guzzini, Stephano. Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy:
The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold. 1998.)
10
. p. 5.
B. Porter. 0 p cit,

11

In the event, however, E.H Carr was appointed to the chair. This was not
without its acrimony, and in fact Carr s appointment prompted Lord Daviess
immediate resignation of the Presidency of the University College of Wales. 11 It is
probable that Lord Davies was as yet unaware of how radically different their ideas
were at this point. Lord Davies, it seems, simply had his own favoured candidate, and
let his somewhat authoritarian personality get the better of him.
Lord Davies

sympathies were indicative of both the thoughts of his

contemporaries and his cultural heritage. For such a small nation, The Welsh were, and
indeed still are, a very internationally oriented people. At that time the people and
their more affluent and public-spirited

upper classes alike, aimed to forge strong

international ties with the world derived from what Porter argues was a world of
nave and enthusiastic idealism, made up partly of Nonconformist pacifism, and
partly of Celtic knight-errantry . 12 Porters antipathy here reveals the lingering
prejudice against idealism in the twenty first century which began in earnest with
Carr s inaugural lecture at Aberystwyth that was to spark this first positivist
dichotomy in IR, and the raging debate since.
Carr s realism argued that rather than resort to intellectual idealism, and
[i]nstead of designing perfect schemes for the salvation of the world, [Utopianists]
should, if they wished to have any influence over public opinion, keep in touch with
it, with the political thinking of the man in the street

II
12

British public opinion, he

Ibid, p. 7.
Ibid, p. 9.

12

said, would never countenance collective security measures aimed to perpetuate
Versailles.

13

Carr s pnor tenure at the Foreign Office undoubtedly shaped his way of
perceiving the realities of the world. It seems from the above that the British state is
a homogenous sovereign entity, worthy of no analysis; it is only public opinion that
need be influenced. However it was through his brief appointment at the Ministry of
Information at the outbreak of the war, and his four year employment on the editorial
team of The Times, (at that time regarded throughout the world as a semi-official
mouthpiece of the British Government

14

)

where he wrote a total of over 350 leading

articles [and] played an important part in influencing domestic and foreign opinion
although the line he took as the War approached its end diverged increasingly from
government views and policy

15

that he undoubtedly achieved the very goal he had set

himself in his inaugural lecture, i.e. to influence public and academic opinion.
An indication of his success can be seen in the remarks of Thomas Jones, one

of the most politically influential of all Welsh men and advisor to successive Prime
Ministers, who argued in a letter to the Principle of the College after the war, when
Carr s future there was in jeopardy, that

Professor Carr on The Times is worth

several generals in the field and the brilliant strategist who put him there should be
promoted Field-Marshal of the Home Guard. Later in the year

he made the point

with brutal precision: Should D .D. [David Davies] attempt to dislodge Carr he will be
fought to the death.

16

13

Ibid, p. 12 (emphasis added).
Ibid, p. 15.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid, p. 19.

14

13

Carr s early conservatism is exemplified in his aspirations for the department.
Again in his inaugural lecture, Carr argued for the promotion of a truer understanding
of the nature of international relations, and thereby contribute to the creation of a
balanced and well-informed public opinion on international problems.

17

Thus the normative element was abandoned explicitly from the discourse and
students were forced to focus their attention on the world as it was considered to be
rather than as it might be, and although this occasionally prompted accusations of
cynicism, it seemed the only basis for an intellectual discipline concerned primarily
with understanding rather than improving international relations.

18

Of course, as we

hav,e seen from both the Trust Deeds and the initial proposal letter, this conservatism
betrays the dual aspirations of the founders, to understand and to end the disease of
war, and the abandonment of the normative came to typify the poverty of the Realist
paradigm.
The discipline was to take a decidedly conservative shape and evolve within
very strict statist ontological boundaries derived from a positivist epistemology, and
eventually a negation of the subjective and value-laden realities of life and/or the
ability of the subject to alter his/her objective social environment or the inter-state
system . With the appointment of Edward Hallett Carr to the Wilson Chair it soon
became evident, much to Lord Davies s disappointment, that collaboration and
cooperation were neither the stuff of departments nor of international politics. Indeed
as the events of the following years showed, war and conflict between states and
political ideologies were the norm, and it was to the relations between sovereign

17
18

Quoted in Ieuan John et al. op cit, p. 97.
Ibid, p. 98.
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antagonistic states, reflected in the conflict between the disciplines founding
protagonists, that academic, scholarly, and professional interest was to turn.
One of the main arguments in this thesis is the proposition that scientific
Neo/Realism is seeking to sever its subjective and historical links to the past and
present in an attempt to absolve itself from responsibility in the real world which
Neo/Realism (this term signifies the only very superficial methodological difference
between Realism and N eorealism and thus justifies their amalgamation, the terms
Realist or N eorealist are used when referring to the conventional meanings which
these terms encompass) has played a very constructive role in creating. Severance, I
will argue, has occurred via reification, through reference to the timeless laws of
nature or of the international system, via appeals to an objective science and
primarily via reference to the ubiquitous and intransigent nature of the sovereign
state . This thesis is an attempt to contextualise science, a theory of the state, and the
philosophical chassis of Neo/Realism in such a way as to erode the sovereign voice
that has been attributed to N eo/Realism over the last fifty years.
Moreover, by attempting to historicize the moments in which Neo/Realism
has gone through a fundamental change in either methodology or subject (such as the
one outlined above between Idealism and Realism), I would like to show that science
does not evolve in a vacuum, that politics are never far behind appeals to objectivity,
and that once this is recognised, the determinism which, I argue, underpins a vast
amount ofNeo/Realism, can be bypassed and in such a way as to dramatically widen
-

to paraphrase Jim George -

tlunge of the possible in international relations and

15

also in the theoretical and normative aspect of International Relations (IR) as a
discipline.
As the title deed suggest, the dual aspirations of the founders of the discipline
were to understand the causes of conflict and to promote peace. This thesis challenges
the traditional understandings of the causes of conflict, moreover it challenges the
traditional methods of coming to understand the world around us and it also challenges
the common conception (in IR) of what the world actually consists of. In so doing I
would like to demonstrate the way in which responsibility and culpability should be
reintroduced to collective and individual international relations.

Aims and structure of the thesis.

International theory of the modem era has always been inherently problem
solving. This is evident in Hobbes s treatment of the English civil war, Machiavelli s
proscriptions for the rise of a new system of autonomous political spheres ; it is
evident in the work of Pufendorf, of Kant, and almost any other western political
theorist of the last two thousand years.
Only in the last century with the proliferation of positivism as the definitive
method of social investigation has the study of society been given its consciously
naturalistic and scientific status. 19 Here it seems that the problem solving method
and the empirical analysis of society was transformed to include grand theorising and
the deduction of laws using the methods of the natural sciences without any
recognition of societies history, its changing nature and the human role in this change.

19

The paragraphs to follow serve only as an introduction to arguments that will be developed further
in Chapters 4 and 5.

16

Positivism sought to sever the link between theory and practice via appeals to
objectivity. Theories, gleaned from the empirical facts of our social existence, such as
Realism and Neorealism (Neo/Realism) served the problem-solving ends of the social
scientists though they were never recognised as doing so. These ends usually sought
an end to the contingency of our social existence, the radical unpredictability and the
anarchy of a society without the sovereign presence of an all-powerful God. This 1s
arguably modernity score project. In addition, Zygmunt Bauman has written,
Modernity was, among other things, a gigantic exercise in abolishing individual
responsibility other than that measured by the criteria of instrumental rationality
and practical achievement. The authorship of moral rules and the responsibility
for their promotion was shifted to a supra individual level. 20

The supra individual level , the higher ground as it were, was
commandeered by the sovereignty of legislative reason . Bauman argues that this
form of reasoning stemmed from Kant (Critique ofPure Reason) and the proposition
that the philosopher, by virtue of his laborious reasoning, can legislate for the rest of
humanity in the form of normative and universal propositions. 21 This normative
project thus operated in two ways; not only did it proscribe the ought for society it
also sought to homogenise society, to establish norms, so as to facilitate the
eradication of superstition (i.e. the power of the Church), the grounding of knowledge
in certainty, and the evolution of modernity, the human spirit, and progress.
Further Bauman argues,
Modem rulers and modem philosophers were first and foremost legislators; they
found chaos, and set out to tame it and replace it with order. The orders they
wished to introduce were by definition artificial, and as such had to rest on
designs appealing to the laws that claimed the sole endorsement of reason and by
22
the same token de-legitimised all opposition to themselves.

20

Z, Bauman. Intimations of Postmodernity. Pg xvi.
Ibid, pp. 114 - 118.
22
Ibid, p. 119.

22

17

These were natural laws that had to be founded upon fact that was value and
prejudice free. This was the positivist method and the legislators were almost
unanimous in method, though not in interpretation of facts and indeed what
constituted a fact. Nowhere is this more glaringly obvious than in the domain of
High Politics , or the discourse of International Relations.
This theme of responsibility is one that we can only take up, however, once
morality has been re-accorded a primary role in international politics. Considering the
statist ontology ofNeo/Realism, bearing in mind Neo/Realist admonitions to privilege
power over morality, as we shall see in the first chapter, it is especially important to
discuss how reality can involve morality. What must be demonstrated is that
identifying the human nature of our social existence is of central importance so as to
recognise morality and ethics for their constructive and destructive roles in society.
Realism in no way solves the problem of conflict. In fact, as John Vasquez
has shown (using falsificationist methods) it actually exacerbates it. He found that
power politics is an image of the world that encourages behaviour that helps bring
about war

23

and that when Realists are in power there is a greater chance that war

will break out than when they are not.
However my intention is not to offer more empirical evidence in support of
Vasquez s claims. My intention is to deconstruct traditional and neo- realism and to
demonstrate that the statist ontology, the method (i.e. positivist/empiricist) and the
purpose (rational utilitarian) of Neo/Realism as dominant ways of understanding the
world and conflicts place within it are fundamentally flawed, contradictory and

23

Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics. 1983. Quoted in George, 1994, p. 13.
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inadequate. I also propose that Neo/Realism as a school of thought is no less utopian
than the Idealism which it sought to replace. This proposition rests upon the
observation that the world for N eo/Realists is a metaphysical construct with no
tangible base in reality. A state centric ontology, which is the characteristic of

Neo/Realism exists simply because we believe and act as though it does, as this thesis
aims to demonstrate. Moreover, I would like to link this psychological construction to
broader discourses of modernity in far more detail than above but with the same
intentions in hand, and to demonstrate how Neo/Realism at once attempts both to
absolve itself of culpability in world affairs yet, paradoxically, has more of a hand
than most in shaping them.
If I can demonstrate how Neo/Realism is but one way of viewing the world
and not of necessity the only real way ofdoing so, I should also be able to demonstrate

what the implications of living and thinking in terms of states and power are. In
essence, to think and live in terms of states and power restricts the ways in which
it is possible to live and act, to do so is therefore counterproductive and, as has been
argued by many postmodemists, violent and dangerous.
This thesis also seeks to reconfigure what we think the world consists of and
the way in which this reconfiguration displaces Neo/Realism, and offers space for a
new way of thinking and acting in the world freed from the ontological constraints of
state centrism. These lines of argument will be traced through six chapters.
The first chapter of this thesis seeks to discuss two things. First, I would like
to discuss how Neo/Realism comes to view the world in an amoral and ahistorical
way, how it is that the state has come to be reified via abstraction and hypothetical

19

deduction with no roots in the reality of our historical past and how viewing the world
in the way in which N eo/Realists do is permissive of all manner of dangerous and
violent acts in the name of the state , but always in a self-referential, justificatory
manner. The main contention here is that N eo/Realism relies upon a metaphysical
view of the state-as-actor. As such, Neo/Realism s theories, which I will discuss in
relation to this metaphysical construction (the state), will be elaborate and seemingly
conclusive. The main problem is that metaphysics are renowned for being extremely
inconclusive.
The second chapter of this thesis begins our decent into the theory of science.
What I would like to demonstrate here is how positivism, with all its inherent
contradictions, supports Neo/Realism s commonsense view of the world by allocating
states an objective and immutable nature, and then directing our studies away from the
subjective nature of our constructed world and towards an enforcement of a
metaphysical and largely psychological utopia. What will also be discussed is the way
in which ontology and epistemology in N eo/Realist IR are mutually constitutive. The
contradiction occurs when we recognise that positivism in IR supports a metaphysical
ontology. Positivism as an epistemology was developed explicitly to move to a higher
level of knowledge; Comte saw metaphysics as a second level of knowledge after
theology. Why then is positivism so successful in maintaining metaphysics? This is a
question that I will seek to answer in the second chapter.
The third chapter will begin the critical analysis of N eo/Realist statist
ontology. Here, I would like to do three things. First I will demonstrate how
Neo/Realism s core assumptions

are

false,

by

using

Vasquez

Popperian

20

/falsificationist methodology. To date The Power Of Power Politics (1998), is the only
major study that actually seeks to verify the core Neo/Realist assumptions via an
overview of the last fifty years of empirical research in IR. In so doing, Vasquez
work confirms the theoretical anomalies discussed in chapters one and two:
metaphysical abstractions cannot be either verified or falsified using an empirical
epistemology no matter how pragmatic.
Second, by demonstrating how Neo/Realism is empirically fundamentally
flawed, and by demonstrating the relative strengths of non realist propositions one
can open up Neo/Realism to a scientifically proven charge of utopianism. Neo/Realism
does not reflect reality ; as such its grip on policy forums should be lessened because
it is destructive and illogical to act on the basis of false information.
The third part of chapter three attempts to move further away from
empiricism and positivism by asking how Neo/Realism is so resilient as a discourse.
To explain Neo/Realism s power I have turned to the one philosopher who is
qualified -in my view- to comment upon the power in knowledge and the resilience of
discourse: Michel Foucault. This explanation of Neo/Realism s strength will act as a
precursor to the proceeding two chapters and will seek to provide a context for the
inclusion of linguistic philosophy within IR in general.
Chapter four begins the task of relocating International Relations within a
broader modem context. Here I will demonstrate the position of the core Neo/Realist
thinkers and their texts in relation to broader social theory using the landmark work of
Jim George: Discourses of global Politics: A Critical (re)Introduction to International

21

Relations. The role of this work in any attempt to (re)write IR theory cannot be

overstated.
The relocation of Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz within the broader discourse of
modernity serves two purposes. First it becomes possible to level the well-honed
critiques of broader social and political scientists at the fairly insular works of the
major Neo/Realists, and, secondly, it becomes possible to begin anew our
reconstruction of what constitutes reality on different premises. These premises are
largely linguistic and critical. They stress the human authorship of our social reality,
and its mutable and constructed nature.
In the fifth chapter, I would like to redraw the mental picture we have of IR.
To do so I will draw upon the critical and radical voices of the postmodern theorists in
IR. These theorists do not recognise the sovereignty of statist ontology. fudeed, it is
exactly this that they question. Postmodern theory in IR both reframes our common
conception of what constitutes the world , and our role within it. Moreover, the likes
of Ashley, Sylvester and Walker, question the legitimacy of viewing the world in the
way in which Neo/Realism has advocated for so long. Their work encourages us to
look beneath the state to the human workings of society and to eschew a logocentric
discourse that dictates otherwise.
The final chapter seeks to move beyond postmodernism. This very brief
chapter, considering the amount of material that had to be excluded, seeks to link
postmodernism to what I believe to be its anarchistic roots. Secondly, it seeks to retell
the story of the rise of the states system without the first principle of self interest .
Finally I would like to point the way towards working deterritorialised international

22

relations into a global historical and political sociology via the work of Roberto Unger.
His methodology will also allow me to bring together some of the eclectic themes of
the prior chapters. This re-telling of the story -in chapter six -allows us to
circumvent the mirage of the sovereign state and rework IR theory into the broader
fabric of international society. Unger s work, Politics, allows us to take a step closer
to the dual aspirations of the disciplines founders namely to have a deeper and more
sociologically informed conception of the rise of the interstate system, the cause of
war, and some understanding of how it might be avoided in the future, devoid of
N eo/Realism s naturalistic determinism.
This thesis is primarily an attempt to demonstrate that there is no single
reality, sovereign and undisputed, which is our sole repository of meaning and data.
This thesis seeks not so much to refocus the lens as to redirect its aim, to widen the
angle of inclusion, to illuminate inconsistencies for the possibilities which they hold
for the refashioning of the relationship between the subject and object, and this thesis
is primarily an attempt to use the thinking space

opened up by postmodern

interferences in International Relations for constructive purposes.

23

Chapter 1
The Construction Of Utopia:
A De-construction ofNeo/Realist
Statist Ontology.
Introduction.
[P]ower politics

wrote Martin Wight, suggests the relationship

independent powers, and we take such a state of affairs for granted.

24

between

He argues that

this phrase indicates not only the existence of sovereign political units but also the
conduct of relations between them. This is an extremely powerful statement of
Wights statist ontology. This statist commitment is one that not only presupposes,
but one that demands understanding on its own terms, for if you accept the existence
of states, moreover, if states form the centrepiece of ones image of the world and are
also an ontological commitment, then it could be argued, one must implicitly accept
the entire Neo/Realist world view with all its nuances and sophistications, its
developments and degenerations. If we accept that states exist as analytical
constructs, we must ask why?

and with the answers proffered come to the same

conclusion as Wight - that to bt:realistic, we must take states for granted. What I am
concerned with in this chapter is the how and why of this statement: how does
Wight come to the conclusion that reality is states, and why.
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M. Wight. Power Politics. 1978, p. 23.
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It is not, however, an answer that can be found Wight s work due to his

historically positivistic methodology. For Wight, his epistemology presupposes his
statist ontology, and the validity of what the world consists is taken for granted. I
would also like to question this assumption. The question, therefore, is why does
reality consists of states? And the answer can be found in the core Realist texts, those
being, in chronological order, E.H. Carr s The Twenty Years Crisis, Hans
Morgenthau s Politics Among Nations, and Kenneth Waltz, Man The State and War
and, also, Theory of International Politics. With qualification the same arguments can
be traced through all statist IR, most IPE and regime theory alike.
I shall discuss what I regard as The Seven Stages of Neo/Realism . Essentially
these stages

represent a deconstruction of the Neo/Realist statist ontology,25

whereby these stages represent less a methodology aimed at coming to understand our
reality, and more of a discursive praxis which reconstitutes meaning and reality via a
myth of origins and claims to universality. Chapter two will discuss the more
traditional concept of methodology in relation to the same seven stages , here,
however, I would like to tell the story of how and why the world is what it is
according to the Realist and N eorealist (henceforth Neo/Realist ) schools of
International Relations.
Underlying this argument is the assertion that even the most sophisticated
Neorealist

scientific

theories

concerning international relations

rest

upon

unrelinquishable statist ontology. For example, I propose that it would be impossible
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This deconstruction ofNeo/Realist statist ontology also represents the extent of state theory in
mainstream IR. Variations in state conceptualisation in Neoliberalism or Neoliberal institutionalism
whilst they add analytical depth to the broader concept of international relations, they do not venture
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for Kenneth Waltz in his work Man The State And War to devise a third image of
international relations with which he can reject his first and second images without
previously accepting the first two in their entirety. For instance, the states system
(third image) rests upon an essentialist ontology of man (first image). Neither could he
devise the economic analogy in Theory of International Politics had not the
epistemology and ontology of Neoclassical political economy almost entirely
resembled that ofNeo/Realism. By the end of this chapter, what I would like to have
made dear is that Realism, Neorealism and neoclassical political economy share the
same view of the world: it seems for Neo/Realists the world is complex and in need of
atomising, anarchic and in need of controlling, inefficient and in need of order, and that
the proscription which is applied to these issues, in essence, exacerbates that which it
seeks to pacify. In short, Neo/Realism creates that which it seeks to eradicate; namely
anarchy.
The Seven Stages of Neo/Realism 26 progress in this order: first we are
presented with an entirely unacceptable, though hypothetical, (I) state of nature
which allows the unhampered pursuit of the most evil vices (more modestly put as
self-interest or desires) -ever present within (2) human nature. In this state of
nature within which our human natures struggle in a war of all against all, it becomes
evident that self-preservation is paramount. The success of our will to survive in
conditions of scarcity is dependent upon our (3) power though by this stage power
and indeed human sovereignty has been divested to the (4) state

in our best

far from the core article of faith in IR, namely a state-as-actor theory. These variants will be discussed
· in greater detail towards the end of the chapter.

26

interests mainly to resolve conflict amongst individuals. Further, the state becomes
the embodiment of the human spirit; sanctioned by the social contract and vested in
relinquished (5) sovereignty , this

sovereign

actor then steps out onto the

international stage, one that by virtue of a multiplicity of like actors recognising no
higher authority, is now (6) anarchic or structural depending upon modem day
theoretical orientations. Ironically, the very act of attempting to subdue the initial
state of nature has produced the very same (7) state of nature

outside

m

international relations. Thus our modem concern with attempting to understand this
state of nature.
Of central concern here is the way in which this world view, this myth of
origins, this hypothetical and a priori base for universal theory, absolves all
responsibility for action given the constraints that each hypothetical stage imposes
upon actors. Morality is superfluous to Neo/Realist theory precisely because it has
invented reality in such a way as to render it unrealistic. In this sense it is exactly as

Bauman suggested (above), Neo/Realism, as a modern discourse, is the discourse of
irresponsibility par excellence. Moreover, this hypothetical interpretation, this

metaphysical construction, is the basis for all manner of misdemeanours in the name
of the state.

1) A State of Nature.

Thomas Hobbes is the most often cited theorist of a State of Nature in
traditional Realism. Citing Hobbes, H.J Morgenthau argues that were it not for the
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The first and second stage overlap considerably, indeed most stages contain a degree of overlap and
do not necessarily follow each other quite so simply. They do however provide a stable framework
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Leviathan domestic society would be reduced to a war of every man against every
man

27

and we are indebted to the state for the peace and order which we find in

domestic society. As such the state of nature is a rampant gladiator pit not unlike
the one to which Thomas Huxley and the social Darwinists alluded to at the end of the
nineteenth century.
For Neo/Realists a theory of a State of Nature is derived from an atomistic
view of pre-civil society, based upon the assumption that either (in the Hobbesian
view) men pursuing their rational self interests in a society without a sovereign reduce
society to a gladiator pit, or, (in Waltz s interpretation of Rousseau) the early state
of nature, men were sufficiently dispersed to make any pattern of cooperation
unnecessary

28

and thus a state of nature is inefficient. Waltz, argues that it was only

upon collaboration that a state of nature arose due to the fact that there was no
impartial or sovereign arbiter which could guarantee that human interaction would be
equitable, efficient and productive. The infamous Stag Hunt analogy typifies this
point of view. Men previously unable to satisfy their own needs in isolation
collaborate to achieve collective ends, though without a sovereign there is no guarantee
of successful collaboration. Either way, the state of nature thesis is hypothetical so as
to provide a basis for ahistorical theorising. Waltz argues that Rousseau was
concerned to show how it was society and human interaction that brought out
malevolence and deceit, whereas for Hobbes (via Morgenthau) it resided in the
inherent results of human (co)action. However, even a cursory reading of Thucydides
will demonstrate that the state of nature is not only hypothetical but also far more

within which the ideas of this chapter can be presented fully.
H.J Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations. 1967, p. 483.

27
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complicated. 29 Why then do we presuppose a state of nature? The answer concerns
human nature.

2) Human Nature.

Theories concerning human nature in Neo/Realist IR theory reside in either the
rational-utilitarian camp, exemplified by Carr and Waltz, or within the traditional
spiritual camp typified by Niebhur and Morgenthau. Underpinning both theories
however, is the concept of self-interest-as-motivator epistemologically derived from
the unpredictability of a rampant state of nature, for if society has no impartial
arbiter, no sovereign , then what is to guarantee that society will be harmonious, and
what will suppress our natural urges to satisfy material self interest?
For Morgenthau and Niebhur, self-interest is irrational. Moreover it is the
result of original sin, it is inherent in a society that has fallen from grace, and in seeking
to be Gods the Christian traditionalists assume humanity to be beastly. This demands
either a sovereign power to crush overzealous individuals and states or a religious
pacifism and enlightened reasoning, respectively, to end a chaotic state of affairs. Greg
Russell argues, Morgenthau elaborated on man s separation from God as the starting
point for theoretical reflection on the desires and aspirations of man as a political

28

K. Waltz. Man The State And War.1959 , p. 167.
Thucydides noted that the Athenians were the first to lay aside their arms, to change to more
luxurious ways and that their more settled life was due to their desire for gain . They settled on the
relatively poor soil slightly further back from the seashore than other coastal communities. Piracy
forced many communities away from the shore and into the midst of the Athenian community.
Alliances were drawn up between the Athenians and other communities for mutual support and when
Athens became too populous, colonies were formed. Thucydides, History of the Pefoponnesian Wars
Book 1. p 13.
29
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animal. 30 Niebhur, on the other hand, argues that it is the stupidity of the average
man

which taints the human race, based upon his observation that [m]ost

individuals lack the intellectual penetration to form independent judgements and
therefore accept the moral opinions of their society.

31

This position prompts

Niebhur to advocate a purely religious pacifism which makes no claims to be socially
efficacious. It submits to any demands, however unjust, and yields to any claims,
however inordinate, rather than assert itself against another.

32

Conversely, for Waltz and Carr, utilitarian self-interest is unavoidable, as it is
the only rational means of self-preservation in a society without sovereign.
Consequently, [m]orality
losers

for Carr, has no rational attraction for prospective

33

3) Power.

The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined as power

34

wrote

Morgenthau. Thus, for Morgenthau, human nature is seen to be a malignant will to
power , which leads to conflict. Carr defines power as an ability to achieve ends at the
expense of others, in zero-sum terms, and by Waltz in Theory of International Politics
as the capability, whether exercised or not, to influence policy and outcomes within
the immutable structure of the international states system.

30
31
32
33
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Greg Russell, Hans J Morgenthau and The Ethics Of American Statescraft. 1990, p. 75.
Reinhold Niebhur, Moral Man and Immoral Society, 1936, p 21-36.
Ibid, pp. 263-264.
E.H. Carr. The Twenty Years Crisis. 1946, p. 49.
H.J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.1978, p. 4.
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Power in International Relations is a taken-for-granted concept, which, by
broader Political Science standards, is underdeveloped. Referred to interchangeably as
capabilities and interests, and either relative or objectively quantifiable, giving rise
to gains or more power , interests or capabilities in unending circularity; power
knows no limits and is sought after by all. To have power, by the Neo/Realist
definition, means to have the ability to coerce. It is also one of many underdeveloped
concepts in IR.

4) The State.

Given the hypothetical nature of a state of nature, given the nature of man ,
given also the ubiquitous and ephemeral nature of power which pollutes the fabric of
society, the state is rationalised as a sovereign centre which came about to adjudicate
between the irrational warring parties in a the Gladiator pit defined by scarcity, and
the rational-utilitarians amongst us who would lead society into chaos or chaos into
society.
For Waltz the material satisfaction of wants and needs prompt men to arrange
their social existence along lines of adjudication and enforcement set down by a
sovereign authority. Either way the repression of the avarice and greed in men is the
duty of the state and it does so in order to preserve civil society and, ultimately,
peace.

31

5) Sovereignty.

The legitimacy of state rule is secured via the concept of sovereignty.
Sovereignty presupposes that within a given territory over which there presides a
state, whose duty it is to secure the peace, and whose authority is unquestionable, the
sovereign will is the expression of right . To presume a state to be sovereign is to
presume that within its borders there is no higher authority, that a violation of
sovereignty is a violation of domestic control, and sovereignty also demarcates the
internal from the external , the bounded and homogenous from the. anarchic and
unpredictable. In essence, Sovereignty implies an order, which would otherwise be
absent without its recognition, and it is tied intrinsically to the theory of the state and
modem foundationalism. 35

6) Anarchy/Structure.

Sovereignty assumes form and content
other

that can be distinguished from

claims to sovereignty. By personifying the state, by cartographically

demarcating the extent of the state s sovereignty, an other than or an outside or
simply another body other than the state itself is immediately created once we come
to accept that while multiple in source, W estphalian claims to sovereignty are
indivisible. 36 Being as the globe is territorially bound within its own ecosphere it
follows therefore that all other sources of sovereign authority be either constituted in
binary or multilateral relationships, which cannot violate the homogeneity and totality
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This will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter five.
S. Krasner Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy. Krasner notes that the Westphalian Ideal is largely a
myth. This is however of great pertinence to this discussion because as we shall see a great deal of
N eo/Realist theory is based upon myth.
36
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of the state as actor that the concept of sovereignty implies. The United Nations
exemplifies this idea of equal sovereign units as actors. Sovereignty, in essence, is the
basis of a statist ontology. It by definition implies anarchy and/or structure depending
upon the variations that can be applied to the previous five stages.
However, this production of multiple bodies of equally sovereign natures,
presupposes that, given the irreducible and absolute nature of sovereignty, that these
states will logically stand or position themselves in a posture of warre lacking any
supra- sovereign entity. Hence the traditional Neo/Realist belief that conflict is
unavoidable.
Traditionally, the international system has been considered anarchic, though on
further reflection it became evident that the free for all was in fact constrained or
ordered by varying degrees. Later Neo/Realists in fact viewed the international
system as structural due to its timeless essence and the recurrence of balances between
states despite concerted efforts by actors equally as sovereign -but without the
mandate for legitimate force- such as firms, to affect certain balances of power.

7) A State of Nature.

Ironically the state of nature so loathed in domestic sovereign-less society
between irrational self-interested and power seeking individuals, has now been swept
outside and it is accepted that states now carry the burden of anarchy which this
story has constructed for them. The only contrivance being the assumption -though
hotly contested- that states are in fact rational actors. Anarchy is thus superseded by
rational utilitarian methods that constitute the order which the sovereign could not
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expect of domestic subjects - human nature being as it 1s and power being the
ephemeral, amoral prerequisite of survival and so on
The point of discussing the seven stages is to illustrate their hypothetical,
abstract, metaphysical, inter-related, and mythical nature.

Impending Crisis,
And,

Man, The State, Then War!
Here I would like to trace the stages which make up the Neo/Realist statist
ontology through E.H Carr s The Twenty Years Crisis, Waltz s Man The State And

War and Hans J. Morgenthau s paradigmatic text: Politics Among Nations. Leading
from this expose of Neo/Realist ontological commitments and why they are held as
such will be a discussion of a similar ontology evident in Neo-classical economic
theory-as-discourse in its application by way of analogy in International Relations
theory, principally in Waltz s Theory of International Politics and mainstream
N eorealist discourse as it has subsequently evolved. The choice of these texts is due to
their centrality and status to the discipline. However, a reading of most (if not all)
Neo/Realist texts would demonstrate that this statist ontology, and its mythical
nature, is rampant.
It is no coincidence that we should find the issues pertinent to this discussion

in Carr s work under the heading of Morality . True to Carr s project of asserting the
overwhelming power of power, various stages leading to the Realist statist ontological
commitment are emphasised over others, such as Carr s dialectical treatment of power
is privileged over the state of nature thesis. The ubiquity of power, indeed of the will
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of the stronger, is the foundation of Carr s world view. Though he is primarily
concerned with the relations between states (much to the detriment of future
Neo/Realist theory as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5) the internal constitution of
states is commented upon only in a cursory fashion. However, it is still possible to
trace the seven stages through his The Twenty Years Crisis. 37
Carr begins by questioning the plausibility of the state of nature thesis ,
arguing instead that Man has always lived in groups
membership of society is voluntary

38

.

However, he argues that

and that expulsion is indeed possible.

Nevertheless, the peculiarity of political society, which in the modern world takes the
form of the state, is that membership is compulsory,

39

compulsory due to the

impossibility of existing outside of a state. The origin of this peculiarity is not
discussed causally in the manner in which he himself argues is the primary theoretical
distinction of Realist discourse 40 except through inference to power relations within
society, which make up the hierarchical system that we have inherited from history.
For example, he argues that the United States was made through a combination of
the wish dreams of Jefferson, and Hamilton s position on questions of strength,
wealth and power

and both power and the dream were necessary ingredients.

41

Here it is a dialectical counterbalance between the ideal and the real, which is the basis
of state formation. For a realist, this is a slightly metaphysical explanation of state
formation!
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Carr s theoretical orientation changed dramatically after the Second World War. This is most evident
in his work What Is History? (1987) and will be discussed briefly in chapter four. However, these later
works do not feature prominently in IR debate and will therefore not be discussed here.
38
E.H Carr. The Twenty Years Crisis, 1946, p. 95.
39
Ibid, emphasis added.
40
Ibid, pp. 63 - 67.
41
Ibid, p. 96.
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The state, he argues, is the product of human nature, our natures being either
belligerent or altruistic in varying proportions. In his own dialectic manner he argues
that it is power that is the constitutive factor of all politics and [p ]olitical action
must be based on a co-ordination of morality and power.

42

However, given political

reality , or the ubiquity of power, power is privileged over morality as a first cause in
his theory. Throughout this work we see how the power/morality and reality/utopia
dichotomies are the constitutive factors of international politics, and that the
hypotheses derived from these oppositions explain our present day reality.
Nonetheless, as chapter four will demonstrate, there is a clear operation of
logocentrism43 involved in Carr s methodology.
Carr does, however, come into some difficulties when he attempts to reconcile
the dichotomy of the individual and the state in his discussion of personification. Here
we see how his theory of the state is developed so as to vindicate his power thesis on
the international (i.e. metaphysical) stage. This is the fourth stage in the construction
and vindication of his statist ontology.
Personification he argues, is the category of thought which expresses the
continuity of institutions; and of all institutions the state is the one whose continuity
it is most essential to express.

44

Without this personification, regardless of whether

the argument is in favour or against, there would be no mainstream discipline of IR.
Thus, personification serves the dual object of constituting not only the object and
subject in relation to the discourse but legitimises claims to sovereignty by
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Ibid, p. 97.
Logocentrism is a concept developed by Jacques Derrida to denote the arbitrary privileging of
dichotomous concepts in terms of the logos or the I of political discourse. In this sense, Carr
privileges power over morality through reference to his own world view, philosophy etc.
43
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reproduction of this personification. Moreover, this personification serves to reify the
state and thus absolve its historical past from critique. We are instructed to personify
so as to forget the intricacies of the state and make it easier to think of the state as an
actor in the international arena.
Sovereignty, or our fifth stage, is thus constituted by personification, in what
has become a primarily statist ontology.45 Once the distinction is made between
objects such as Great Britain and Italy, once it is assumed that there exists a space
out there in which these entities can exist, there must be some rational basis for this
ontology. Sovereignty, despite the fact that Carr derides its use as a term with any
preordained meaning (see below), allows us to construct an atomistic imagery or
metaphor that can explain how and why states act as they do. The final three stages
of Neo/Realism become immediately evident in Carr s work. As he quite rightly
points out,
It is a curious and significant paradox that those utopian writers on
international affairs who most vigorously denounce the personification of the
state as absurd and sinister none the less persistently allocate moral praise and
blame (generally the latter) to those imaflinary entities, Great Britain , France
and Italy, whose existence they deny. 4

Following from this, he argues:
The obligation of the state cannot be identified with the obligation of any
individual or individuals; and it is the obligations of states which are the subject
47
of international morality.

Thus Carr, by personifying the state, by reifying its socially constructed nature,
can also absolve the state of any moral criticism. State obligations

in this sense, are

predefined by the very same imagery which personification implies. Once we accept
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Ibid, pp. 149-150. Of course, the reason for this resides in the previous three stages.
In this sense it can be said that International Relations actually constitutes and supports political
theory. Indeed this is the argument ofR.B.J Walker in Inside/Outside: International Relations as
Political Theory. 1993 that we shall discuss in chapter 4.
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Op cit, p. 149-150.
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the personified powerful

state, we must also accept that other states also exist in

the same personified way. It then becomes difficult to associate any moral culpability
with the state as it is said to be the sole source of legitimate power that makes it quite
irrelevant to question how it uses such power. The personified state and its sovereign
neighbours exist and are powerful (i.e. they have a monopoly of the legitimate use of
violence) and any questioning of such power is pointless: it simply is reality. The
point, however, is that this is a question of imagery and metaphor not tangible reality.
Carr s realism is thus typically metaphysical; one must ask how it is possible to be
quite so utilitarian as well.
This utilitarianism is developed through an evaluation of the sociological
theories of Reinhold Niebuhr and it also acts as a further development of his state
theory. He argues that men seek strength in numbers and subsequently relinquish
individual responsibility and morality in the name of the group. He argues,
Loyalty to the group comes to be regarded as a cardinal virtue of the
individual, and may require him to condone behaviour by the group person which
he would condemn himself. It becomes a moral duty to promote the welfare, and
further the interests, of the group as a whole; and this duty tends to eclipse duty
. 48
to a w1'der commumty.

How or why this is accepted as a cardinal virtue is also explained by reference
to the internal logic of Realism. If power is expansionary and knows no limits,
utilitarian self-interest would dictate that the most prudential mode of behaviour is a
protective one. The nature of any threat is also relative to the individual s own power,
and thus states will be threatened by other states and individuals by other individuals.
In personifying the state or the group, in swearing allegiance to it and renouncing the
right to criticism in the name of expediency, Carr advocates the right and the
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Ibid, p . 151.
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legitimacy of sovereignty as a concept, Carr s personified state does not have multiple
heads, the group unites under a leader and that leader is sovereign. Sovereignty is
established as a core realist tenet by assuming allegiance to a higher authority within
the state despite the fact that Carr rarely, if ever, uses the word. 49
The anarchy of the international system is discussed implicitly in Part Four of

The Twenty Years Crisis, in which Carr seeks to discern the nature of legality in
international relations, and comes to the conclusion that a treaty, whatever its scope
and content, lacks the essential · quality of law: it is not automatically and
unconditionally applicable to all members of the community whether they assent to it
or not.

50

And thus the autonomous and power conscious states and non-state actors

of the international system exist in a state of antimony ever conscious of the
inevitability of war and conflict. And in the absence of an omnipotent power, it is in
the nature of power itself that the stronger will seek to maintain its position while it is
in the interests of weaker to disrupt, and therefore benefit from re-distributions of
power.

And all this from personification. This demonstrates the power of Realist

imagery, the ability to elucidate and devise theories of causation from simple
assumptions.
The same is true in the work of Waltz. In Man The State and War,51 Waltz s
ability to deduce an entire theory of causation from a simple first principle of the
state of nature is more explicit here than in the work of Carr.
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E.H Carr, 1946, p.
In one place where he does, Carr argues, One prediction may be made with some confidence. The
concept of sovereignty is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at
rcresent It was never more than a convenient label ibid p 230. See below, chapter five.
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Ibid, p. 171.
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Waltz, by process of elimination, attempts to locate the origin of conflict first in
the nature of man , as his first image hypothesis , then in the nature of the state

his

second image hypothesis . Waltz argues that if man is the cause of war then he is also
the cause of peace and thus man s nature has no explanatory power in questions of
causation. His second image of the cause of conflict resides in state theory. First he
argues that liberals (which he should have referred to as libertarians in order to avoid
confusion) are misguided in their nave faith in humanity, therefore their assertions
that if only the state would step out of society and laissez faire all would be well are
as utopian as the aspirations of the Marxists who (whilst also being caricatured to the
extreme) view the seizure of the state in the name of the international proletariat as the
only way of alleviating oppression and thus negating or ending the eternal class war
which is the cause of all conflict. Waltz argues that the normative Kantian aspirations
of the neoliberals will also lead to conflict. This echoes Carr who argues that the
interests of the strong will always prevail over the weak and that the liberal
utopianists conflate this logical observation and avoid the brute reality of policies.
Communists, on the other hand, overtly endorse war to end war -as Waltz sees itthus also reducing life to a constant battle.
That two sides should entertain contradictory goals does not mean that
either is unworthy. It may indicate that both are impractical. The projected
crusades of the liberals, as of Dostoievsky and the Communists, must, if
implemented, lead to unlimited war for unlimited ends. They may lead to
52
perpetual war for perpetual peace.

And so after opposing human nature as cause to human nature as benign, and
liberalism to communism and finding both sets of dichotomies to be lacking in a
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Kenneth Waltz, Man The State And War, 1959, p. 113.
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typically logocentric manner, in which his foundation is his statist utilitarian ontology,
the stage is set for Waltz s interpretation of the primary causes of conflict.
As with Carr, Waltz begins by discussing a hypothetical state of nature,
surprisingly citing Rousseau s argument in a footnote that the state of nature no
longer exists, perhaps never did exist, and probably never will exist; and of which it is,

nevertheless, necessary to have true ideas.

53

Indeed, Waltz s theories are derived

mainly from Rousseau, in opposition to what he sees as the inadequate ideologues
that he discusses and eliminates during the previous arguments.
For Rousseau primitive man lived in splendid isolation, or as Waltz puts it;
men were sufficiently dispersed to make any pattern of cooperation unnecessary.
But finally the combination of increased numbers and the usual natural hazards posed
the proposition: cooperate or die

54

invoking a stereotypical Malthusian scarcity

thesis and the assumption that prior to society (if such a thing can exist) man had no
concept of anything.
And thus our self-preservatory instincts, or our will to survive, or what, given
the context, must be seen as an amoral nature, forces humans into a free for all fight
for survival which is exacerbated by the fact that whilst cooperation would seem the
logical method of survival, pursuing ones own self-interest, as the stag hunt analogy
sought to demonstrate, will produce the most immediate individualistic and positive
results. Moreover, the stag hunt analogy , it is the point of departure for the
establishment of government and contains the basis for [Rousseau s] explanation of
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Ibid, p. 167. n. 18. emphasis added. The point here is to demonstrate not the contradictory nature of
a hypothetical argument so much as to show that it is used as a justification for a state centric
ontology and for states per se.
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conflict in international relations.

55

In short, Waltz argues that cooperative action is

not synonymous with individual interest, but why Waltz needs hypothetical
argument to substantiate a purely subjective interpretation of an imaginary history, is
never explained.
Which brings us to the third stage of Neo/Realism in what is becoming more
and more a hypothetical and metaphysical justification for a statist ontological
commitment. Interests are deemed to be inherently conflictual and whilst power is not
· mentioned explicitly, we are led to believe that interest is its synonym. His position is
inherently utilitarian, and again, one is forced to try and reconcile utilitarianism with
metaphysics.
Waltz argues that as society cannot be guaranteed to function smoothly by the
collaborative actions and good will of humanity (mainly because these conditions
cannot exist, see above), it therefore becomes necessary for humans to
set up rules governing cooperative and competitive situations, and organise the
means of enforcing them. Others are forced to follow the new pattern, for those
outside the organised society, unable to cooperate efficiently, cannot stand up
against the efficiency of a group united and enjoying the benefits of a social
56
division of labour.

Thus the fourth stage (Power) in the construction of the Neo/Realist statist
ontology argues for the state to be constituted as a rational entity and a blessing for all
mankind. As Rousseau argues, man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which
alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery,
while obligation to a law which we proscribe to ourselves is liberty.

57

Moreover, the

implication from Waltz s reasoning is that state formation has less to do with consent
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and politics than it does with coercion and force commonly understood as being
traditional power.
Waltz, however, encourages the constitution of the state along patriotic lines,
the embedding of the idea of an us/them distinction incorporated within an
inside/outside dichotomy. This inside/outside dichotomy is actually one of the most
important constitutive principles of international politics and of state psychology, for
the state, which is after all an abstraction and consequently inanimate cannot be
viewed as an acting unit unless the people view it as a living homogenous organism
distinct from other such units. 58 Thus nationalism is intrinsic to the praxis of
international relations. Indeed, Waltz argues that nationalism is constitutive of
sovereignty, as nationalism resides in the (hypothetical) will of the people (the state)
or the will of the sovereign. 59
Sovereignty, or the fifth stage of Neo/Realism, in Rousseau s view is the
manifestation of the will

of a homogenous -therefore good- state (bad

by

implication denoting heterogeneity). 60 Sovereignty presupposes, therefore, that the
actions of the state reflect the will of the people, and other like units will respond to
the actions of sovereign states in kind. Therefore, in aiming to secure their peace and
liberty in an international arena without a correspond:ing sovereign power to the one
present :in the domestic field, sovereign states produce what has become synonymous
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Ibid, pp. 173-177.
Waltz s trumpeting of nationalism and patriotism in these pages is entirely understandable given its
publication in the midst of the Communist witch hunts which plagued America in the fifties, however,
it is also integral to the state centric ontology of Neo/Realist discourse which is our main focus here.
60
It is surprising that Waltz does not reprimand Rousseau for arguments such as The will of the state,
which in its perfection is general for each of the citizens, is only a particular when considered in
relation to the rest of the world (p 181) considering it is this very (liberal) attitude which he denotes as
being misguided in his discussion of the second image .
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with Neorealist discourse and the defining characteristic of their ontology: the security
dilemma or the sixth stage ofNeo/Realism.
States acting in their own interests, by the sheer physical proximity of other
states cannot but affect the interests of neighbouring states. Thus, there is a perpetual
dichotomy between sovereignty and the rational benefits of collaborative action. In
Waltz s appraisal of Rousseau s philosophy it becomes apparent that given the
ontology adopted, and in predictably eschewing the utopianist call for world
government, one can only conclude with Waltz that wars occur because there is
nothing to prevent them.
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Therefore causes are relegated to being of secondary

importance behind the permissive or underling nature of the international system.
Much in the same vein as Carr, Waltz concludes by arguing that the positive utopian
side of his third image (the possibility of world government) as a goal, whilst we must
also adopt this third image as a stark reminder of the unassailable character of the
(hypothetical) international system. 62
Waltz argues that the theories of Hans J Morgenthau fit squarely within his
first image classification. Indeed, Greg Russell has argued, Morgenthau elaborated
on man s separation from God as the starting point for theoretical reflection on the
desires and aspirations of man as a political animal.

63

The constitution of his statist

ontology nevertheless proceeds through the same seven stages with varying degrees of
emphasis as with our previous two examples.
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Ibid, p. 232.
Unassailable, one might add, in utilitarian terms, but what of the metaphysics of the international
states system? Surely we could simply think another hypothesis into being and continue in like
fashion until we get the desired result?
63
Greg Russell. Hans. J Morgenthau And The Ethics ofAmerican Statescraft. P 74-75.

62

44

However, by the time we reach the relevant sections of Morgenthau s work

(Politics Among Nations) which contain the material which we desire, his statist
ontology has been profoundly stamped into the psychology of the reader by
continuous historical citation of treaties and wars among Great Powers and lesser
states, and also by his talk of the objective and unchanging nature of the international
arena and the scientific laws which can be derived from it.
Morgenthau s primary focus of analysis is power.

Indeed it is in Chapter

Eight, under the heading The Essence of National Power , that we find the seven
stages ofNeo/Realism playing out their fateful tune to the full.
Morgenthau explains,
We have learned from our discussion of the ideologies of foreign policies
that in the mind of the individual the power aspirations of others bear the stigma
of immorality. While this attitude has one of its roots in the desire of the
prospective victim of the power of others to defend his freedom against this
threat, the other root grows from the attempt of society as a whole to suppress
and keep in bounds individual aspirations for power. Society has established a
network of rules of conduct and institutional devices for controlling individual
power drives into channels where they cannot endanger society, or else they
weaken them or suppress them altogether. Law, ethics, and mores, innumerable
social institutions and arrangements, such as competitive examinations, election
contests, sports, social clubs and fraternal organizations - all serve that purpos~

Of course, the state also provides avenues for the pursuit and expression of
individual aspirations for power as Carr pointed out in reference to the creation of
the American federal state. Moreover, not all aspirations for power bear the stigma
of immorality and still less do competitive pursuits guarantee that individual power
urges can be controlled. In essence, Morgenthau is referring to the ordered nature of
domestic society as opposed to the anarchic one which would triumph were it not for
institutional devices of the type to which he alludes, which could suppress
humanity s lust for power, as Russell argues, [b ]ecause imperfect man aspires to the
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good but is frequently betrayed by a propensity for sin, the best system of
government is one which harnesses his virtues to serve good purposes and limits his
vices through legal and institutional restraints.

65

Here, the state of nature , or our

first stage is caused by man s propensity for self-assertion, which is for Morgenthau
an essentialist conception of human nature, or our second stage .
In the third stage , the struggle for power is universal in time and place

66

Morgenthau argues; mankind has fallen from grace and thus institutions aim to limit
his vices. Morgenthau argues much in the same vein as Niebhur, that groups manifest
the malignant nature of man far more easily, Thus, to take examples only from the
sphere of power, most societies condemn killing as a means of attaining power within
society, but all societies encourage the killing of enemies in that struggle for power
which is called war.
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Society by this definition is one giant exercise in the

suppression of power in the individual, except it seems, for the statesman. It is this
political exception which leads us to the directly to the fourth stage .
States take on their subjects power struggles, and sanctify this struggle by its
sovereignty, and in the protection of the national interest. The national interest is
thus individual human interest writ large and as all humans are the same, comprising of
the same base motivations, the national interest involves protection from other group
interests. To repeat Morgenthau, the individual power aspirations of others bear the
stigma of immorality (above), nevertheless for Morgenthau these power aspirations
do exist and they are malignant.

64
65

66
67

H.J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1979. p. 98.
Ibid, p. 5.
Ibid, p. 31.
Ibid.

46

The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to
maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a confi~ation that is
called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it. 68

All state action on the international scene is reduced to a struggle for power
against prevailing forces manifested within power balances. This is the sixth stage of
Neo/Realism. Further, the system is anarchic, it is recognised by Morgenthau that the
lack of a single sovereign precludes order, thus any tipping of the scales constitutes a
state of nature out there and the final stage in our seven stage synopsis.

Ontological Economising
And,

Another Theory of International Politics?

Two international moments of great significance in the early 1970 s -the oil
shocks and the end of the Bretton-Woods system -changed the classical view that
international politics was solely the domain of diplomats and high politics . For the
first time there was a mainstream recognition within IR that economic causes can have
political effects and vice versa. This was manifested in IR theory with a wholesale
embrace of Neoclassical political economy.
What I aim to demonstrate here is how similar the world view of Neoclassical
political economy (economics) and traditional Realist theory are. Waltz s ontology is
based upon the same presuppositions as Neoclassical economics, namely that the
state is a sovereign rational actor constrained by the mechanisms of the international
system. Excluding sovereignty, the firm to which Waltz alludes also follows from
this statist and structural functionalist ontology.
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Ibid, p. 162.
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What I would like to do now is trace the seven stages of Neo/Realism
through the later work of Kenneth Waltz and then see if the same ontology is present
in recent Neo/Realist and Neoliberal works.
Reasoning by analogy argues Waltz, is helpful where one can move from a
domain for which theory is well developed to one where it is not.
justification for incorporating microeconomic theory.

69

This is Waltz s

Microeconomic

theory

describes how an order is spontaneously formed from the self interested acts and
interactions of individual units , and while Waltz knows and understands how
unrealistic it is to talk of economic men and utility maximisers , units

and

markets , he nevertheless maintains that it is useful for theory. 70 Here we have the
first stage epitomised once more, a hypothetical primal state is offered as the basis
for further theory. From this anarchic first base, we are then told that the state s
primary motive is survival (utilitarianism), and we see both of these points in Waltz s
conceptualisation of the market.
For Waltz, a market arises out of the self-interested actions of like units as
stated above, however, the market contains order (which Waltz defines as structure)
and this order is constituted despite the anarchy of the autonomous parts. Indeed,
Waltz argues, Adam Smiths great achievement was to show how self-interested
greed-driven action may produce good social outcomes if only political and social
conditions permit free competition.

71

The market is structural due to the fact that it
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Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. 1979, p. 89.
Again, as in Man, The State and War Waltz encourages us to look away from the evidence which
suggests that the hypothetical is an over simplification.
71
Ibid, p. 90. This is what can only be called an about face in his theoretical development. In Man
The State and War. It is this blind faith which is the very thing he lambastes in his critique of
liberalism arguing that further self interest on the part of the units creates injustice and this is the
very reason for which we have the state. (See page 87-89) Again we have a purely hypothetical
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conditions [actors] calculations whatever their intentions. As with both states and
economic units

(firms) survival is the base motivator72 and in a predatory

environment, now classified as structural, it is imperative to asses and develop ones
capabilities in a rational and utilitarian manner.
Capabilities can be understood as synonymous with power thus bringing us
to our third stage. As Waltz argues, [s]tates may vary widely in size, wealth,
power and form [and] States

are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in

their ability to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function.

73

Capabilities are quantifiable; this is their only distinction from such abstract concepts
as power . Capability is dependent upon material and immaterial resources, such as
arms or knowledge. These resources are the object of state and firm behaviour, and in a
condition of scarcity their acquisition is imperative for survival. However, the threat
of violence and the recurrent use of force are said to distinguish international from
national affairs

74

and it is the threat derived from the structural condition of self-help

and the unpredictability and rampant state of nature which arises upon collusion,
which creates a security dilemma that forces each actor to consider its capabilities
relative to other actors 75 and act accordingly. Otherwise actors run the risk of
dissolution/bankruptcy, hostile takeovers/defeat in war and so on.
Much in the same way as Morgenthau, though with a decidedly different
structural functionalist ontology (see chapter four), Waltz often argues that [t]o say

assumption, which underscores a scientific theory. This paradox will be discussed in the following
chapter.
72
Ibid, pp. 91-92.
73
Ibid, p. 96. Later Neo/Realism seems to shy from such definitive classificatory terms as power or
human nature and has replaced them with the value free terminology adopted by economics, though
the meanings remain the same.
74
Ibid p 102.

49

the structure selects

means simply that those who conform to accepted and

successful practices more often than not rise to the top and are likelier to stay there ...
or Structures encourage certain behaviours and penalize those who do not respond to
the encouragement.

76

Which shows conclusively just how proscriptive and analogous

both theories are. What we now have to discover is whether the incorporation of the
economic analogy and the acceptance of economic causes and effects in any significant
way changes the statist ontology of contemporary N eo/Realism.

N eoliberal Institutionalism. 77

The argument that Robert Keohane s puts forward in his essay Institutional
Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War

78

is that essentially we live in a

state-centric world whose structure is dictated by economic and security concerns.
Keohane s advance upon older theories is to accept and explore the fact that
sovereignty of units is an abstraction and that actors can and do act in a multiplicity of
ways whilst still maintaining their hypothetical atomistic cohesion. However, even for
neoliberal institutionalism , states are still the principal actors in world politics
[and] are rational egoists.
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Ibid, p. 106.
Ibid, p. 92 and I 06.
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Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The contemporary debate. (1993) pp. 270-300. Indeed most of the
essays in this collection in one way or another seem to combine the agendas of the competing
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Keohane s argument is structured around three points of divergence between
the traditional approach taken by Joseph Gireco and the institutionalist approach
championed by himself. First, Keohane argues that Griecio s approach to relative
gains

80

is rendered problematic with the involvement of three or more actors.

Secondly, that these complications can in fact negate any clear-cut gain (power
aggrandisement) in any specific policy decision, and thirdly that this problematisation
of relative gains renders the empirical evaluation of actors considerations of relative
gains more problematic also. This essentially mirrors what Baldwin argues in the
introduction to Neorealism and Neoliberalism. He argues that the principal difference
between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as theoretical discourses are the
degree to which either part views cooperation as possible under conditions of
anarchy. 81
While the arguments are more specific and nuanced, the ontology remains the
same. Regardless of the degree, or even the feasibility of cooperation anarchy prevails
due to the sovereign nature of hierarchically constituted entities, namely states. The
seven stages are reinforced by the very nature of the argument thus taking abstraction
into even deeper analytical territory. As Helen Milner notes, the question then
becomes not one of determining the degree of cooperation but the definition of the
term anarchy . 82 She argues, Anarchy

has been accorded a central role in

international politics, especially in recent theoretical writings.

83

And despite her

argument that anarchy is not the only defining characteristic of international politics,
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Relative gains are those that contribute to the capabilities of other actors.
David A. Baldwin. Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics in Baldwin (ed) 1993, pp. 329.

81

51

anarchy reigns.

84

Despite the problematic nature of relative and/or absolute gains,

and the paucity of accurate empirical evidence to support arguments either in favour
or against established theoretical positions, 85 the ubiquity of anarchy is never
questioned due to the hypothetical and metaphysical theories of the Neo/Realist
writers.
Neoliberal theory seeks to discover those forces that mitigate interstate
anarchy. One of the primary mollifiers is a regime. Ernst Haas 86 argues that regimes
come about in order to manage

the unintended effects of collaborative action in

conditions of anarchy. Life, he argues, is turbulent and this turbulence is confounded
by man87 who in competing for scarce resources must create regimes in order to
mitigate the worst effects of a general Crisis of Mankind .
The crisis is seen as an overall disequilibrium of the world system, which,
[W]hile nature exhibits instances of
is the totality of interacting forces
[dynamic/benign] equilibria, social evolution is almost always more chaotic
Imbalances
disturb the world system s tendency towards dynamic
.
88
eqm·1·b
I num.

Regimes are in this sense principles, norms, rules and decision making
procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given issue area

89

and

their aim is to mitigate the conflict inherent within this Crisis of Mankind . Oran
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Young

90

argues in much the same way as Hass but is slightly less sophisticated. He

argues that regimes come about due to coordination problems
literature on prisoners

dilemmas, collective action problems

typified in the
etc.91 Actors are

conceptualised as autonomous self-interested actors who in seeking to satisfy their
interests precipitate conflict. Regime analysis such as Young s is not state centric and
thus (in this article) regimes cannot be said to precipitate further conflict.
Arthur Stein s conception of regimes is however decidedly state centric and in
his conception of the international system, conflict is rife. 92 The conceptualisation of
regimes developed here is rooted in the classic characterisation of international politics
as relations between sovereign entities dedicated to their own self preservation,
ultimately able to depend only on themselves, and prepared to resort to force.
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Stein s ontology is rational utilitarian and his conception of regimes whilst not
as metaphysical as his conception of the state as a rational actor, however, contrary to
Young s position that regimes are spontaneous results of self interest, Stein argues
that regimes are the product of the very autonomy of states and their self-interests
that lead them to create regimes when confronting dilemmas.
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In this sense it is

argued that states are not as susceptible to the contingency of a non-state centric view
of the world implies. One could deduce that states create regimes much in the same
way as they create anarchy, primarily because it is in their interests to do so.
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Conclusion.
This chapter has sought an exposition of Neo/Realist state centric
theory. Neo/Realist ontology has here been defined as a theory of the essence of the
international system. This essence consists primarily of states and the utilitarian logic
that informs both their creation

and their actions.

What I have sought to

demonstrate is that a statist commitment in IR is essentially a metaphysical one,
constructed as it is around hypothesis, abstraction and arbitrary privileging of
concepts in terms of the real predefined by the intrinsic logic of the seven stages of
Neo/Realism. This circular and totalising logic is particularly restrictive in terms of the
range of possible policy options open to states- men , despite, as it will be seen, the
fact that this view of history and of the world is held as an article of faith rather than
due to scientific validation and support. Neo/Realism defines reality via its own
criteria in order to maintain the illusion that reality is immutable and ahistorical. This
pretence allows for the abrogation of morality in the name of pragmatism even though
pragmatism is based upon metaphysical a priory assumptions with almost no relation

to the reality which it seeks to reflect as we shall see in the proceeding chapters. In a
sense, Neo/Realism is no less utopian than the idealism it sought to replace; the only
factor which marks Neo/Realism out from its predecessor is its success in establishing
its hegemony in the minds of students and the public alike.
In the following chapter I proceed from the uncontroversial proposition that
Neo/Realism is paradigmatic to the study of international relations. It was necessary
to understand the metaphysical aspect of this paradigm before we could come to

54

understand how this paradigm has shaped the scientific evolution of International
Relations as a discourse and its research agendas.
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Chapter 2
The Positive Constitution
Of A
Metaphysical Reality.
Introduction.
Stephano Guzzini argues that Realism is paradigmatic. 95 In fact he argues that
Realism is the only paradigm in International Relations for two reasons. First, Realism
reflects a world view that has become dominant both inside and outside the
discipline of IR. Secondly, the reflexive effect of this paradigm guiding policy
proscription - and in tum shaping the world that it analyses - reinforces the
paradigms scientific validity (in terms of correspondence to reality) and Realisms
resilience as a view of the world.
Guzzini also argues that Realism is the only paradigm in IR because no other
theory of international relations has a world view and can guide policy in the same
way as Realism. Further, the state centrism of Neo/Realist theory, whilst attacked
from all sides, is left unscathed because while the centrism of the state is questioned,
the state is not. This produces two immediate problems. The first is that the state,
forming the centrepiece of most ontologies in IR, is not easily ignored. Secondly,
Neo/Realism s claim to represent reality per se, and the failure of any theory to
question this reality (moreover for all other

theories to also presuppose the

existence of states in all their multifarious forms), leads more to a battle of definition
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than of paradigm formation. In short, the state, whether central to international theory
or not, is never ignored for fear of charges of utopianism.
However, international theory is surprisingly devoid of state theory. Complex
and diversified Great Debates continue in IR without the state coming under any
theoretical and critical scrutiny. This was Guzzini s first point, Realism as a view of
the world has become hegemonic. We will discuss the implications of this hegemony
in the following chapters. For now I would like to discuss a possible explanation for
the hegemony of this view of the world.
Reason argued Carr, could demonstrate the absurdity of the international
anarchy; and with increasing knowledge, enough people would be rationally convinced
of its absurdity and put an end to it.
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In the mean time, it seems most mainstream

IR scholarship has resigned itself to the international system s objective nature.
International anarchy is a fact, it is a reality beyond human control and as such, it
consists of laws and regularities that can bear fruitful theory. To return to Carr, he
argued [e]very political judgement helps to modify the facts on which it is passed.
Political thought is itself a form of political action. Political science is the science not
only of what is, but of what ought to be.
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Unfortunately, subsequent theoreticians

and political scientists in the N eo/Realist camp have sought to ignore this line of
debate within the mainstream, by appeals to objectivity through positive and
naturalistic science. 98
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One of the glaring contradictions within IR theory, which I would like to
demonstrate, is the contradiction between positivism and metaphysics. Moreover, I
hope to make it apparent that within IR epistemology and ontology are mutually
constitutive. In less technical terms, I will argue that positivism in IR entrenches
metaphysics! The reason for the astonishment here, indeed the irony, is that Comte,
in coining the phrase

positivism , sought to move away from theology and

metaphysics and ground epistemology in brute experience and thus constitute a third higher -level of knowledge. 99
The purpose of this chapter therefore is to demonstrate that ontology and
epistemology 100 in International Relations are mutually constitutive. The previous
chapter aimed to show that mainstream state theory in IR rests upon a profoundly
metaphysical conception of t~e state. What I would like to demonstrate here is how
positivism as an epistemology reinforces the misconception that the state is a tangible
and physical entity by treating it as a thing in itself. James Rosenau s statement
epitomises the Neo/Realist (dis)position:
As a focus of study the nation-state is no different from the atom or a single cell
organism. Its patterns of behaviour, idiosyncratic traits, and internal structure are
as amenable to the process of formulating and testing hypotheses as are the
101
characteristics of the electron or the molecule.

I would now like to discuss the common conception of positivism within the
Neo/Realist camp and how it has changed and developed over the years. This will
serve to show how Neo/Realism has sought both to absolve itself of all responsibility
for the way the world is by virtue of a value free positivist social science, and
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constitute its version of reality as the only possible international reality. Secondly, I
would like to discuss some of the leading scientific theories in IR and how they
reinforce not only mainstream ontology, but also the misguided perception that a
value free science is possible at all.
Positivism.

Steve Smith argues quite succinctly, [d]efining common sense 1s
ultimate act of political power.

102

the

Science, more specifically, a positivist

methodology and empiricist -epistemology that forms the mainstream in IR results in a
very restricted range of permissible ontological claims.

103

Positivism s main assumption is that it is possible to have a unified scientific
methodology, namely that it is possible to apply the empirical methodology (i.e.
observation) of the inanimate natural sciences to the sentient social sphere. Smith
defines three variants of this methodology; the first being that championed by
Comte who argued that all sciences would eventually be unified and thus able to
discover all evolutionary causal laws ; the second variant, which originated in the
Vienna Circle, being logical positivism, maintains that that which cannot be directly
experienced does not constitute knowledge. This approach not only maintains that
moral, aesthetic or hypothetical deductions are not scientific, but that only the
strictest empiricist methodologies constitute a science. Such a view Smith argues,
would mean that it was simply not possible to speak of unobservables such as the
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structure of the international system or objective laws of human nature

104

-or the

state for that matter.
For most theoreticians, this would be incompatible with a scientific
investigation of international relations, as most of the phenomena discussed cannot be
observed; only the results of acting upon the basis of abstraction can be seen in
international relations. Consequently it became necessary for IR scholars to adopt a
less dogmatic philosophy of science, and one which uses less stark criteria for what
counts as knowledge.

105

By eschewing these restrictions, mainstream IR theory has in fact positioned
itself in something of a limbo as to what constitutes knowledge. The third variant of
positivism in IR rests upon the idea that if a statement is logical, can be empirically
verified, and is distinct from the facts about which the statement is made -the statement
constitutes scientific knowledge this is a pragmatist position. Its purpose is to
establish a Humean

theory of causation

with which

invariable

temporal

relationships between observed events can be established. 106 In Smiths view these
three points are more than evident in IR theory though manifested differently, if not
unconsciously: 1) Positivism in IR assumes a naturalistic methodology; 2) there are an
objective set of facts out there which exist independent of our attitudes towards
them; 3) there are laws of causation which exist in the social as well as the natural
world which licences both the deductive-nomological [traditional Realism] and the
inductive-statistical [Neorealism] forms of covering law explanation; 4) theory
validification/falsification is based upon the previous three points; i.e. a theory is valid
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if it conforms to the value free facts which manifest themselves independently of the
subject, and theory is valid if it is useful and if it explains causation, and can -by
implication- predict the future. In short, positivism is a methodological position
reliant on an empiricist epistemology which grounds our knowledge of the world in
justification by (ultimately brute) experience and thereby licensing methodology and
ontology in so far as they are empirically warranted

107

i.e. reconceptualise the round

holes (world) only if the same old squares (states) don t fit.
Thus positivism works in two stages; first there 1s an assertion of what
constitutes reality, and in the second stage positivism asserts the empirical method of
analysing reality as dictated by the paradigm. Realist claims to be closer to reality
than their utopianistic counterparts are thus intrinsic to establishing their ontology as
the only real way of viewing the world. Therefore, ontology is assumed and
epistemology is licensed in so far as it validates ontology. 108
What I will now show is how this conceptualisation of science fulfils the dual
purpose of reconstituting Neo/Realism as a science, and its objects as objects and
not as ideas . As a result, claims to realism reinforce the hegemony of statist
ontologies in the minds of practitioners , observers and Carr s public alike (see
introduction).
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The Beginnings Of A Science

109

To begin an economic analogy of my own, I would like to quote Mark Lutz
who argues:
In the decades after Adam Smith his followers aspired to be considered more as
scientists than as mere social philosophers. They sought to logically deduce from
a first principle of self-interested motivation meaningful implications and
consequences applying to society. Such tendency was particularly apparent in the
works of David Ricardo, Jean Baptiste Say, Nassau Senior, James Mill and in
the earlier works of John Stuart Mill. Economists of that time wanted to explain
prices or exchange value , as well as the production and distribution of social
wealth, and to do so by some generalisable, law like behaviour, as in the physical
.
110
sciences.

Under the heading Economics of an Invented World

Lutz argues that

economists fabricated their world in order to simplify reality. He also shows how on
the basis of this fabrication it was possible for economic scientists to appeal to the
policy elite of the (British) state in terms that would appeal to the interests of the
social sector of which they were a part whilst also giving an air of scientific
impartiality. 111 Rajani Kanth, in Against Economics, shows that this was particularly
so with David Ricardo. Rather than being the paradigmatic Ricardo of distribution
concerns, Ricardian theory was guided by the prior dictates of policy The

so-called

Ricardian model endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to tie general ·economic stagnation to
straitened conditions in agricultural production, such that the Com Laws and their
landlord patrons could both be depicted as ruinous to the general interest.
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In International Relations, however, Guzzini argues that Realism is an attempt
to revive and keep nineteenth century diplomatic practice alive. It could be argued that
idealism would have paved the way for Realism s gradual dismissal, constituted as it
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was around theories of global community, collectivism, and (ruinously for it)
appeasement.
Thus Idealism, or Utopianism, was set up as the first of many (positivist)
is/ought dichotom[ies]

113

Jim George argues that this is the halhnark of Neo/Realist

discourse, the construction of a science on the basis of the privileging of fact over
value, is over ought, and object over subject
which can provide disinterested

114

so as to produce a value free science

guidelines for international conduct. Moreover, by

distinguishing reality from utopia N eo/Realists have confused the meaning of the
term utopia in IR. Utopia has come to signify not only no-place in mainstream
discourse but also the intransigence of contemporary reality . In this sense, to refute
utopians is to argue a deterministic conception of progress and history. This is of
course imperative if scientists are to have a bank of objective date from which they
can deduce timeless or ahistorical naturalistic laws. The very idea that reality can be
anything other than it is now is not conducive to Neo/Realist positive theory
construction.
Moreover, in IR, it must be noted that the Kissinger syndrome

is not

illusory. Both Kissinger and Morgenthau both believed that a balance of power thesis
would be more advantageous to United States national interest during the Cold War,
Carr argued that idealism would confound peaceful intent and let everybody know his
views on prevailing wisdom, and Waltz, whilst accepting the Balance of Power thesis,
developed a theory more in tune with the times to explain causation considering the
influence of economic forces in IR and the prevailing structural determinants of the
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cold war. These ideas took a battering with the U.S. in Vietnam and from this event
there was spawned international political economy and institutionalism, which
changed the focus of study to match prevailing international conditions . For
example, there is no talk of a balance of power in later institutional theory due to the
theoretical hegemony of the US, neither is power discussed per se, instead, we see
the rise of gain theory, and structural or institutional constraints acting to negate the
negative effects of anarchy. State centrism is accepted whilst other more prominent
actors are accorded roles in IR more in tune with institutional Neoliberal patronage.
In effect, events out there have influenced -and been influenced by- actors
m here, and whilst the analytical content of Neo/Realism may have changed, its
methodology has not. To argue that actors cannot influence reality in any distinctive
way, as positivism must presuppose, is a highly problematic claim.
Of course, what interests us here is stasis and not change, and the object that
symbolises this stasis most evidently is the state. State centrism assumes that whilst
the international system may vary by degrees, the state remains an objective, though
metaphysical and a largely a priory, fact of international relations.

The Six Principles.
States, Neo/Realists argue, have always been with us. Moreover, Neo/Realists
argue, as we saw in Chapter one, that states constitute an international anarchy out
there and it is this anarchy which Neo/Realism seeks both to understand and to
mollify. Morgenthau s Politics Among Nations is exemplary of the ambition to
understand the balance of power which he believes is present within the anarchic
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system of states, and he begins his privileging of the reality of the international
system in the first page of his monumental work. Arguing that the history of
modem political thought is the story of a contest between two schools that differ
fundamentally in their [world views]

115

Morgenthau privileges Realism over neo-

Kantianism -unconditionally- so as he is able to assert the reality of the international
system as it is . Morgenthau directs us to analyse the way the international system is
by denouncing the way the international system should be as superfluous to
scientific investigation. His paradigmatic Six Principles of Political Realism are
probably the most unequivocal statement in favour of a positivist methodology that
can show us the way the world really is and better inform our problem solving
enterprises implicit in his instrumental and technical rationality. 116
The second stage of positivism is to assert a sharp distinction between object
and subject in the social sciences. The investigator (subject) must be objective, as the
object (subject) exists

impervious to our preferences.

117

In fact, for Morgenthau,

we risk (subjective definitions of) failure if we attempt to transgress these objective
laws. Thus objective laws are subjectively determined and understood, though the
actions of the majority are still the fmal determinant. If no one acted in a Neo/Realist
way, then Neo/Realist laws could not exist.
Of course, Neo/Realists assume that people do act in specific predictable
ways, and this first principle also assumes our second facet of positivism, that for
realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through
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reason.

118

Thus, laws exist, they are verifiable or falsifiable by facts, which exist

independently of our reason , and therefore our ability to influence them, and they
are derived from a first principle of causation defined as self-interest -which is the
second principle of political realism.
By understanding objective laws, and a first principle of causation, we can
understand human action better than the subject itself. Thus our subjective reasoning
about objective facts easily leads to empathy, which blurs this object/subject
dichotomy. Morgenthau asserts that [t]hinking in terms of interest defined as power,
we think as he [the statesman] does, and as disinterested observers we understand his
thoughts and actions perhaps better than he does himself.

119

True to legislative reason (see Bauman above) the object of this endeavour is to
bring systematic order to the political sphere

[and] it provides for rational

discipline in action and creates an outstanding continuity in foreign policy, which
makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational
continuum, and by and large consistent with itself
Weberian

121

120

This reliance upon a first

principle of interest also serves the dual purpose of setting the criteria

for validation of theories deduced from empirical findings , and of defining the utility
of theories in terms of their convergence with the interests of the actors . The
epistemological tension between interpretation and empiricism is further exacerbated
in Morgenthau s fourth principle where he asserts that the tension between interest
and morality (both subjectively interpreted unless one has clear ideas of, and abides

118

Ibid.
Ibid. p. 5.
120
Ibid, emphasis added.
119

66

by, the laws of social existence) must be subverted in the name of rational political
action given Neo/Realist ontology and the choice of empirical facts which inform it.
It soon becomes evident that realist science is built upon itself i.e. it must be

understood on its own terms by reference to itself. The other (morality/idealism) is
referred to only so as to exemplify the superiority of Neo/Realism and to reinforce its
own concrete ontology. The very exclusion of the other, its marginalisation, is
constitutive of N ea/Realism s sovereignty.
These principles could be read as the scientific apology for a power politics
approach to society, which entrenched cold war doctrine up to Morgenthau s
dismissal from the Pentagon in 1965 over his opposition to the Vietnam War. 122
By this time however, Waltz had already written his response to the human
nature thesis in Man The State And War, and defined the international system as
anarchic on the basis of self interest and the state , though he privileged the states
system as the primary cause of conflict. As we saw above, it is impossible to
theoretically isolate the structure

as cause without first isolating its parts as

constitutive. By the time Waltz wrote Theory of International Politics, this fact is
entirely forgotten in his privileging of systemic over reductionist theories of IR.
Waltz s objective in Man, The State and War, was to refute behaviouralist
science that began with the premise that man was the root cause of all war, therefore
to make man good was tantamount to solving the problem of war. In a sense, this too
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1s a neo-Kantian argument and one that Waltz associates (surprisingly) with
Morgenthau and Niebhur, our arch-realists. 123
More surprisingly still is Waltz s rejection of the empirical methodology and
psychological focus of the quantative revolt of the behavioural sciences, which, by
attempting to explain everything by psychology succeeded in explaining nothing.
Instead, Waltz argues that political analysis

124

is preferable to psychologism

and it is to the analysis of history, and of the facts of political life, which he is
referring. More specifically, Waltz assumes a deductive-nomological

model of

analysis derived from Carl Hempel. He begins by proposing a general law such as war
is a condition inherent in international anarchy . It is then argued that both the
structure and content of states (i.e. people and their institutions) are its antecedent
conditions, and that it is possible to deduce from international anarchy, structures and
institutions -not to mention man - the cause of war. 125 Of course this explains very
little, it does however legitimate the status quo, and allows Waltz to reconceptualise
the nature of scientific enquiry in IR. Instead of focusing on the acts of statesmen we
must now focus on the acts of states, their power distributions/capabilities and least
we forget, the alternatives to pursuing a balance-of-power policy is still a matter of
choice, but the alternatives are those of probable suicide on the one hand and the
active playing of the power-politics game on the other.

126

Enter game theory and

the security dilemma, for the cardinal rule of the game is often taken to be: do
whatever you must in order to win it. If some states act on this rule, or are expected to
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act on it, other states must adjust their strategies accordingly.

127

Game theory and

the prisoner dilemma is predicated upon the state being considered as a coherent and
rational totality in its self, which, as this thesis proposes, it most definitely is not.
For Smith, the fourth contributing factor to a positivist methodology is the
assumption that theories must have utility and be empirically valid, and this is
Waltz s hallmark. Game theory, the stag hunt analogy, etc, all serve the purpose of
reinforcing the ontology to which he is committed and the policies which he asserts to
be most practical ·under the ontological circumstances i.e. balance of power politics
conducted by the two super-powers of the day, an eschewing of which would mean
probable suicide.
By the time Waltz came round to writing his exemplar text of positivist
Neo/Realism, Theory of International Politics, the world had seen two oil crises and
the end of the Bretton Woods system. It was now also self-evident that military
strength was not a guarantee that the national interest can be successfully achieved as
the debacle in Vietnam proved . It was also at this time that multiple military coups
managed to install capitalist/corporate/puppet states all over the developing world, for
example in Chile Pinochet replaced Allende, and in Indonesia Suharto replaced
Sukarno, more often than not with U.S. covert aid.
Power under these circumstances was not so easily conceptualised as simply
military strength, nor could a balance of power be determined by the need to survive
alone, as Waltz argues in Theory of International Politics, few states die

128

,

though

their capabilities (a euphemism for power ) can vary over time. These capabilities are
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affected by the interests pursued and/or achieved and the relative gams derived
therefrom.

129

The structure remains the same and it is anarchically constituted by the

interaction of like units constrained by only deep structural causes and the effects
these structures have on different actors.
Waltz comes to these conclusions by drawing the most explicit parallels
between Newtonian physics, economics, and systemic IR theory. As George argues,
Waltz conflates the dichotomy between reductionist and systemic theories in this
work, by forgetting the constitutive nature of the parts, and in creating a structuralist
theory

for International Relations characterized

by the logic and rigour of

deductivist [rather than traditional inductivist] theorising in the natural sciences he
also managed to drop all the undesirables of traditional theorising. These included
reductionist, fact-grubbing empiricism

130

and a Popperian sleight of hand which

reasserts the privileging of the subject over the object in certain instances such as
Morgenthau s second principle in which we are directed to think for the subject. This,
one is led to believe, is not conducive to positive science. Positivist emp1nc1sm,
predicated as it is upon the complete separation between object and subject in
order to substantiate claims to a value free science, lends itself to the reinforcement of
ontology. Charles Jones argues that [fJor empiricists no truth about the world can be
established other than on the basis of experience. Rationalists, on the other hand, take
the view that we may have a priori knowledge of the world. This means, literally,
knowledge before experience; but the sense of before

is not temporal
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Whilst

there is still some confusion over Waltz s position, it is widely believed that he
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occupies a middle ground between rationalism and pragmatism. Pragmatism in this
sense holds that if a community accepts a statement then it holds as a temporary
truth. Waltz s latent positivism in Theory of International Politics concerns his
commitment to a naturalistic philosophy, and the vagueness of this position concerns
his pragmatic licensing of empiricism if it conforms to what he perceives to be
rationally warranted.
Empiricism in IR is not such a contested concept. Apart for the postpositivists , most theorists subscribe to the idea that a fact is a fact, is a fact. One of
the most confusing facts of IR is the status of the state as a fact. It is undoubtedly
a metaphysical concept and it is strange to see that IR theorists and non-theorists ,
most of who employ positivist methodologies in what was an attempt to transcend
metaphysics, seem to be reinforcing the ubiquity of metaphysics via the very methods
which sought to eradicate it.
Positivists within IR thus state their ontologies dogmatically; to challenge the
dogma is to brand oneself utopian. Secondly, positivists in IR gather facts informed
by the dominant ontology or paradigm (predominantly statist), which reinforces the
ubiquity of metaphysics! Thus, Neo/Realists have come to see the structure of the
international system as dictating the range of the possible in international relations by
demanding our complete attention and subsequently constraining it. Though structural
theory allows for change at the systemic level. The state centrism of Neo/Realism is
reinforced by the concept that states do not die and that they therefore are still of
primary importance, thus the constitutive elements of the structure are still to be our
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primary focus of analysis even though Waltz directs us not to reduce structure to its
constitutive parts. State structures constitute the epitome of macro structures and
thus the international anarchy and the balance of power thesis, which must result from
this reality, is preordained. Thus Smiths third defining element of the positivist
methodology is fulfilled; causation is restricted within the parameters of structural
ontology.
The utility of this theory cannot be underestimated. It allows for the inclusion
of other actors though it still relies upon a crude empiricism to validate its central
tenets. This empiricism, tied as it is to a standard Neo/Realist ontology will always
produce the same results, i.e. nothing of great value, as shall be discussed in the next
chapter.
Carr s scientific structuring of Realism is far more sophisticated. Actually, it
becomes rather hard to untie his constant admonitions to pay heed to the dialectic of
thought and the mutual dependence of concepts upon their antithesis , though his
position does shine through. While Waltz and Morgenthau are reticent to admit the
limitations of their arguments, Carr actually celebrates these limitations as constitutive
of progress in a truly Hegelian manner. He does not however, refrain from asserting
that

reality

must be discovered

before any is/ought, power/morality (etc.)

dichotomy can be resolved.
Carr s historical self-consciousness is the defining factor that sets him aside
from his American counterparts and the positivist epistemology, which was to
become entrenched within North American IR. 132 Statements such as Purpose is
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a

condition of thought and There can be no reality outside the historical process

133

display the extent of this awareness. It thus becomes problematic to pigeon hole
Carr s methodology as a Neo/Realist caricature. 134 He is however, the master of the
dichotomy and always privileges the is of international relations over the ought and
in this way Carr shifts from
an original position, emphasising the complex dialectic of subject and object, to
a power politics Realism that insisted on the factual independence of some
inexorably linked aspects of existence over others [ ] The
point
is that one
does not need to reject Carr s critique of the neo-Kantians to recognise the
paradoxical and inadequate nature of his own position, with its equally one-sided
positivist determinism, which acknowledges a sphere of reality out there
independent of the function of thinking, which the observing subject is powerless
135
to influence or alter.
Much more than enforce a particular methodology,
indeed his methodology was largely ignored. 136

And Carr thus constitutes his policy proscription in terms of this is reality so
do as you ought given this reality , which served to close down thinking space as
George argues, and dissolve the idealistic aspirations of future students of IR.
Neo/Realist ontology/reality was constituted by Carr, developed and tied to
inductivist roots which proved

its validity by Morgenthau, divorced from its

historical roots and objectified by early Waltz, and then consecrated as a modernist
liberal utopia by the neo-Realists of the post-Theory of International Politics era by
virtue of removing all links to the real world via a naturalistic scientific procedure.

Conclusion.
Neo/Realism has many ontologies, which are mutually constituted via a
positivist epistemology. Of primary importance for this chapter and the last, is the
way in which positivism interacts with a statist ontological commitment to construct
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a closed teleology. What this means is that Neo/Realism has used a naturalistic
conception of scientific endeavour to reinforce the ubiquity and intransigence of a
state centric world view. Paradoxically, state centrism relies upon metaphysical
assumptions concerning reality as we saw in the previous chapter, and positivism,
an epistemology largely reliant upon experience and fact, demands concrete
foundations derived from real life observational experience which metaphysics
simply cannot provide. Ironically, this is exactly what Neo/Realism demands, that
positivism prove a statist ontology to be foundational via observation , thus
rendering N eo/Realism utopianistic in the sense that this is a contradiction in terms.
The N eo/Realist paradigm is therefore philosophically fundamentally flawed,
(the myriad details of this proposition will be discussed further in chapters four and
five) it has, however, dictated the direction of empirical research over the last fifty
years since the publication of Morgenthau s Politics Among Nations. What the
following chapter will demonstrate is that the anomalies, which have been discussed
thus far, render it glaringly obvious that empirical research cannot either prove or
disprove metaphysics. How then do we account for the tenacity of the Neo/Realist
paradigm?
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Chapter 3
A Critique of the
Power of Power Politics .
Introduction.
John Vasquez
Morgenthau has not

argument is that realism, specifically the work of Hans J
been successful in passing [empirical] tests and concludes that

this [empirical] evidence along with well-known conceptual flaws indicates that the
realist paradigm is a fundamentally flawed and empirically inaccurate view of the
world.

137

The falsificationist epistemology which Vasquez uses to test the core

Realist propositions is explicitly empirical, it is therefore extremely pertinent to this
discussion. Moreover, by demonstrating the Realist paradigm to be flawed, Vasquez
argument may support my own, which is to say that the Neo/Realist conception of
the state is largely metaphysical and that positivism and/or an empiricist
epistemology would obviously find a metaphysical commitment very difficult to
either prove or falsify. However, I aimed to demonstrate in the previous chapter
that positivism aids in the establishment of the state as an objective fact by branding
theories that do not take the Neo/Realist conception of the state and its logic into
account as utopian.
What we will see in this chapter is that Vasquez does not see the metaphysical
quality of the state and it thus allows him to hold a state centric view of the world.
What we will also see however is that Vasquez is subsequently unable to explain the
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tenacity of power politics in anything but empirical terms, which essentially explains
nothing. Vasquez shows without a doubt, that Neo/Realist statist and largely
metaphysical ontology and the scientific method ubiquitous to the discipline, are
flawed in both what they aim to prove (the existence of international anarchy) and in
the manner in which they do it (naturalistically). For it seems that this fundamentally
flawed paradigm still commands the field of scholarly enquiry despite its conceptual,
analytical, empirical and ontological problems. It is this anomaly that this chapter
seeks to explain.
I will thus Vasquez work in two ways. First, I would like to demonstrate how
metaphysical assumptions about the world couldn t provide a true picture and this
is proven (secondly) by the very methods that realism employs to sustain this
ontology. The postmodern critique will involve a discussion of how it has managed to
sustain this obtuse paradox for so long. The central contention here is that the
positivist/empiricist methodology severs the very real history of the present by
uncritically reinforcing. the presents ubiquity and intransigence via an uncritical
objective scientific methodology. In short, reified metaphysics are not conducive to
testing via falsificationist procedures.
Finally, I would like to discuss Vasquez conception of the postmodern agenda
and how his view of both the methodology and the purpose of what he calls an
attitude

is itself fundamentally flawed. In effect he elucidates only the

epistemological role of postmodernism in order to falsify it. I will also take a
Foucauldian position in an attempt to explain the resilience of the Neo/Realist
paradigm. What I would also like to demonstrate is that it is the construction and the
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maintenance of technologies of power/knowledge embodied within the discourse of
Neo/Realism, which is the power of power politics.

Texts.
Traditionally, it is argued, the positivist approach to international relations is
no more problematic than to accept that in the common or garden, not the
postmodern definition of text-

texts consist of words.

138

And this is the Achilles

Heel of the empirical critique, for Vasquez analyses texts as unproblematic pages full
of value free objective facts gleaned from the world out there and as such, for him, if
these pages do not validate a theory, indeed if the realist thesis is falsified by the
evidence provided by the empirical research agendas spawned by the realist
paradigm itself, then the theories -not the facts - are false. Indeed, the assumption
that there is no subjective link between facts and theories is the primary assumption
of the scientific enterprise. 139
First, therefore I shall examine if indeed there is a correlation between the
assumptions that Vasquez presents

as paradigm defining, and the statist

theory/ontology that I discussed in the first chapter. It is important to establish that
both Vasquez and I are discussing the same reality . Secondly, once it has been
shown that there is a correlation between the scientific and the deconstructive view of
the world, and that Vasquez empiricism can be applied to the deconstruction offered
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in the first chapter- we must discover whether Vasquez critique, the points he makes,
and the results he offers, will in any way end the proliferation of realist-inspired work
and thus enable the development of another paradigm/ontology. The point here is to
show how a flawed ontology is not going to produce facts that correspond to, or
validate, an assumed and largely metaphysical reality.
The problem my analysis poses is whether the positivist pursuit is a good
method of theory construction and evaluation. Alternatively, is it true that as theories
create facts it is valid to assume that facts will always be found to support theories
and that such a tautology is not conducive to science? 140
Vasquez uses Masterman s three-point definition of a paradigm and the
questions that it seeks to answer.
A) What are the fundamental units of which the world is composed?
B) How do these units interact with each other?
C) What conception of the world should be employed to answer these
questions?

To which, Morgenthau, as the exemplar paradigmatic realist m Vasquez
analysis, answers:
1) Nation-states or their decision makers are the most important actors for
understanding international relations.
2) There is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international
politics.
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3) International relations are the struggle for power and peace. Understanding
how and why that struggle occurs and suggesting ways for regulating it is
the normative purpose of the discipline. All research that is not at least
indirectly related to this purpose is trivial. Further Morgenthau argues,
4) Politics consists of a struggle for power.
5) In [present day] international politics

only nations wield significant

power.
6) Therefore, in international politics, during the modem state system, only
nations are actors. 141 However, the realist agenda bloomed with the arrival
of Waltz s Theory of International Politics, which subsequently added
three extra points to the realist paradigm. They were:
7) Anarchy is given a pre-eminent role in the realist paradigm given the
unmoving structure of international relations,
8) The Balance of Power becomes a law of international relations that
theory must explain,
9) The number of actors in the system is now a critical factor, importance
also being attributed to non-state actors, though not equitably. 142

The way in which Vasquez short synopsis of realism reflects the analytical
approach ( seven stages ) outlined in chapter one is most obviously represented in
points number 1), 3), 4), 5) and 7), with the possible inclusion of an empirical
statement concerning the ongm

of the quest for power (i.e. human nature)

somewhere between points 4) and 5), or, 4) and 7) 143 to account for the behavioural
oriented science of the decades leading up to the war in Vietnam.
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Thus my seven stages are represented by
1) Structure is anarchy (state of nature)
2) Human nature as cause, included by me though excluded by
Vasquez, is not a philosophical issue but an empirical one
concerning the cause ofwar 144,
3) Power is the central focus of IR research, as cause, effect and object
of analysis.
4) The sovereign state is the primary unit of analysis.
5) By implication, sovereignty or nation states as coherent unified and
autonomous actors, constitute the international arena,
6) The above produces anarchy/structure, which is either
7) A state of nature, a society of states, etc. etc. though unequivocally
a domain in which war can occur as because there is no body that
can effectively prohibit it. 145
First, Vasquez bases the scientific method along broadly Popperian
falsificationist lines and applies this to the concept of the paradigm that he develops
from Kuhn. 146 He argues that the paradigm to be falsified is mainly a realist paradigm
as it dominates the intellectual field of IR both in its assertions and by the number of
nonrealist writers that take issue with it. Thus realism is paradigmatic due to the fact
that it asserts its dominance by claims to represent reality , its endurance, and in the
way it acts as a sounding board for counter arguments.
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He argues that in the field of IR there is a basic consensus concerning the
method, objects and objectives of analysis and that despite the proliferation of
var10us approaches and conceptual frameworks that have become popular in the
field there remains only one paradigm due to the fact that pnor to the Marxist
paradigm in IR, none of the core realist assumptions (numbers 1), 2) and 3) above)
were challenged. 147 Further, Vasquez argues that the Marxist paradigm was rejected
not for its scientific input but for largely political reasons. 148 Further, Vasquez draws
our attention to a quite disturbing finding in IRliterature, he argues quite convincingly,
that mainstream IR literature is based upon cumulative knowledge

which, rather

than being progressive in the sense that scholars abandon falsified assumptions prior
to developing future arguments, is degenerative in the sense that [e]ach [scholar] just
kept writing until people stopped reading , a change to approach was/is favourable to
a challenge to the core assumptions. Often Vasquez argues,

the policy relevance of

an explanation seemed to be a more important criterion for its acceptance than its
accuracy.

149

As such realism is prone to dogma and ideology, which Vasquez argues,

was not even dispelled by the quantative revolt of the behaviouralists during the
. . who arme
. d to move beyond conJec
. ture
SIX.ties
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.

Vasquez research shows that of 7,827 hypotheses (of which an average
93.7% of the tested hypotheses were oriented by realist assumptions), 93.l % of
realist hypotheses were falsified while only 83% of the remaining nonrealist (7 .1 % of
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Ibid, p. 71. Vasquez concludes from a review of the literature that the Marxist challenge was
viewed to be outside of the main debate and thus not deemed central to the mainstream concerns
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research paradigm in Chapter 11 as part of the additional six chapters to the original text, which was
published in 1983.

81

total hypotheses) hypotheses were falsified. The central Realist hypothesis, which
for Vasquez is paradigm defining, is hypothesis 5a. which states that Realist
hypotheses that relate national power or inter-nation alliances with inter-nation
conflict-cooperation should fail to be falsified more frequently than all other
hypotheses - noncentral realist or nonrealist. 151
Overall, however, nonrealist hypotheses faired dramatically better in failing to
be falsified and were proven to be more accurate, more central to IR debate and indeed,
were -irfrequency- better able to predict behaviour in international relations thus
making them more scientific and less trivial. 152
Vasquez concludes that the realist paradigm has

not produced much

knowledge and both the pursuit of knowledge and its paucity should be the central
concern of any science. Furthermore, he asks, if the view of the world presented by
the realist paradigm is correct or useful as a guide to understanding, why have so many
hypotheses guided by this view been falsified? If the realist paradigm is correct, why
have hypotheses that have rejected it been falsified proportionately less often?

If

the view of the realist paradigm is correct, why has the realist paradigm produced only
48 scientifically important findings out of 7,158 realist hypotheses that were tested
from 1956 to 1970?

153

Primarily, the research conducted across the field indicates that the primary
assumptions of realism (and by implication Neorealism) are false. The idea that
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states are rational and unitary actors is seriously questioned by the psychological
revelation that,
individuals and groups generally do not make decisions in a rational manner,
because they process information not on the basis of logical rules but on the basis
of a set of psychological principles which do not necessarily correspond with
logical reasoning (see Jervis 1976; Janis and Mann 1977)
Especially during
crisis situations, overreliance on images and analogies to what worked in the past
plays an important role in decision-making. 154

Thus the idea that states can be rational actors independent of the personal
wishes of individuals, and that these wishes are value free and rational is seriously
questioned. If states cannot be deemed rational and unitary, indeed if it is people
which comprise them that are not rational, why speak of states as undoubtedly
problematic analytical entities at all?
Anomalies in the field of IR pose a problem in Vasquez view. He argues that
to discover the cause of such anomalies would require further empirical testing of
established realist assumptions, despite the fact that empiricism cannot produce
theories which can challenge the dominance of the realist paradigm, as he argues at the
beginning of chapter four, and, indeed, as both Waltz and Carr argue in their works.
Thus it would be pertinent to ask whether it is practical to continue empirical testing
of any theory while the same statist ontology is being utilised to construct an image of
the world. For example, Vasquez argues,
any alternative paradigm will need at minimum a typology of wars that can
adequately distinguish wars that result from misperception from those that do
not, and a theory that can explain why each type is different and the conditions
under which each is likely to occur Any successful competitor of the realist
paradigm_ must fill_ thaf5~ap and develop a theory of war broader than the [realist]
one on m1spercept1on.

154 Ibid, pp. 156-157.
155 Ibid, p. 165.
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Research also shows that balance of power politics in fact leads to war,
alliances are the precursor to conflict and that the more powerful states are, the more
involved they become in wars.

156

This poses serious anomalies for the realist

paradigm as Vasquez repeatedly shows. Realists also argue that rational action whilst
it causes security dilemmas can also produces balances. These are the hypotheses that
the evidence falsifies.
Waltz and the neorealists do in some sense change this lillage or view of the
world. They redefine its nature as

structural

and following central realist

propositions claim that war occurs because there is nothing to prevent it However,
Vasquez shows that in times where major states have made a concerted effort to
manage their rivalries war has not occurred between them. 157 Vasquez also seems to
endorse the positions taken by the poststructuralists Alexander Wendt and Richard
Ashley that structure, rather than being given, is actually socially (or historically)
constructed.

158

Secondly, Vasquez argues that to focus upon anarchy and structure is

to ignore more important structures of cooperation and interdependence, and the
structure shaping qualities of the capitalist system. Neither are the analytical tools of
the prisoners/security dilemma etc. empirically warranted in aiding policy formation
as most states, in fact, have fewer than three interstate wars in the post-Napoleonic
era
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and further to this, the theory of predation central to the Hobbsean thesis of
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constant war between rational self interested actors seems to be prone only to major
states and can be avoided, quite simply, by not playing the power politics game.

160

The democratic peace theory also poses as an anomaly for the Neo/Realist
science in that if democracies do not fight each other then they should be immune from
the security dilemma of structural realism. Further, and this is also characteristic of a
degenerating research programme, if structure does not exist and war is not a
permanent threat then why do Neo/Realists insist upon maintaining the assumptions
which underpin their entire world view?
As the evidence suggests, none of the core Neo/Realist assumptions are correct
simply because one can be logically deduced from the other. Anarchy cannot be
presupposed simply because of a core assumption concerning a first principle of selfinterest etc. In fact international life is far more complicated and the evidence is
inconclusive as to just how complicated it actually is. In conclusion, Vasquez argues
that the
paradigm s conception of the international system as anarchic has hidden two of
the real fundamentals of the system that have profoundly shaped its order and
nature; namely, that it has been an international capitalist system and that it' has
an international legal system constructed around the rule of state sovereignty.
Focusing on the anarchy of the system has hidden these other structural
161
characteristics that are probably more important.
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Ibid, p. 210. power politics is an image of the world that encourages behaviour that helps bring
about war [thus] the attempt to balance power is itself part of the very behaviour that leads to war
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alliances between major powers. The only precondition for the erosion of an alliance is enmity that
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It demonstrates how useless Neo/Realist ontology actually is.
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The Promise of Post-modernism.

One thing, which Vasquez does not explain fully, is why power politics is so
powerful. Whilst an explanation of The Power of Power Politics is the central concern
of the book there is no adequate theory as to why Neo/Realism is so resilient bar the
degenerating research programme argument and how theorists tend to shift goal
posts which was discussed very briefly above. While Vasquez does note that the
realist paradigm does command a vast amount of financial resources directed at further
research into the core realist tenets, · and that alternative research strategies are
proportionately less financed, 162 this is only a partial -though insightful- explanation
for the resilience ofNeo/Realism.
However, his definition of paradigm allows some room for explanation,
though not necessarily in the direction favoured by Vasquez. For Vasquez, the power
of Neo/Realism will only ever be eroded once the anomalies discovered by and within
the research agendas can be accounted for by an alternative paradigm. Thus, to explain
power politics one need only discuss the grip a certain view of the world has upon
practitioners, how it has become hegemonic and why.
The most constructive element of postmodern intrusions into IR (which
Vasquez argues may be abandoned in favour of a more critically reasoned poststructuralism before it has gotten much of a foothold.

163

)

is the revelation, that if

modernity is indeed arbitrary 164 and what poses as the only truth is in fact one choice
amongst many, then what exists must have been socially constructed by people who

162
163
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consciously or unconsciously chose to act in the way that they did. Indeed, Vasquez
concedes, All data are theory laden. Any good social scientist would agree with this,
but the word independent

[facts] means different things to each side of the

situation. For the post-positivist critic, it seems to mean that any data set will always
be biased in favour of the theory that informed its collection. The implication here is
that datasets will always produce confirmation rather than falsification of an
explanation or theory.

165

Of course, it seems Vasquez misunderstands his own argument when he in fact
points out that the more common scientific discovery in IR is the null finding . What
must be pointed out is that theory is value laden also; therefore it conditions not only
facts as discovered but also their gathering and interpretation. Would not a null
theory produce null findings? Neo/Realism consistently validates itself by its own
criteria with reference to its own metaphysical and statist ontology. The reason, it
endures despite empirical inaccuracy has nothing to do with the facts as stated, but
everything to do with the idea that if reality is a social construction, any theory which
purports to represent this reality with the greatest following of believers is bound to
become hegemonic regardless of empirical accuracy. This is the core idea behind the
concept of the paradigm and it as the previous chapter shows, Waltz consistently
directs student to pay heed to the most productive mode of theorising about the
world as other methods are prone to penalising their adherents. 166 Empirically
Vasquez argues, we know enough about the world to conclude that not every

164 This is in itself a debateable position; Foucault s study of the Panoptican seems to demonstrate that
modernity is anything but arbitrary. Where Vasquez is correct however is to show how something else
could equally well have occurred. Vasquez 1995, p. 216.
165
Ibid, pp. 226-227.
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imaginative narrative can be imposed on the world The

word reality

refers to this

resistance of the world to conform to every imaginable conception humans think
up.

167

v asquez s

. pomt
. however 1s. to show that the world does conform to
mam

conceptions and blatantly so with Neo/Realism. What is a paradigm if it is not an
imaginative narrative as was discussed in the first chapter, indeed it seems this line of
argument goes much deeper, as overreliance on images and analogies to what worked
in the past plays an important role in decision making

168

as Vasquez shows, and

rational unitary states are complicated by the irrationality of the individuals which
constitute these very human constructions. Therefore, for Vasquez to argue the idea
that if reality is socially constructed and, consequently, every theory is therefore
socially constructed -including the theory that reality is a social construction- and
because choice poses as truth (for postmodernists) neither statement can be truewhilst an attack on relativism, is nonetheless a meaningless play on words considering
his own scientific concerns; namely the refutation of the realist paradigm.
Vasquez cannot accept the theory that would expose the value-laden nature of
his own philosophical position, namely linguistic postmodernism. For example,
Vasquez states that it is the differences between accuracy and error, reality and
fiction, truth and falsity are in fact constructed by concepts

169

,

Vasquez cannot relate

postmodernist philosophy to his own positivist position. In his attempt to falsify
postmodernism he had to set it up in opposition to science and privilege (falsify) one
over the other. What I would like to show how is how postmodernism deliberately

166

Waltz. 1979, p. 92 and 106.
Vasquez, 1998. p. 225.
168
Ibid, pp. 156-157.
169
Vasquez, 1995, p. 226
167

88

avoids such dichotomies by refusing to take a position per se and by maintaining that
everything is questionable. 170

Foucault and Power.

Vasquez isolates Foucault as the ephemeral constructivist

171

though it is

more than evident that the subtleties and sophistications of Foucault s argument are
lost on Vasquez. What I would like to attempt here is fill the holes in Vasquez
argument by reference to the Foucauldian concept of power and how it relates to the
concept of paradigm and reality, not to mention scientific objectivity. What I would
also like to show is that there is more to postmodern philosophy than the question
of relativism

172

in IR, though this will explained in chapter four and five. Essentially,

I would like to explain the power of power politics in non-empirical terms.
Foucault argues, we cannot exercise power except through the production of
truth and this is done through the production, accumulation, circulation and the
functioning of a discourse

173

which is, in this case, International Relations and the

dominant realist paradigm. Here, as Guzzini shows, Kuhn s description of the
function of a paradigm seems to fit rather well the development of realism and of its
discipline

in that it began as an academic pursuit; changed by the material

conditions of the post war periods, it became taken over by the Kissingersyndrome with its mutual ties between university and the hegemonic power status of

170
The role of relativism in postmodern theory is predominantly misunderstood. From my readings, I
have been led to believe that relativism acts to erode the dogmatic sovereignty of the hegemonic
discourse the nihilism which is commonly associated with relativism only assumes negative
e~ologies once it is compared with the illusory foundationalism of objectivism.
17 By constructivist Vasquez refers to those theorists who assume reality to be a social construction.
Ibid, p. 218.
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the United States. Realism functioned as a paradigm in setting the boundaries of
legitimate research.

174

Notice here how Guzzini highlights the term legitimate . This is the core of
the Foucaultian argument. How is it that realism has such a monopoly on truth? Its
textual history and the link between theory and practice constitute the discipline,
N eo/Realism s statist ontology and the disciplinary world view or paradigm itself.
Foucault terms the classical scientific endeavour the will to truth

175

,

it 1s

essentially a naturalistic pursuit of ultimate enlightenment, whose source is the
objective world, which is, paradoxically, never discussed but always assumed. 176 The
established truth is manifested within the legislative right of the practitioners of a
discourse to claim a sovereignty of right, or a monopoly of truth conferred upon them
via an acceptance of their legislative reason. Here, right and truth cannot be separated.
Both are functionaries of power, essentially there can be no discursive power without
its monopoly of truth; this truth is in turn, latent power.

Moreover, power is

linguistic and not material.
However, as rights and right , in the West, are also legal concepts, truth
being its detennining factor and right having the power to confer death upon a
subject, right becomes less a law, than the whole complex apparatuses, institutions
and regularities responsible for their application.

177

Right and truth thus have

traditional and violent power in society. In this sense, power is visually apparent to
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the social scientist as a coercive effect. Therefore discourses are no longer passive
intermediaries between theory and practice, they permeate life and knowledgeable
practices.
Philip Barker 178 isolates six points within Foucault s theorising, which
establishes power not as a coercive force but as an idea.
First, for Foucault -Barker argues- there is no realm outside of power. It is
not an object and it is impossible not to become subjected to it. In this sense,
Individuals are the vehicles of power not its points of application.

179

Essentially,

there is nowhere within its intricate network where freedom exists nor, contrary to
most modernist, emancipatory philosophy, is there some primal liberty to which we
can aim. 180 Power is a positive thing and as such, is the best distributed thing in the
world.

181

Power, m this sense, pervades all our personal relationships. It is the
knowledge we hold of ourselves, and our relations with one another. This, the second
facet to power shows how the simplest social etiquette is a dictate of power; manners,
politeness etc., because they vary in degree over time it is possible to see just how
technologies of power have manifested themselves in society at any one time and the
processes and procedures which demanded their existence. For example the
communist witch hunts in 1950 s America is reflective of the power of Marxist
philosophy and the very real violent effects of this dichotomy between capitalism and
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communism were manifested and made intelligible by reference to the state , right and
wrong, and other such logocentric dichotomies.
However, power relationships are not necessarily repressive or coercive, they
can also be determined as productive

and indeed multiple in their form . As it is

resistance which produces moments of power, there can be no change without
hegemony, thus power becomes free of its negative connotations, that are the bane of
the realist discourse as now power no longer deals with coercion and force, neither
does it have utility or a materially quantifiable element. Power/knowledge resides
within discourses and paradigms; it is an accepted conditioning and directing of
thought. As Foucault explains,
power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the privilege of a dominant
class, which exercises it actively upon a passive, dominated class. It is rather
exercised through and by the dominated. Indeed, it is perhaps unhelpful to think
in terms of classes in this way, for power is not unitary and its exercise binary.
Power in that sense does not exist: what exists is an infinitely complex network
of micro-powers , of power relations that permeate every aspect of social life. For
that reason, power cannot be overthrown and acquired once and for all by the
destruction of institutions and the seizure of the state apparatus. Because power
is multiple and ubiquitous, the struggle against it must be localised. Equally,
however, because it is a network and not a collection of isolated points, each
182
localized struggle induces effects upon the entire network.

Because, with Foucault, there is no distinction between the dominator and
the dominated, both are subject to forms and manifestations of the power
relationship, power is, [i]n this sense
effects.

183

local in its application but global in its

The power strategy can thus be utilised, it becomes a relationship with

implications, in the sense that, and depending upon the context, it establishes itself
and precipitates imitation or habit, without conscious reflection. It is most evident in
the Kissinger Syndrome .
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But the final facet of power, which Barker distinguishes, is that there can be no
power without resistance. Conciliatory acts or those of accession cannot produce
power/knowledge. Consequently, this renders the traditional view of power as an
ability by B to persuade A to do something he/she would not otherwise do, as
secondary to the underlying knowledge structures. The psychological relation which
Morgenthau discusses, is in fact the power relation. Once the individual decides to
submit, there is no power. Coercion has ramifications or global effects, but
essentially an ability to coerce does not constitute power. In fact Neo/Realism is a
classic example of discursive power.
International Relations theory is derived from a very distinct set of classical
texts. The role these texts played at the time they were written cannot be
underestimated; excluding the ambiguous readings of classical writers such as
Machiavelli and Thucydides, Carr wrote to re-establish the ubiquity of power politics
in an era that demanded its input, equally so with Kissinger, Morgenthau and Keohane
who wrote to legitimise the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGO s) and
regimes of the modem day in our calculations of international politics.
None of these texts can be taken out of their historical context. As this thesis
1s attempting to demonstrate, universal theories are predominantly contextual.
However, each one of the above texts has assumed a discursive legitimacy that cannot
be divorced from the power relations that they served. Each work was an act of
political rebellion against the established order/disorder of the times from which they
arose. By assuming a scientific quest for truth, these texts allowed for the possibility
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of a universal truth whilst denying it in practice. This is a clever act of rebellion
against the established hegemony of a world view by whatever name.
The act of power with which Realism established what was to constitute truth
in IR was first done through commentary. 184

The commentary is formulated by

building upon primary texts such as those of Waltz, Morgenthau and Carr, which then
become the focus of discussion. By selecting the type and form of these texts within a
discourse, there is a clear act of exclusion of the others that do not conform to the
perceived scientific goal, or to the reality as dictated by theorists of that time.
Subsequently, once these primary texts have been established, there is a proliferation
of secondary commentary, which cannot be clearly distinguished from their
precursors. As Sheridan notes, it is about homogeneity

and agreement, mutual

support within the field at the expense of valuable criticism that does not necessarily
conform to the assumptions (truths) of the dominant paradigm, as we saw with
Vasquez above.
For Guzzini and Vasquez to refer to Neo/Realist discourse as paradigmatic is
completely legitimate, and to refer to the other theories in IR more as conceptual
frameworks

shows the power of power politics.185

The

endless froth of

commentary is worked up from within by the dream of masked repetition: on its
horizon, there is nothing else, perhaps, but what was at its point of departure, mere
recitation.

186

This rather bizarre way of describing the evolution of Neo/Realism is
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pertinent due to the degenerating nature of the realist research programme as discussed
by Vasquez above.
The second principle of exclusivity within a discipline derives from what
Foucault calls the principle of the author . Not the individual, to whom the text can
be attributed, but the unifying principle or the paradigm, which underpins the
discourse. In this case I have tried to argue that it is the seven stages of Neo/Realism
that constitute the underlying unifying principle. Of course, in IR, explicitly or not,
the unifying principle is the sovereign state. By deriving its monopoly on reality
from both its acceptance of and its bolstering of state institutions and theory, not to
mention externality

or other

which is reinforced by the discipline of IR,

Neo/Realism can claim a hegemony of truth. There can be no originality of authorship
within as the discipline is closed to futher interpretation; sovereignty also signifies
the boundaries of the discourse.
As IR is such a young discipline in its present guise, the dominance of one
theory or paradigm at the expense of all others is to be expected. The realist paradigm
has set the parameters for researchable topics, for choosing between them and then
simply excluding all others due to its internal logic or paradigmatic approach. The
dominant discourse thus becomes self-perpetuating and, as outlined above, all
powerful . But, [s]ince paradigms constitute the basic tool of research in normal
science, normal science in turn cannot correct the paradigm

Hence, a new paradigm

can only be born of a radical new world-view, that is, by the abandonment of the old
paradigm.

187
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The second facet of the paradigm is its strong connections with historical
context or, its relationship with the real world.

As Kuhn noted, A paradigm

governs, in the first instance, not a subject matter, but a group of practitioners. Any
study of paradigm directed or paradigm shattering research must begin by locating the
responsible group or groups

188

which I attempted to do in the first chapter of this

thesis.
For John Vasquez, the post-positivist

debate (or post modernism) must be

kept separate from the inter paradigm debate within IR, despite the fact that in his
opinion only one paradigm exists, because it is very unclear how, if at all, the post
positivist debate will favour or advantage one international relations paradigm over the
other

189

Of course, Vasquez has argued that there is only one paradigm in IR as the

core concepts employed by researchers in IR remain the same. Postmodernism seeks
not to add empirical evidence to one theory or another, but to demonstrate how and
why one paradigm has become dominant over time and what deconstructive practices
can reveal to us about our presumed reality as dictated by dominant paradigms. This
is the line that I will adopt in chapter five and six.

Conclusion.
In deconstructing the statist ontology and world view of Neo/Realism and its
scientific methodology in the first and second chapters I aimed to draw attention to its
value laden nature to demonstrate its lack of scientific impartiality. I also tried to
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demonstrate how reality is not quite as simplistic as mainstream theorists would
have us believe by reference to metaphysical constructions and arguments to justify a
power politics paradigm. This chapter has sought to show how the empiricist
epistemology has falsified the Neo/Realist world view and has shown that
metaphysics cannot be true reflections of reality, as empirical data cannot support
these assertions. Moreover, this would imply that if Neo/Realism were to remain as
the paradigm in International Relations, it would have to adopt a different scientific

methodology, possibly one more akin to theology.
The contradiction between positivism and metaphysics, which I discussed in
chapter two, is thus seen to be a major anomaly in IR. Positivism is constitutive of
an objective position towards the international states system and of the state itself by
dogmatically asserting its metaphysical qualities to be objective and conducive to
empirical analysis. However, empirical data cannot explain Neo/Realism s resilience
though it does demonstrate that metaphysics cannot produce empirically accurate and
non-falsifiable evidence.
To explain the resilience of power politics it was necessary to develop a
theoretical critique. A discussion of Foucault s theories of power as applied to texts
and discursive practices proposed an alternative, and I believe more plausible,
explanation for Neo/Realism s monopoly of truth claims in IR. What this discussion
shows is that repetition and praxis rather than truth

underpin the resilience of

Neo/Realism. We exist in a world of anarchic states because we believe and act as
though we do, and for no other reason. The problem with a state centric theory,
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however implicit, is that it demands understanding on its own terms, it demands that
we come to the same logical conclusions as power politicians because we are dealing
with the same state centric realities , with the same range of plausible truth claims, all
of which are dependent upon N ea/Realism s own internal and limiting logic. This logic
is in tum tied to the project of modernity and its quest for emancipation and
enlightenment, not to mention release from the bondage of ideology and superstition.
The following chapter will develop these themes further by demonstrating the
position ofNeo/Realist discourse within the broader discourse of modernity.
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Chapter 4.
Opening Up Some Thinking Space .
Introduction.
In chapters one and two I sought to provide a discussion of the world-view of
the N eo/Realist school of international Relations. Metaphorically speaking, one could
argue that this world-view might represent the body of a car. Chapter three sought to
understand the way the engine powered the vehicle forward; in this chapter I would
like to discuss the car s chassis. All three fit together in such a manner that dictates
the range of possible shapes which the car can take. A London bus could not be built
on a Ferrari chassis, nor could a Ferrari be identified apart from its constituent parts.
What this chapter seeks to demonstrate is the position of Neo/Realism within
broader discourses of modernity, and in so doing to level criticism at Neo/Realism,
which would have otherwise been impossible.
Neo/Realism is only self-explanatory; indeed its constituent units dictate a
certain type of discourse, a predetermined range of the possible and reality per se,
Neo/Realism also dictates the nature of the discipline of International Relations itself
by its monopoly of truth claims derived from its positivist pretensions. International
Relations presupposes states, sovereignty, relations between separate objects, objects
and subjects, empiricism, positivism, and Modernity which are all the stuff of
Neo/Realism. Therefore there is more at stake in a deconstruction of Neo/Realism than
a certain world-view, ontology or epistemology, indeed, the disciplines raison d etre
99

is at stake; its sovereignty 1s in jeopardy, postmodernism has the Hobbesean
Leviathan -and all which it represents- under siege.

During the course of this chapter I will contextualise the philosophy of
Neo/Realism. While it is commonly accepted amongst less dogmatic theorists that
there can be no value-free science of International Relations, postmodern
deconstruction can show how Neo/Realism (a decidedly Neo-Liberal creed) can be
placed squarely within the modernist tradition and has thus adopted its values and
normative concerns regardless of whether these concerns and values are recognised or
not. We can historicize Neo/Realism by discussing its philosophical and historical
roots, by showing the concerns of its lineage and ancestors and how it developed.
Specifically, I want to show how Neo/Realism has sought to objectify itself and
therefore provide some form of Cartesian certainty though science. Neo/Realism s
claims to be the mirror of nature have been shown (Chapter three) to be dubious at
least due to the anomalies this science has inadvertently discovered ; what I would
now like to discuss is how a N eo/Realism s philosophical chassis is also
dysfunctional.
What I will discuss is the Verstehen approach of Morgenthau and Carr and its
abandonment by Waltz et al. What I wish to show is how this abandonment of a
certain mode of coming to understand the world around us (Verstehen) confounded a
more encompassing understanding than that which a more hermeneutically oriented
approach may have achieved. As we shall see, N eo/Realist discourse encourages a
certain way of thinking about the world, a certain way of framing questions and
producing answers, which all support the ideology of science and the sovereignty of
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its objective data bank. In short, what can be shown is that Neo/Realist methodology
is simply one amongst many, and as such its adoption is a subjective choice,
consequently the merits of this choice can be discussed further.
The limitations of the Neo/Realist approach to the scientific study of
international society will be discussed in light of the critiques of this traditional
approach advanced by the postmodern scholars whose lineage has been traced by Jim
George and David Campbell

from Wittgenstein to Foucault

190

.

This broad

introduction to the diverse and diffuse corpus of postmodern scholarship in the social
sciences will serve to contextualise the following chapter, in which I will discuss the
specific arguments of a select few writers in the postmodern vein.
One could argue that the first and second chapters of this thesis sought to
criticise the body-work of Neo/Realism and found that on its own terms it is fairly
dilapidated, the third chapter sought to show how its engine, its scientific driving
force, needs servicing, and this chapter would like to show how shot through with rust
N eo/Realism s chassis has become.

The Verstehen debt ofMorgenthau and Carr.
Jim George notes that the term Verstehen (process of understanding) refers to
a range of approaches, associated (broadly) with a sociology-of-knowledge
perspective which have in their diverse ways challenged the notion that there can be
objective scientific knowledge of human society akin to that in the natural
sciences.
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It signifies a general rejection of naturalistic investigation.

George and Campbell, 1990.
Jim George. Discourses of Global Politics. 1994, p. 37, n. 57.
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The Verstehen approach began as a psychologically oriented position (derived
from Dilthey) applied to a broadly hermeneutical methodology that sought to derive
meaning from society not from objective data sets but from human speech and action.
George argues that von Humboldt s position, in which [m]eaning
active linguistic competence

is a matter of

that arises from the human social process, the

dialectical interaction of mind, and the social use of grammar

192

is exemplary of this

orientation and that it can also be traced though Weber and Mannheim; the men behind
Morgenthau and Carr. 193
For the purpose of this thesis, two aspects of Weber s Verstehen approach
can be isolated. First, Weber sought to move away from the positions of earlier
scholars such as Wilhelm Dilthey who argued for the egocentric, sociopsychological
approach to Verstehen which rejected the proposition that the natural and social
sciences could work with the same methodology, and to apply explicitly the
methodology of the natural (positivist) sciences to the social sciences in order to
alleviate the obvious subjectivity in social investigation. In this way it became
possible to deny pure objectivity in social reality (theory) whilst continuing a
relentless search for Cartesian certainty (practice), which Weber perceived to lie in the
regularities and constants of human interaction. In effect, Weber began a mode of
social investigation that sought naturalistic laws within human thought and action, and
believed that the discovery of laws lay not so much in observation but in
interpretation and implicit subjectivity.

Secondly, due to Weber s move away
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Ibid, p. 146.
George re-positions IR within broader social theory debates by giving Realism roots and eroding
some of its ahistorical pretensions.
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from the ego as the primary source of meaning, the search for objectivity necessitated
recognition of the distinction between a
scientifically deduced is and a culturally deduced ought
Its impact
has been a model of rational behaviour for International Relations in which, in an
objectified realm, the motives of actors are given [as] the rational pursuit of
culturally determined ends or interests and further analysis of them is considered
logically unwarranted in any scientific judgement as to the nature of the system
out there . 194

Morgenthau s interpretation of Weber s position is epitomised in his second
principle of political realism, in which he argues that while interest can and should be
defined as power and taken as an objective category [of reality] which is universally
valid , nevertheless, one can best understand how this is so through hermeneutical
analysis of dispatches

conversations with other statesmen

and anticipation of

his [the statesman s] very thoughts . In this sense, Weber and Morgenthau combined
two positions. The first was a hermeneutic position that reverses the argument of
[later] epistemology and instead of a being interpreting a world sees a being formed by
tacit know-how which is prior to the interpretation of facts

Individuals are caught

up in a hermeneutic circle whereby we can only understand the world by our being
caught up in a web of significance.

195

Morgenthau s epistemology aimed to come to an understanding of the
psychology of the actor and was intrinsic to the problem solving enterprises of the
early Cold War years and the demonization of the other in modem political thought,
which was the communist Soviet threat to Liberal western democracies and the
capitalist ideology that it was nurturing. Positivism adopted a dominant scientific
status via the testing of

194

195

rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their

See George op cit. 193, p. 147 -148.
Smith, Positivism and Beyond , p. 26
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consequences

196

. "fi1es Weber s influence and also the philosophical
wh"1ch s1gru

anomaly inherent in the early Realist approach to science. The presupposition of
value free and objective facts which exist independently of human concern, though
cannot exist without a Verstehen interpretation of them is such an epistemological
contradiction. In short, if power-defined-as-interest is a fact which can only be given
meaning through interpretative practices, then in what sense is it an objective fact? It
is a contradiction in terms. However, as George has argued,
The Russian/Soviets were, on this basis, a neurotic people, with an instinctive
sense of insecurity that, in the postwar era, had become heightened by their
interaction with the more competent, more powerful economically advanced
west . Such a power could not be rationally dealt with because it was
impervious to the logic of reason [and} seemingly inaccessible to
considerations of reality [emphasis added]
On this basis, all the
Russian/Soviets understood was military force -this is, power politics. With
this historical analysis established, the Cold War scenario had its (external)
factual foundation. And from this foundation all other Cold War logic flowed.
The Soviet desire to expand was, in this discursive context, both predictable and
a source of great danger, to the west in general and the United States in particular.
This was because the modem attempt to alleviate Russian neurosis was now
combined with a Marxist ideology, which preached world domination and the
. of capita
. l'1st democracy.197
destructton

Positivism could thus be seen as an attempt to mask the inherently ideological
chassis of the Realist/Verstehen phase of International Relations scholarship.
George also argues that this modernist tension

198

between interpretation and

naturalistic positivism also forms the dialectical chassis of Carr s political realism,
which is indebted to Mannheim. In The Twenty Years Crisis positivism and
interpretation are not mutually constitutive (and productive) as are most if not all
Carr s other dialectical oppositions. 199 Instead, Carr resolves his dialectical tensions -
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Carr s debt to Mannheim rather than to Weber may suggest a reas?n for t .e . s~cttve evo utton o
the British School of International Relations into a more critically onented dtsc1plme rather than th~.
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in this case- logocentrically by privileging deductive empiricism over interpretation,
egoism over sociability, power over morality, and the state over society. 200
Moreover, historical analysis assumes an unproblematic data set which comprises of
facts [that] exist independently of what anyone thinks about them and which [one]
is powerless to influence or alter [a central characteristic of which is] the irresistible
character of existing tendencies

201

a comment which shows Carr s early conservative

tendencies which are later mirrored by Morgenthau who argues that objective laws
exist and are impervious to our preferences .

202

The philosophical anomaly in Carr s earlier works are also the focus of his
later works in which he resorts to seeing himself as an intellectual dissident

203

and

argues for a more hermeneutically oriented approach to the study of history and what
is in David Boucher s words a search for the author

204

•

This development of

thought contrast s with Carr s position in The Twenty Years Crisis in which his

Verstehen position is set against the law-like nature of power, of the state and of his
crude inductivist logic concerning history.
The anomaly, which was discussed in Morgenthau s conception of objectivity,
was presented above; Carr s argument that the state is a personification, given
meaning through human understanding and imagination, and whose nature it is most

generalisations in either history or sociology as opposed to the laws which he postulates in The
Twenty Years Crisis? (see page 65 & n2 p 65) which leads me to believe that the position which I
maintained on Carr in the introduction to this thesis is warranted. Namely that specific historical
circumstance prompts individuals to argue practical and subjectively determined useful theories.
200
George 1994, p. 78.
201
Quoted in George, 1994, p. 79.
202
Ibid, p. 93. Again it should not go unnoticed that the arguments presented in the introduction of
this chapter support the observation that this philosophical anomaly has many practical uses, namely
the masking of subjective ideological interpretation of an enemies interests in scientific terms for
explicit reasons, namely the influence of public opinion.
203
E.H Carr, What Is History? p. 6.
204navid Boucher quoted in George 1994, p. 147.
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. 1
essentia to express

205 .

1s a repeat of the same mistake. How can there exist an

objective set of data impervious to our preferences, if it is our preferences that also
constitute the primary unit of analysis? This paradox is never addressed and indeed it
cannot be addressed, as Vasquez asked in the previous chapter, what can remain of
positivist social science, however, if this point [reality being a social construction] is
accepted in its entirety? the answer -quite simply- is nothing, though the question
is never asked nor answered in anything but crude anti-relativist terms which skirt the
issue entirely and avoid serious debate concerning the historical contingency of
reality as we have seen.

Waltz Structural Integrity?

In 1961 Carr wrote in What is History? that sociology at present faces two
opposite dangers- the danger of becoming ultra theoretical and the danger of becoming
ultra empirical. The first is the danger of losing itself in abstract and meaningless
generalisations about society in general

The other danger is that foreseen by Karl

Mannheim of a sociology split into a series of discrete technical problems of
readjustment .

206

social

N eorealist structuralism has fallen victim to both.

The chassis of Neorealism developed and marketed by Waltz et al (1979-) is
based upon a rejection of the Verstehen approach in an attempt to overcome the
interpretative and inductive leanings (not to mention inconsistencies) of the traditional
realist school of IR and to provide Cartesian certainty for a discourse embroiled in
objectifying the Cold War.

205
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Jim George s position is exemplary of postmodern attitudes towards the
abandonment of a richer methodological approach to IR promised by the Verstehen
approach when he argues that
Theory of International Politics and (to a lesser extent) Man the State and War
stand as major indictments of an International Relations community that,
closed to critical reflective capacity for so long, has accorded such high status to
works of so little substance. They stand, in this regard, as a testament to the
continuing legacy of a closed modernist discourse in the period of Realist
dominance in International Relations. 207

It is, however, Richard Ashley s critique of Neorealism in his article The

Poverty ofNeorealism (which appeared in a collection of essays entitled Neorealism
and its Critics )208 which is most pertinent to our discussion. The Poverty of

Neorealism argues that not only is neorealism a degeneration of theory as George and
Vasquez have pointed out, but it is also an orrery of errors . What Ashley s
argument also demonstrates is that the constituent aspects of the structuralist
argument as a whole are contradictory-in-themselves (see below). 209
What was edited out of Ashley s argument by Robert Keohane was his
position on the abandonment of the Verstehen approach of traditional thought in IR
and the direct result of which was to pose his argument in exactly the terms he was
aiming to avoid, i.e. either you accept his argument and abandon Neorealist
scholarship -because one is deprived of the capacity to think and speak in answer to
most of what is important in world politics today [- or one]

repudiate[ s Ashley s]

commitments, in which case one is free of the limitations on thought that the
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George, 1994, p. 119-120.
Richard K Ashley, The Poverty ofNeorealism, in Robert Keohane (ed) Neorealism and its
Critics (1986).
209
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neorealist enclosure would impose.

210

Thus by taking out of the argument that

element which leant itself most heavily to a conversation or debate , Keohane
actually silenced N eo/Realism s critics and deafened its adherents.
However, I would argue that neorealist enclosure

is not simply due to

methodology and the units of analysis as they exist-in-themselves, but the way in
which the two interact to produce and facilitate an understanding of life and a worldview which restricts the range of the possible due (primarily) to International
Relations state centric commitments (theory) and the state centric assumptions of
international relations (practice).
By dominating mainstream truth claims, Neorealist theory constrains practice
within its own ontology and world view represented and articulated through its
dogmatic and ideological theoretical base. Ashley argues wherever it has emerged,
structuralist argument has taken form in reaction against phenomenological knowledge
and speculative, evolutionary thought. In this sense it rejects subjectivity on all levels
of analysis, it aims to go deeper than this subjectivity and discover the
independently existing logic or structure whilst attempting to transcend a simplistic
object/subject dualism by arguing a type of holistic approach to society governed by
rules laws and regularities which constrain and transcend (thus dictate) the range of
possible outcomes of rational or irrational action. While structure is privileged over its
constituent parts, only the parts can change whilst the structure will always remain
the same. 211
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However,

if

neorealism is to bathe in the glow of structuralist

accomplishments it must also be prepared to
limits.

212

suffer criticisms as to structuralism s

Ashley argues that if Neorealism was to progress beyond the limits of

traditional Realism it had to first highlight its inadequacies, those were its penchant for
subjectivity on questions which demanded more objective value free knowledge,
namely power defined as interest and the nature of the states system, and its lack of
learning from other fields of social theory such as economics and psychology.213
Moreover, Neorealism sought to locate economic variables within analysis of
international affairs so as resuscitate what Neorealist scholars and the public alike saw
as the declining power of the state over international affairs during the economic crises
of the seventies and the eighties.
Ashley argues that the state centric concern of N eorealist IR theorists negates
Neorealism s structuralist pretensions, for in not problematising the nature of the
constituent parts of a structure, by assuming the unproblematic, unitary, and
sovereign nature of the state, the concept of a structure becomes less problematic.
Waltz in this sense sought to construct an image of the international states system
that corresponded to pre-established cartographic conceptions of the world and invest
them with structure and a deterministic quality. The problem with this is that
Neorealist state centrism is too problematic to constitute an effective structural
functionalism.
The Neorealist utilitarian concern with econollllc rationale and the
microeconomic analogy, or the assumption that social reality [is] made up of
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individual

actors inhabiting

a world characterized by scarcity also negates the

concept of structure in that it presuppose[ s] normative structures transcending and
irreducible to individual wants and needs, [which] the utilitarian would hold to be
scientifically indefensible metaphysical notions.

214

Thus while Neorealism 1s

utilitarian in orientation, it contradicts the idea of a structure. Indeed Ashley cites the
position taken by Talcott Parsons who suggests that utilitarianism precludes even the
most rudimentary regimes, let alone a supranational structure. Thus, if neorealism is to
be utilitarian it cannot be structuralist as well.
Further, Neorealism s utilitarianism -derived from a selective reading of
Weberian technical or instrumental rationality- presupposes the rational actor model
of international relations, which also reduces structuralism to the positivist
empiricism, and the subjective analysis (not to mention reductionism) of its
forbearers. Not only that but by unconsciously advocating technical rationality, and
herein lies the danger of the Neorealism for international practice, if Neorealism s
structuralism/ conservatism masks the inherent responsibility of the actor, it also
abrogates it. Moreover it is a metaphysical imagery that supports this abrogation of
responsibility and it is also contradictory when applied to positivism as we saw in
chapter two.
Ashley summarises the first three parts of his argument with the neorealist
denial of the four p s. He argues that neorealism denies history as process by
arguing its ephemeral and unchanging structure (explicitly in the law of a balance of
power). It denies the historical significance of practice as constitutive of reality, the
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power of power

(traditionally conceived) to dictate the nature of society. And

finally neorealist structuralism denies politics or more correctly, neorealism reduces
politics to those aspects, which lend themselves to interpretation exclusively within a
framework of economic action under structural constraints set by the state over its
domestic subjects. Thus structure is restricted to the power relations amongst larger
entities and it also serves to reinforce our commonsense views of the world and
ourselves , and by reinforcing the anarchical nature of the structure it also reconfirms
the necessity of the state as-unit-of-analysis convention among students of
politics.

215

In sum it is the . blinding light of the halo surrounding the state m

neorealist thought

216

which for Ashley is the deciding element in neorealist confusion

as to the nature of their scientific orientation. This state/science theme will be
discussed in the next chapter, but for now it would serve to show how in
presupposing the state as an unproblematic and given entity in IR scholarship,
neorealism (more so than its predecessor) contradicts all its structuralist tenets,
simply because the state is problematic not only ideologically, scientifically,
theoretically and historically but also conceptually and it resides upon a plethora of
complex discursive practices for its existence as an objective fact of reality as this
thesis is attempting to demonstrate.

An Introduction to Postmodernity.

Ashley s argument in The Poverty of Neorealism borrows concepts from
such diverse writers as Habermas, Bourdieu and Foucault whose positions whilst not
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incommensurable are not entirely compatible, neither are they accorded the exegesIS
which thinkers of this importance deserve, and this leaves Ashley s argument open to
conceptual flaws. These will be discussed towards the end of this chapter.217 Here I
will discuss the intellectual ancestry of Ashley and George, informed as they are by
broader social theory debates marginalized by the mainstream in IR scholarship, and
attempt to place them within a sociohistorical context.

Reality and Language.218
George and Campbell have traced the roots of postmodern philosophy back to
the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy championed by Wittgenstein, Winch and
Quine. 219 What this turn achieved was the repudiation of
the twin pillars of (post-Kantian) empiricist-based philosophy: [which were] (1)
the notion of a fundamental distinction between analytic and synthetic statements
[i.e. between logically true and humanly derived or fabricated statements]
and (2) and the nominalist principle, which reduces the conditions for real
knowledge of the world to a universe of atomised contingent things . 220

Wittgenstein s later contributions revolved around the principle that language
was constitutive of reality in its articulation; that this articulation was subject in tum
to socio-historical and cultural influence, and thus reality -if to be understood through
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Jim George 1994, p. 176.
This section cannot pretend to be conclusive or comprehensive in any way. It serves mainly to
introduce arguments pertinent to the arguments which follow in the next chapter and to discuss the
central concept that reality per se is not as simplistically deduced from our surroundings as
Neo/Realists would have us believe. On the contrary, the very fact that Neo/Realists presume to have
the strongest grasp of the true essence of reality and the correct method of coming to those
conclusions is exactly what is under question. Thus this chapter serves to displace the self-assured
nature ofNeo/Realist discourse. The following chapter will highlight the logical inconsistencies of
Neo/Realist discourse in light of recent critical social theory and discuss the effects of these
inconsistencies upon our social existence.
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language as was held by the logical positivists- constituted not of logically
independent facts and objects which could be understood simply through their
articulation in language, but of the linguistic and socio-historical practices which invest
objects with meaning. Thus reality could not be understood apart from our subjective
interpretation and articulation of it.
The theoretical arguments of Quine and Winch together challenged the
positivist empiricist core of modem social theory in their assertions that, according to
Quine, all statements are synthetic or man made, insinuating that direct experience and
observation as such is a boundary condition of thought and understanding and that as such- there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the
light of any single experience [as such] No particular experiences [can be] linked to
any particular statements.

221

In this light, if all knowledge is synthetic and its

articulation is determined by sociohistorical circumstance as Wittgenstein showed,
then it becomes logical to accept Peter Winch s (1972) proposition that if what
constitutes knowledge is subjectively determined and subjectively expressed as such,
then that which constitutes the positivist other
the expense of myriad other
other .

222

others

can only be constituted as such at

subjectively determined and expressed as

Thus there is an explicit process of exclusion and marginalisation intrinsic

to the positivist quest for universal Cartesian foundational certainty based upon
arbitrary subjective judgements.
This position is given added strength by the earlier work of Thomas Kuhn
(1970), who argued that knowledge is constructed by social communities following
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agreement upon norms, traditions, and rules of reading and interpretation, and not by
an atheoretical process of testing theory-impregnated observations

223

hence the

concept of the paradigm which dictates research and the range of the possible within
the natural sciences . Though Kuhn expressed some doubt as to whether his analysis
would be applicable to the social sciences, its challenge to the positivist epistemology
lies in its questioning of the objective and value free nature of the natural sciences and
thus the legitimacy of its role as a model for social analysis.
Thus social theory becomes firmly grounded in the language games and social
practices, and understanding thereof, which bring it to light. As a consequence it could
be argued logically that it is in fact social necessity that draws forth knowledge. Indeed
the critical hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer would suggest as much. He argued as an extension of the Verstehen approach neglected by the positivists- that
hermeneutics can be a universal approach to understanding derived from texts as they
present themselves in their historical context and mainly through language.
Understanding was then determined through interpretation and its influence upon
practice in the social reality of a given time and place. Gadamer privileged a practical
and ethical form of knowledge over the technical knowledge advocated by the
scientific community epitomised in the false idolatry of the expert , an attitude
mirrored in Feyerabend and John Ralston Saul.
Gadamer sought to bridge the gaps between objects and subjects through a
process of understanding and action derived from the Aristotelian notion of praxis,
which denotes the link between theory and practice. In so doing, he argued that the
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individual is united by a specific bond with the other, he thinks with the other and
undergoes the situation with him.

224

This lack of distinction between the object and

subject of interpretation moves further than the simplistic search for the author
(noted above) employed by the traditional Verstehen hermenuticists -and by Carr and
Morgenthau- in that it denies the objectified authors autonomy in either text or
history (which produced deductivism) and seeks instead to locate the human process
of understanding -consciously- in all aspects of sociological understanding and rejects
the search for objective foundations of knowledge, as well as the possibility of an
impartial observer, as illusory. Further, the idea that one is powerless to influence
or to alter the facts of history is thrown into confusion, indeed the complication of
the idea that an ahistorical edifice of fact exists at all undermines the positivist quest
for certainty. Bernstein has argued that this form of analysis also supersedes the
simplistic objectivism/relativism dichotomy so prevalent as the retort to most critical
theory, as it denies the autonomy of the constituent pars of the dualism and relocates
the argument squarely within a personal, ethical and normative project of living
harmoniously in the world.
Each time some philosopher comes up with what he or she takes to be a new
argument or insight showing why one cannot assimilate or reduce all forms of
knowledge to the canonical forms of the formal and natural sciences, there have
always been an ample supply of tough-minded types who have countered with
arguments that, at best, their opponents have noted some practical difficulties
but certainly not any genuine theoretical obstacles to the essential unity of all
science and the reduction of the several sciences to a single all encompassing
225
universal science.

This rejection of a unity of method resonates throughout the post-positivist
debate, it does not, however, resonate throughout the various forms of critical social
theory which has eroded modernist certainties. Indeed, neither has it eroded all faith in
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the modernist project of emancipation and progress deemed so illusory by the
postmodernists.
In an attempt to further or complete the emancipatory and progressive element
of the project of modernity, Jurgen Habermas expounds further on the issue of praxis
in an attempt to answer the question of how modem peoples might come to
understand the deformed and ideological nature of the language, social rules, values and
meanings associated with a dominant mode of understanding -scientificrationalismwhich has successfully transformed philosophico-political problems into technical
and strategic ones.

226

He thus attempts to retrieve the critical aspect of the project

of modernity (i.e. the quest for pure knowledge free from superstition, mythology,
and ideology via rational thought) and direct it at all aspects of human interaction not
simply the traditional dichotomy between the oppressed and oppressors within it
-namely the proletarian and bourgeois class. Thus Habermas moves beyond traditional
critical Marxism to try and discover the emancipatory possibilities

of a Critical

Theory informed though not constrained by the post-positivist debate.

This

approach employs dialectical methods, which are true to a universal emancipatory
project derived from Kant, (and with qualification Hegel and Marx) though without
the positivist blinkers inherent to each approach. Intrinsic to all is the adherence to a
naturalistic and deterministic epistemology -informed as it may be by hermeneutics
and humanism- and a teleological and progressivist approach to history and the future.
This is the point at which postmodern scholarship can enter the debate -opposed as it
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is to some idea of rationality as distinct from irrationality- though it does not follow
consecutively -but alongside- the Habermasian project.
Postmodern scholars reject simplistic dualism and dichotomies such as
rational/irrational, subjectJobject, reality/utopia etc. Inherent to all postmodernism is
the

concern for heterogeneity and difference.

227

This concern develops from the

understanding that divisions and classifications of types and forms of human existence
are arbitrary and subjectively determined which -while radically relativist in approachseeks not a firm foundation from which one can determine the difference between one
and the other extreme, but seeks to understand and ask Why?

the methods and

social practices by which these dualisms and dichotomies are constituted and enforced
in modem society and to what ends.
Postmodemism takes the linguistic tum one step further; in that what
constitutes our social reality and makes it meaningful are the complex forms and
procedures of discursive practices .
A discourse
generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be
understood and explained. More precisely, a discourse makes real that which it
prescribes as meaningful. In so doing, a discourse of Realism, for example,
establishes the sociolinguistic conditions under which realistic theory and practice
can take place, and it establishes, simultaneously, that which, by discursive
228
definition, does not correspond with reality.

With a linguistic and textual understanding of reality it becomes possible for
those engaged in critical social theory to question the notion of a singular, stable,
knowable reality which has been an integral part of a dominant post-Enlightenment
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story in which the ascent of Western rational man is located as integral to the
gradual historicophilosophic unfolding of the worlds real nature.

229

Already we can see how this approach differs from its predecessors. It breaks
with Habermasian Critical Theory in its denial of the proposition that the sole
repository of human emancipation lies in enlightened human rationality. Indeed it
questions the possibility of emancipation at all (see below) and any truer form of
understanding derived from grand narratives

and either/or dualisms such as

rationality/madness; Indeed, thinkers informed by a postmodern understanding of
philosophy deny that understandings of philosophical issues of the post-Wittgenstein
era simply clarify. It is argued instead that it has made us more conscious of our actual
involvement in -and responsibility for- the world around us. In this sense, postmodern
philosophy, while it is justifiably seen as an epistemological position, is actually more
concerned with ontology. It seeks to erode the influence of dominant discourses and in
such a way reveal that there is more to reality than is postulated by the realists.
Epistemology is co-dependent upon to the project of ontological deconstruction. In
short postmodernists are ontological anarchists.
Integral to all discourse is a reconceptualisation of power. 230 By redefining
power as the forms and technologies of language and social practice at work within a
discourse, by therefore recognising the role of and the constitutive nature of
knowledge, of all forms, in the formation of a discourse, postmodernists do not
recognise a distinction between knowledge and power. The two become synonymous
in the constant reformulation of notions of truth and rationality, of madness and what
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constitutes the other in all eras of history . In this sense the arbitrary nature of
truth- claims and the disqualification of other in everyday life has very real effects
upon the link between theory and practice. In fact George argues that for
postmodemism there is in fact no distinction between theory and practice, theory
becomes practice as soon as it informs our understanding of the world and the range of

possible modes of living within it.

Conclusion.
This chapter sought, first of all, to demonstrate the limitations of Neo/Realist
theory from a philosophical perspective. This was attempted by placing the
objectified and universal theory of international relations adopted by Neo/Realists
into

context, something that Neo/Realists -indeed philosophical positivists in

general- have sought to avoid since the dawn of the enlightenment . The absolutist
and universalistic aspirations of modernists in general are illusory. On the basis of the
arguments presented here, there can be no all encompassing totalised whole within
which all dissent is tamed, rationalised and conformed. The very concept of us
necessitates a them , which suggests that there could be no us without a them . If
this universalising project is an enigma, as this chapter sought to outline very briefly,
then what was the purpose of objective theory and analysis in IR? It was suggested
that actual physical circumstance brought about by Neo/Realist praxis231 dictated the
role and purpose of structuralism-as-practice during the Cold War years of the last
century. It gave scientific credence to state action, much in the same way as other

231

See also Vasquez above chapter 3.

119

pretences at objectivity (outlined in Chapters 1& 2) have done in the past. Couple
this with the philosophical paradox illuminated in the first three chapters and one
would be led to conclude that Neo/Realism is more of an ideological endeavour than a
scientific one.
Secondly, it aimed to provide a context within which the following exposition
of postmodern thought in IR can be placed. I sought to demonstrate that reality is
not given, but made and remade by active linguistic procedures, which erode the
deterministic implications of modem science. It also attempted to demonstrate how
postmodemism seeks to avoid logocentric privileging and dichotomies in general,
viewing them as problematic, polemic and limiting. Postmodemism leaves dichotomies
well alone and as we shall see in the following chapter, seeks more to question than to
provide any definitive answers, and to question not the reality as opposed to the
un-reality of the world view of Neo/Realism but how, by what methods and for
what purpose this reality has become the dominant way of understanding and acting in
the world around us.
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Chapter 5
What Constitutes Reality?
Introduction.
We have now arrived at a contextualisation of postmodern interferences
IR.
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As George quite succinctly put it, Reality is

International Relations
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not what it used to be
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and in this space we will now further problematise the

taken for granted maxims and axioms of IR; here, in the relatively spacious area
(de )constructed by a questioning and challenging philosophical position, we can
approach our central tenets with values heretofore unacknowledged and question the
sovereignty of an insular discipline and its objects , units , methods ,

assumptions

and so forth. Not only this, it now becomes possible to redirect the rhetoric, and
challenge the realism of those with a monopoly of truth claims in IR. As we saw in
the previous chapter, there is far more that constitutes reality than simply meets the
eye, and this chapter will introduce the linguistic questions as they have been
directed at the taken-for-granted-truths in IR.
The argument I will forward at the end of this chapter is that international
theory is more than in a simple state of disarray
postmodern interferences

234

,

it will become clearer that the

go far deeper than anyone in the mainstream of the

discipline is willing to acknowledge, it is more than a question of method or of

232

Roland Bleiker Retracing and Redrawing the Boundaries of Events: Postmodern Interferences with
International Theory Alternatives 23: 1998.
233
George. 1994, p. 1.

121

normative objectives or research programmes empirically defined, at stake here is the
reality which we have come to accept and the plethora of discursive practices which
support it. In short, one might say that postmodernism has exposed the
foundationless irrelevance that is the Neo/Realist metaphysical conception of the
sovereign nation-state, and a discipline (IR) dependent upon such constructs for its
rhetorical force and its patronage.
This chapter will attempt to achieve two things. I intend to illustrate the
nature of the arguments presented by the postmodern theorists in IR. What I intend to
show is the broad discursive concerns which connect those who theorise in IR via a
postmodern orientation and the implications such lines of reasoning have for the
discipline as a whole.
It will also be necessary here to repeat some of the main arguments presented

in the preceding chapter in order to contextualise the more specific and targeted
arguments within the narrow discipline of IR and to juxtapose the sophisticated with
the Realist. Realism, it will be seen is predicated upon philosophical unselfconsciousness.
The second line of argument in this chapter will attempt to reframe the
concerns of the first chapter of this thesis. In so doing I will scour the postmodern
literature in IR to attempt an exegesis of what constitutes the state or what does not,
I will attempt to uncover the postmodern concerns with rational man , sovereignty ,
anarchy , power and structure and show how these reconceptualisations, whilst
leaving the material world (as opposed to metaphysical) intact, ruin our traditional
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understandings of it and in so doing allow for a an overhaul -or reformulation- of the
ways in which we as individuals and the societies which we form, wish to and can live
together. This section will operate as a broad introduction to the following chapter, in
which I will attempt the construction of a state-less theory of international relations.
It will become evident from the arguments presented in this chapter, that stereotypical

anarchism resonates throughout postmodern IR.

Stereotypes.

Though it has become somewhat of a clich to comment on the inherent
eclecticism of postmodernism, it nevertheless is a very prominent aspect of this mode
of inquiry. Stereotypical postmodernism could be seen as an anti-method , though in
reality there is a broad consensus that the deconstructive strategy is the one to be
employed almost unequivocally across the board.
It is the objects of deconstruction that vary, along with the manner in which

the deconstruction is carried out. For example, Cynthia Enloe235 deconstructs common
understandings of power, the nature of the state and the public/private divide in IR
theory though from a feminist perspective. She does this by deconstructing our
common understandings of domination and social hierarchy, by introducing the
marginal -in this case women- and thereby revealing the inconsistencies with the
assumption, in IR theory, of a sovereign unproblematic bounded and homogenous
state-as-actor.
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Richard Ashley236, on the other hand, introduces an interpretative double
reading deconstructive strategy, which aims to silence the sovereign voice within IR
literature (Statist Neo/Realism) and the heroic practices which are predicated upon
the establishment of logocentric privileging. Ashley s deconstructive strategy is
textual, thought the implications go further than the bindings of a text, in that by
questioning the possibility of sovereignty in general, he questions whether it is
possible for the state to be sovereign at all.
It is arguments such as these that we will discuss here in an attempt to

deconstruct the nature of postmodern interferences in established IR theory and
why they could be considered as such. Also central to postmodern concern is the
unsettling of established and unquestioned assumptions in IR. Postmodern readings go
to great lengths to illustrate the extent of philosophical and methodological
unselfconsciousness in IR. And in so doing, postmodernists unsettle the sovereignty
of the dominant discourse within IR which is the subordination of all ambiguity and
diversity in the name of a sovereign centre and an appeal to legislative reason and
rationality in the face of a fracturing postmodern era.
Richard Ashley and Cynthia Enloe both ask What is the state? and both
come up with different responses though the deconstructive method may be very
similar. Enloe deconstructs the semi-fictional work of Rosario Castellanos -The Nine
Guardians- to try to uncover just how underestimat[ ed] the amounts and varieties of

power it takes to form and sustain any given set of relationships between states.
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Specifically, Enloe wants to show how the public/private relations within states mirror
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and are constitutive of the inside/outside relations between states. In this sense, what
Enloe is concerned to show is how the metaphysical nature of the state is based upon
a patriarchal hierarchy.
Cesar and Ernesto went down the steps from the veranda to the farmyard. They
mounted, and at a slow trot put the house behind them
The women, kneeling
on the ground to pound the grain, stopped their tasks and sat quietly with arms
rigid, as if rooted into the stone of their mortars, their slack breasts hanging loose
in their blouses. They watched the two men pass
There are the Indian women to do your bidding, Ernesto. We ll be
looking out for one of these brats to turn up with your complexion
Beggars
can t be choosers. I m talking from experience [ ]
It was doing them a favour, really, because after that the Indian women
were more sought after and could marry where they liked. The Indian always
recognises this virtue in his woman, that the patron had found pleasure in her.
And the children among those that hung about the big house
and served
38
there faithfully. (Castellanos, 1992, p 127/

Patriarchy is discussed here in relation to the Zapatista uprising in Mexico,
and how relations of domination actually sustain the concept of a bounded sovereign
entity that is the state. Even from this quotation we can see five relations of
domination and the technologies of power which support them. For instance, Enloe
seeks to highlight the technologies of power between Cesar and the Chiapas women;
between the women and the impoverished men of the Chiapas; between the children
and the patron, and between the Chiapas men and their patron. It is fear and force and
the relations of power which are transferred through the body as the object and
subject of power, which perpetuate these modes of domination. The argument that
humans are the vehicles of power (see chapter three) is one of Foucault s major
insights concerning technologies of power . Postmodern feminists take this further
and by problematising the traditional concept of power over in IR. Rather than
power being simply exercised as an ability to force someone to do something they
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would not otherwise do, Enloe draws our attention to the institutionalised nature of
gender hierarchy, how it is a form of bio-power , how knowledge and coercion
combine to produce these localised technologies of power, which in turn support
global structures of power relations.239
Enloe writes,
a male rancher s ability to bargain with the central state officials over land
reform and tariff proposals depends in no small part on his confidence -and the
credibility in the eyes of the state official- in his ability to control his ranch
employees, his confidence that they won t be able to bargain with that same
official behind his back, his confidence that they, or at least most of them, won t
even ima~ine that bargaining independently with the state was in their own
interests.2 0

And she does so, so as to illustrate that
Mexico never negotiated with the United States [over the NAFTA agreement],
anymore than
Canada had negotiated with the United States . Particular
officials of particular ruling regimes conducted these highly complex negotiations
under the more or less credible pretence that the states they spoke for were
functioning and durable.241

In Mexico however, the Chiapas peasant rebellion which took place in the run
up to the acceptance of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement in
1994, and Enloe notes how almost all political commentators writing on the successes
of the Mexican economy were entirely unprepared when the Zapatista (the
representative revolutionary party of the poor Chiapas Indians) shook Mexico, it was
shown in bold relief the amount and nature of repressive practices which were
necessary to portray the norm which the state system expects, of a sovereign bounded
homogenous entity. Enloe shows how this revolutionary party had broad grass roots
support with strong female representation which encouraged the margins to speak
up for themselves and in so doing changed the nature of the state of Mexico.
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The way by which Enloe comes to understand the world is via affinity. She
transcends the us and them dichotomy by approaching international relations via a
feminist perspective that
international.

242

argues,

the

personal is the

political and

the

Thus there is no distinction between women and more importantly,

their experiences. Enloe s transnational approach is global in this sense, and eschews
the male dominated and constructed international regimes that can be seen to be
constructed upon localised technologies of power. In this sense, her analysis goes
deeper than a positivist empiricist methodology could recognise.
Enloe contrasts this epistemology with the typical Joe Friday s Just the
facts, M am approach to international politics

243

championed by the positivists

which fails to recognise the complexity of the primary unit of analysis, namely the
state. Taking this line further, asking the same questions of IR theorists as does Enloe
would force a complication of what NAFTA

actually means, from where is its

meaning derived and what is its constitutive principle if the state is a problematic
entity? Further, is the domestic sphere (society) legitimately excluded from
mainstream IR theoretical analysis at all?
Ashley244 goes a long way towards answenng and problematising these
questions. He attempts to do this whilst eschewing simplistic yes/no answers and
logocentric privileging, thus his method is clearly far more deconstructive for he
deliberately provides no foundational basis for reconstruction. What Ashley is
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concerned to do is ask how it is that these questions came to be framed in the first
place and what it means for modem theoretical discourse. His point of departure is his
interpretation of logocentrism in IR, which he calls the

heroic practice . 245 This

heavily gendered term ties in with the arguments of many postmodern feminist
critiques and it is possible -despite obvious differences- to link Ashley s work with
the arguments put forward by Enloe above.
The heroic practice ,

turns

on a simple hierarchical opposition: a

dichotomy of sovereign versus anarchy, where the former term is privileged as a
higher reality, a regulative ideal, and the latter term is understood as
which endangers this ideal.

246

something

This privileging assumes the state to be the

fountainhead of rationality, it assumes also that the state is an unproblematic entity in
its foreign dealings and it assumes that the state is also the only form of salvation in an
anarchical and contingent, not to mention violent and harsh global ( external ) arena. It
is this very same arena that the state seeks to pacify.
Ashley argues that in the face of pre-modem contingency, ambiguity, and
superstition, the heroic practice arose as a form of inquiry that sought to tame our
natural and social environments. It sought by way of subordination and privileging to
make foundational claims upon which all other claims could be made and this
logocentric procedure was centred upon the sovereignty of the state against the
anarchy of our social environment. True to the logocentric procedure -or the heroic
practice - anarchy must be tamed so that

an analysis of his most prominent journal articles. A pr cis of his larger works would be beyond the
scope of this thesis.
245
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sovereignty [can] betoken a rational identity: a homogenous and continuous
presence that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique centre of decision
presiding over a coherent self , and that is demarcated from, and in opposition
to, an external domain of difference and change that resists assimilation to its
identical being.247

This practice is seen as heroic precisely because it assumes such a gallant and
chivalrous enterprise. And it is logocentric precisely because, when adhered to
unquestioningly2

48

,

it demands understanding on its own terms and rejects dissidence

and protest in terms of a quest to destroy the heroic practice itself. To talk in terms
of the heroic practice in such a way demands that all options be posited in terms of an
either/or dichotomy. Either you are inside or outside the

heroic

camp. In

international politics this is a dangerous pursuit. Understanding the heroic practice m
this way and the reality of multiple sovereign states out there , we can see how the
anarchy , which it presupposes in tandem with the order of each individual separate
state, precipitates conflict. Moreover, Ashley ties this to modem discourse as a whole
and does not locate it exclusively within the reahn of International Relations.
Ashley problematises this understanding of the modem constitution of
sovereignty, by distinguishing between two ways of approaching the sovereignty
question . Considered logocentrically, Ashley concedes that the heroic practice tends
towards sovereignty though universal sovereignty can never be achieved. Indeed this
is so because sovereignty can only be recognised in the face of contingency or anarchy
that is personified by the other . Ashley contrasts monological reading of the anarchy
problematique (the heroic practice) with a dialogical reading, which introduces
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multiple sovereign voices. These voices do not necessarily stand in opposition to the
heroic practice, but must be understood in their constitutive role of that very same
practice, their role as the other, the untamed or anarchic necessary for the logocentric
privileging of the tame and ordered.
However, it is this accommodation of the other which erodes the primacy of
the hero , the process of inclusion and acceptance breaks through the blackmail of
the heroic practice which stipulates that you are either with us or against us, by
refusing the either/or dichotomy and instead enters into a process of dialogue. In this
sense it is also possible to resist simplistic idealism/realism dichotomies and construct
new and meaningful ways of understanding the world around us.
In terms of International Relations, Ashley alludes to the neorealist inclusion
of the non-state actor in its theoretical constructions. Ashley points out that the
heroic practice is effectively nullified once the sovereignty of the state is questioned
by the inclusion of multiple sources of rational autonomy, such as multinational
companies or international organisations, be they governmental or not. In effect,
neorealism renders itself problematic if it maintains both a statist and a pluralist
outlook at once. Sovereignty is impossible as a method of delineation and exclusion,
as a way of delimiting exactly what constitutes the inside or the outside. As
Ashley argues, once
the theorist confronts this metaphysical conceit and concludes that he has utterly
no rational basis for deciding [what] can be counted as sovereign sources of valid
interpretations and which cannot, then he cannot disregard the independent forces
of the (non state actors] and he must take the predicament seriously as a political
249
problem.
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Of course to recognise Neorealism s value laden nature is to ruin its scientific
pretensions and allow more than the heroic practice can accommodate.
This issue of accommodation is tackled directly in a later article250 , where
Ashley responds to the gendered nature of traditional theorising in IR again, and
portrays International Relations to be the Inniterate Condottiere

-a subject in

estrangement. Ashley argues here that Poststructuralism has opened up debate in IR;
it has also transcended the relativist retorts of its critics and shows relativism to be
superfluous to the discussion. Poststructuralism has shown those who wish to see
that IR as a discipline and its dominant positivist epistemology have serious
limitations, postmodernism can make us conscious of the sources of contingency in
international relations and their constitutive role in identity-formation. In this sense,
poststructuralism has encouraged theorists to question their primary units of analysis
(i.e. the state) prior to anything else. Thus the very nature of the discipline is thrown
open to interpretation encouraging the possibility of far more productive dialogue -if
only theorists caught in the mainstream would engage in conversation with the
other . 251
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For Ashley, the place of poststructuralist argument in IR is on

the

borderlines between domestic and international political theory.252 In this sense,
Ashley seeks to locate inquiry between those traditional societal manifestations of
international consciousness derived from their recognition of a world out there and
the transnational recognition of a localised world, and in this sense he again reflects
the concerns of Enloe above.
Feminist writers, to accentuate the inconsistencies of traditional theorising in

IR often use Ashley s line of reasoning to complement their own. Jaqui True aptly
summarises the arguments presented above when she notes that,
[Men s] understanding of human agency [in IR] is imposed by taking the
standpoint of men-masculinity as generic. Rational man as metaphor for human
nature is presented as self-interested and autonomous with the capacity for
instrumental reason. Moreover he is abstracted from situatedness in the concrete
world, from a place in time and space, from particular prejudices, interests and
needs. The workings of the inter-state system are explained by reference to the
egoistic behaviour of this Hobbesian or Waltzian man in the state of nature
The naturalisation of gender hierarchy is inextricably tied to the assumption that
the state of nature is competitive, egoistic, rapacious and violent and therefore
anarchy is not what states make of it, but is essentially power and conflict ridden.
Feminist theorists are suspicious of such theoretical models which deny the
centrality of human relatedness, and repress the way affective relations constitute
distinctive subjectivities. 253

Thus we see how both subjectivity and femininity are diametrically opposed
to the heroic practice of taming anarchy via a strong and ordered centre.
Jean Elshtain questions why and on what grounds the realist narrative can
construct caricatured accounts of Hobbes and Machiavelli in an attempt to prove that
the male, like Machiavelli s virtuous Prince [must be] the bearer of order who must
tame capricious female forces rfortuna], domestically and externally.
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This imposed
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and chosen policy of domestic regimentation is seen as a paternalistic imposition, and
as such is questionable for both male and female critical theorists alike.
Needless to say the use of Machiavelli is caricatured throughout the
Neo/Realist literature in IR. R.B.J Walker has gone to great lengths to show how this
is so and to show, from a postmodern standpoint how it is not only constitutive of
Neo/Realism but of a specific modern discourse as he sees it. 255
As we can see from the arguments proposed by True, Machiavelli and Hobbes
are conjured from the annals of history to prove the static nature of the international
system, specifically the timeless nature of power and self-interest and the inclinations
of man-as-human-nature. Walker rejects this crude interpretation of the great Realist
texts arguing that Machiavelli and Hobbes are far more complex.
Walker s readings of Hobbes and Machiavelli are undertaken via a questioning
of the realist axiom that while [c]ivil society may
pursuit of justice international
conflict.

256

be the site of progress and the

politics simply is the realm of contingency and

This axiom is repeated time and again by Neo/Realist s who point to

Machiavelli and Hobbes as having to cope with exactly the same problems and lest we
repeat

prev10us

mistakes

we

should heed

their

teachings

of prudence,

unscrupulousness, and virtu in the face of contingency and anarchy which make up
the timeless nature of the international system. 257 However a contextualisation of
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Machiavelli reveals that he existed within a new historically specific time and place.
Specifically, Walker notes how Machiavelli sought to speak about the emergence of
the new city state in terms unfamiliar to those steeped in the Christian universalism of
the time. In this sense, contrary to realist appeals to his timeless nature, Machiavelli
spoke more of humanism,

republicanism,

or civic virtue than of ends-means

rationale, or interest defined as power. 258 Further, Machiavelli sought to confront the
contingency of Fortuna head on and as such he counselled for preparedness for the
unpredictable, which is in stark contrast to realist counselling for the timeless and
predictable.
Walker highlights Machiavelli s counselling concerning the use of fortresses in
this respect. Walker shows how Machiavelli is aware of the contingency of time and
place and that what is useful today may not be tomorrow. This he deciphers from
Machiavelli s counselling that fortresses are either useful or not but that only fools
trust

in fortresses [and] consider the hatred of the people to be of little

importance

259

.

Thus it can be seen that Machiavelli is

[committed] to a politics that responds to the temporal contingency of life in this
world, Machiavelli is prepared to face up to the consequences that, according to
what we have come to learn from both the classical and Christian inheritance,
must be drawn once one abandons the possibility of transcending the
260
contingencies of time through an appeal to being or etemity.

Moreover, Walker later draws our attention to the role of spatiality in the
constitution of modem political discourse261 and this is also typified in Machiavelli s
admonitions, that the fortress wall cannot guarantee internal peace any more than it
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can external. They are simply walls, thought they constitute political space which is
the foundation of international politics both now and in Machiavelli s day. This is the
beginning of the very real human construction of political space that became reified
overtime.
Further, Walker argues that the concept of the other, central to modern
logocentric political discourse could not be constituted without spatial demarcation of
what constitutes the outside of political discourse. The material outside of the
fortress also came to signify an area of contingency and anarchy not protected under
the auspice of the city-state. Indeed, Walker argues that as sovereignty is never
simply there what was never simply there can never simply disappear.

262

Identity.
William Connolly2 63 argues that the construction of the other in political
discourse was undertaken, so as to compensate for the death of God in modern
western society, and the passing away of the Ultimate Arbiter, He who is the
impartial voice of truth between contesting dichotomies. There are, indeed, parallels
between the history of Christian definitions and treatment of otherness and the range
of contemporary orientations to
scientists.

academic otherness

among

secular

social

264

Connolly s main concern is identity formation. Identity in the modem sense is
by definition set against its antithesis. Identity in the modern sense of the term can
only be constructed via an unproblematic totalisation of what it means to be totally
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formed as a discemable object as opposed to the indiscernible fragmented other .
Further, to assume an identity -in the modem sense of the term- is to assume a
hierarchy of identities in which God or the universal truth, or the ego/rational self
reigns supreme and those who exist in closest proximity to this ideal are at the top
of the hierarchy.
Identity, for Connolly, is subjectively determined. It is not however
determined in a vacuum without external influence. Modem senses of ones identity
are constructed via a process of differentiation closely akin to the logocentric
procedure outlined previously. Connolly shows how Christianity was so constructed
as a universal identity in opposition to its antithesis - paganism:rhus to be Christian
meant to assume the superiority of one s faith to that of the other and to convert or
excommunicate non-Christians . Christianity itself could not be questioned from
within without eroding the faith upon which this identity stood.
The discovery of the New World was both productive and destructive in this
sense. It allowed for a strengthening of faith in the face of a history of paganism but
discovery of the other en mass also proved to be a force which predisposed Christians
to cross the line between the questioning of the other in relation to the self to a
questioning of the self in relation to the other. This second line of questioning is
problematic. If one is to retain the totality of the self as an identity that is externally
given and predetermined as either Christian or England , it must be done so
unquestioningly. To question is to accept that it is at least possible for ones identity
to be in a state of flux. Individuals by this token are not reducible to rational actors ,
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nor are a plethora of social activities which go in to constituting what is traditionally
known as the state , necessarily reducible by the same token to a state which can
assume a timeless and unproblematic identity.
Alternatively, Connolly argues that a postmodern identity assumes an ironic
stance toward what it is even while affirming itself in its identity.

265

As such it

presupposes flux, change, and a lack of foundations whilst accepting immediate
perceptions of the truth as foundational and static. Here we can see how it may be

problematic to assume, as does Waltz, that the only true objective of the state is
survival and we may be inclined to agree more with Morgenthau when he argues that
the notion of interest is not fixed in time and place (second principle). The
contradiction occurs when we assume that interest/power is separate from
identity/state, that interests whilst they may change will leave the state intact. This is
the basis of a structuralist or regime theory as per Waltz. In short, if our conceptions
of what a state is , of what constitutes the state and its interests, of how these
interests constitute its identity, can vary, there is no rational basis for believing that
the international states system is a timeless and ahistorical manifestation of the
collective interests of man defined contractually via either a Hobbes or a Rousseau.
The theme of identity thus shakes the foundations of caricatured interpretation of the
classical realists , of the state and the nature of international anarchy .
Alexander Wendt elaborates upon a theory of identity to attempt the
construction of a theory of interests in his article Anarchy is what States Make Of
It Though this article is not without its inconsistencies and contradictions. First
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however it may serve to illustrate the main points of Wendt s argument as there are
some fairly strong connections between his thesis and Connolly s. Wendt argues that
[i]dentities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a portfolio of interests
that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their
interests in the process of defining situations
Sometimes situations are
unprecedented in our experience, and in these cases we have construct their
meaning, and thus our interests, by analogy or invent them de novo. More often
they have routine qualities in which we assign meanings on the basis of
institutionally defined roles.266

Thus he argues that institutions create fairly stable sets of identities,
alternatively, fairly stable sets of identities create institutions. Institutions and
identities are mutually constitutive . 267 Thus anarchy is constituted by identity and
interests that can change. We could therefore assume that anarchy can be transformed
into any other form of social (dis)organisation depending upon the identities and
interests of actors and the social context within which they exist. For example, once
the USSR effectively abrogated its communist totalitarian identity (in the eyes of the
west), the Cold War was effectively over. As Wendt states, [w]e also assume too
much if we argue that, in virtue of anarchy, states in the state of nature necessarily

face a stag hunt or security dilemma . 268 In short, it is too simplistic to assume
that actors pursuing rational interests, either autonomously of or in conjunction with
other actors will necessarily produce anarchy. This is simply an oversimplification of
very complex issues that have been omitted from Neo/Realist discourse.
Neo/Realists qualify their positions by reification. Reification disguises the
fact that actors play a major role in shaping an objective world, and in this sense it is
similar to the deterministic attitudes of Christian theology.
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Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the
human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his
product is lost to consciousness. The reified world is experienced by man as a
strange facticity, an opus a/ienum over which he has no control rather than as the
opus proprium of his own productive activity. 269

What Wendt aims to demonstrate is that, not unlike Vasquez argument (see
chapter 3), Realism is prone to self-fulfilling prophesies

270

as it fails to recognise its

own agency in the process of identity and interest formation. Essentially, a state of
nature is what states have made of themselves . 271 This was the point which I tried
to make in the first chapter of this thesis, though l came to it via a different process of
investigation. Essentially, the arguments presented are that Realists and diplomats
have read themselves into a comer and have accepted the normal way of coming to
understand the world. This would not pose as too much of a problem were it not for
the fact that realism, states, sovereignty and traditional modes of understanding the
world precipitate violence and death on unimaginably orchestrated scales. In short
Neo/Realism is able to sanction murder, though Neo/Realism s

just cause, or the

timeless nature of the international system seems to be a problematic justification.
However, the problems in Wendt s argument are glaring. In concluding,

Anarchy is what states make of it
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Wendt accepts reification in terms of structure

and anarchy, though not in terms of the state. As such, it becomes possible for Wendt
to ask what kind of foundation offers the most fruitful set of questions and research
strategies for explaining revolutionary changes ?
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and answer in terms a simplistic

either/or dichotomy in which one methodology can reign supreme in the quest for
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truth in IR. Wendt is also predisposed towards empmc1sm, though there is no
evidence of it anywhere in his article. He argues that the answer to the methodology
question is ultimately an empirical one
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which betrays his positivist bias and

contradicts his prior argument. Wendt seems to accept the role of interest and identity
in the social construction of power politics but not of the material world.
Wendt notes,

[t]he

state-centrism of this agenda may strike some,

particularly postmodernists, as depressingly familiar.
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Though I would have to

argue that it is not state-centrism s familiarity that is depressing, but the way in which
it contradicts his entire argument.
The first and second chapter of this thesis attempted to show how concepts
and the most often used units of analysis in IR (namely the state of nature and the
state) discipline the range of the possible in international relations, and thus dictate
our possible conclusions not so much be their physical essence but by their ideological
appeal. This is also the argument that Wendt proposes, but it may serve to note that
he in fact disqualifies his conclusion throughout his argument
Wendt, can question all the constitutive elements of the international state
system but leave the entire edifice intact by presupposing the state to be an
unproblematic entity-in-itself. Conceding to the argument that language is constitutive
of our social reality, and by arguing that if society forgets what a university is, the
powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist
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he should also

presume that same for the state, it being as metaphysical as the anarchy which it
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constitutes. In fact Wendt does not, which renders his argument problematic. For if
agency and language is constitutive of anarchy, it is also constitutive of the state and
empirical analysis will not be the impartial arbiter it is hoped it will be. There is still
no way of deciding between the relative strengths and weaknesses of either a
structural or constructivist theory.

Empiricism presupposes that objects exist in

themselves and independent of the subject s volition. However, Wendt s argument is
predicated upon the opposite assumption; that objects and subjects interact in a
manner which imposes identity upon each other. It is this contradiction that allows
Wendt to talk of collective security and anarchy in the same paragraph. By
N eo/Realist definitions, how can there be collective anything under anarchy? 277
So far we have seen that Neo/Realism has effectively reified its primary units
of analysis, those being the state, sovereignty, and anarchy. For Rob Walker, it is the
mythical history of the discipline that has been reified. In History and Structure in
International Relations

278

Walker discusses the evolution of Realism as a text. Here

he repeats the prototypical stories, which have decomposed the historical links
between Neo/Realism and our historical past. Walker shows how the stories proffered
by Neo/Realists tie very closely to modem stories of emancipation and progress,
and reification proceeds by showing us that the world is as it is and not very
dissimilar to how it was . The massive and erudite literature which has advanced our
understanding of [premodem] phases of human experience
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is systematically

omitted in favour of the grand modem narratives of emancipation, freedom and justice.
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problem with the idea of an anarchical society is that it is a metaphysical idea . Ontologically and
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This privileging of myth over reality2 80 severs our very real historical links to the
past and begins the process of reification. It is also the foundation stone of a social
science devoted to the positivist building block approach to social investigation
whereby objects must be constituted independently of the subject to afford empirical
analysis. Unfortunately, there are fundamental flaws in its foundations, which speak
volumes about the intended results of scientific investigation in IR. In short, the
simple story of life before international relations has become quite implausible

281

though some of the selected empirical/historical reasons for this will become clearer
in the next chapter.
Walker terms the history of international relations a myth of origins which
while it commands considerable authority conceals its own mythical nature by
constant repetition and obligatory footnoting . Once however, these myths of origins
are displaced, the plethora of alternative interpretations of history and progress erode
the hegemony ofNeo/Realist theory and it becomes visible as only one interpretation
amongst many and a faulty one at that. As Walker points out, some of the most
familiar and enduring analysis of world politics has been facilitated by a certain
forgetting of history.
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Such forgetting is integral to positivist IR. More specifically, it is integral to
a Waltzian interpretation of positivist/empiricist science and structuralist IR. Further,
it is integral to the constitutive and dichotomous nature of structure and anarchy in the
praxis of international relations. However, of central importance here, reification is
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integral to our understanding of what constitutes the state as an entity worthy of
theoretical and empirical study.
This leads me to a rather difficult question for postmodern theorists of
international relations: what exactly constitutes an object

and an event

for

postmodemists both in international relations and its study?

Synthetic Reality.
Roland Bleiker283 goes some way to answering these questions. Drawing upon
linguistic interpretations of meaning and language s constitutive role therein, Bleiker
argues that the linguistic tum transcends and precedes classical epistemology. As
such, events are actualisations of reality in language

284

and reality has no meaning

aside from its articulation. Reality s identity is thus constituted through interaction of
thought, language and purpose. As such meaning is accentuated by intervention

and

participation and not pre-constituted simply by being .
This relocation of meaning and identity-construction squarely in the social
process of understanding and interaction encourages us to look not at universal
categories and constructions, but to the localised areas of meaning construction and
their linguistic representation. Bleiker s example is the fall of the Berlin Wall and what
constituted this as an event worthy of interpretation. Here, he argues, the event was
constituted and given meaning through the plethora of images and interpretations
which erupted onto the world via the media and political commentary all of which
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were informed by subjective interpretations but were translated and transmitted by
individuals who wished to objectify that which they thought constituted the event in
itself. Thus a plethora of societal practices were reduced to one or two five-second
sound bites . 285
The political impact and in many ways the reality of the actual protest was
determined less by what actually happened in the streets of East Berlin, Leipzig,
and Dresden than by how these events were represented in the world media and
absorbed by its viewers. The dynamic of the mass movement, the influence it
exerted on the outside world, and the pressures that the outside world exerted
back on the domestic situation in East Germany was shaped by a long and maybe
untraceable chain of interfering interpretations. 286

Bleiker also shows how events of these magnitudes cannot be understood
in area specific terms. He argues instead that world politics is transversal

in that it

recognises no arbitrary borders or delineations, no centres and peripheries clearly
demarcated and all encompassing. Changing modes of understanding of what actually
constitutes the world supports this deterritorialisation

of world politics. Thus,

while events are constantly in a process of reinterpretation, things are also in a process
of reinterpretation and therefore change. As Walker notes,
Some people may kick tables to reaffirm the material solidity of the real world,
but the demonstration is unlikely to be convincing to anyone familiar with the
. of contemporary phys1cs.
. 287
categones

Essentially, to examine events

1s

to scrutinise how one particular

interpretation of them has been objectified to the level of factuality.

288

It is too ask

which processes elevate the interactions of people and their material surroundings to
the status of events. It is to locate power within the process of constituting both

different meanings for similar though not necessarily identical objects and events would be very
fruitful in understanding just how meaning is constituted universally .
285
Ibid, p. 481.
286 Ibid.
287
Walker. 1995, p. 327.
288
Bleiker. op cit, p. 483.

144

meaningful events and objects within the process of articulation, and this is integral to
understanding the what

and why

of any plethora of circumstances. Further,

language regimes, traditional ways of posing questions and framing answers are located
within the available modes of expression through language and the manner in which
these utterances are to be received. Thus, as with identity, human agency cannot be
distinguished from our social environment. Both are mutually constitutive.
The two-way process of communication is fuelled by expectation and
intentions. This, as Bleiker shows, is dangerous when we talk in terms of war and
statecraft and should be recognised as such. For example, war is traditionally viewed
as a question of pragmatism, strategy and universalistic objectives for explicitly
subjective ends. It is however, somewhat of an impasse in terms of change because the
traditional modes of explaining and doing war are intrinsic to the process itself. Thus
to end war one must first reinvent the language and methods by which war is given
meaning. Postmodern interferences go at least some way towards accomplishing this
goal by disrupting the concept of the other which is the object of hostilities. 289 If
the object cannot be clearly delineated apart from the subject/self/state, then what is a
war and whom are wars fought against and for? More importantly, postmodern
investigations allow a far broader understanding of the why? of war not restricted to
objective arguments concerning the national interest and state security . In a
nutshell, for Bleik:er, the power and the positive potential of postmodern critique
does not lie in engaging orthodox international theory, but in forgetting it.
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Morality.

Finally, I would like to introduce a concept which has had no place in
traditional theorising of international relations due to both the nature of Neo/Realist
assumptions and the way in which they have been deconstructed. Contrary to the
admonitions of various traditionalists that postmodemism would reduce IR to nihilism
and relativism291 with no possibility of detennining right from wrong, I would now
like to show how morality can again be taken seriously in IR. First it may serve to
clarify the realist position and demonstrate how similar it is to many of the arguments
presented thus far.
By now it should be plain to all but the most dogmatic of mainstream
theorists, that to accuse postmodernism of both nihilism and relativism is to assume
that the mainstream is both squarely rooted in an unproblematic universal heroic
practice and of high moral calibre. This chapter has been dedicated to problematising
the first proposition that postmodern IR theory necessarily leads to relativism by
demonstrating the way in which deconstructive and genealogical epistemologies help
in the reformulation of alternative world views. Realism, tied as it is to a
rationalist/hermeneutic epistemology and a metaphysical/utilitarian ontology, is
diametrically opposed to morality. In fact morality does not feature in Realist
discourse precisely because of its positivist (fact/value, interest/morality) logocentric
privileging. Morality is instead restricted to the domestic concerns of subjects
constituted in a dichotomous public and private sphere; the relations between states
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are beyond the influence of morality precisely because N eo/Realists construct to be as
such.
These are the issues which Jim George raises in his article Realist Ethics ,
International Relations, and Post-modernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy
Thematic.

292

Morality is generally deemed to be superfluous to the pragmatism

required by the statesman who must deal with the harsh realities of the world with an
ends justifies the means logic and whereby a rationalism and utilitarianism precludes
morality in a world defined by scarcity and/or structural constraints and/or states
and/or anarchy and/or security dilemmas, stag hunts, etc
For George, Levinas provides an excellent way of entering the ethical debate in
IR. George argues that by relocating the ethics debate prior to the Platonic framing of
all discourse in terms of logic, and physics. 293 In this sense it again means to transcend
the object/subject distinction and the framing of ethical concerns in terms of self as
other or empathy on the selfs terms, but to recognise that we are all Others
somewhere to someone

and that one cannot detach oneself from a concern with

ethics for [t]here is no choice it is always and inescapably my concern.
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Realists may dismiss this manner of framing ethics in terms of impotence, and
conservatism by reference to a state of nature thesis and the seven stages which
follow; however, the arguments presented above show how this conservatism is
unfounded. It has been argued that our social reality is constructed despite the fact
that in the mainstream Neo/Realist literature it has become reified. Thus ethics are our
collective concern simply because if we were their constructive agents, then we also
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have the capacity to deconstruct and eliminate those factors which we deem to be
unethical.
A postmodern discourse also eschews universalism; it denies that there can be
one ethical standard against which all moral judgments can be judged, therefore, for a
postmodernist it becomes necessary to locate ethics within the politico-normative
terms of everyday life . 295 As George argues,

Ethical behaviour in this context is dependent not upon textual doctrine,
regulatory moral codes, or rules and norms of right conduct , but directly upon
the way in which humaneness and the self/other relationship is understood and
formulated. It is, consequently, an ethical theory as practice which transforms the
ethical realm from one in which the acting subject stands independent of the
ethical object (as Other), to one in which subjects and subjects-as-objects are
never autonomous of each other, but are intrinsically bound together in an ethic
ofresponsibility, without ontological detachment clauses. 296

Responsibility has been the one factor that has been altogether eschewed in the
modem narratives offered in the first and second chapters of this thesis - to
paraphrase Bauman, modernity has been one giant exercise in the abolition of
responsibility. 297 Evidence of this can be seen in neo/realist structuralism,
utilitarianism, rationalism, and realism per se and in the plethora of other consciously
constructed dichotomies

and

oppositions

throughout

modem

discourse

of

emancipation and freedom. George argues that we should instead aim towards an ethic
of contextualised
freedom.
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Unfortunately, I have my own reservations as to George s application of these
ideas to international relations. George cannot transcend the state in his application of
the ethic of responsibility. What becomes apparent is that by applying the ethic of
responsibility to the state we presuppose or invite an entire world-view and it
becomes very difficult to combat the effects of non-responsibility via the very same
apparatus and ideological constructions that create and sustain the non-responsibility
ethic in the first place. State or Neo/Realist agnosticism concerning issues of ethical
and moral culpability, are easily justified via reference to a state of nature that would
render any moral acts superfluous to the imperative of survival given the very same
state of nature, interpreted in either micro (domestic) or macro (international anarchy)
terms.
While a postmodern ethic can transcend the given-ness of any specific
situation, I do not agree that politicians informed by postmodemism can transcend
their own interests given that the means available to implement these changes do not
exist and to invent them would destroy the legitimacy and protective role of the
state . This is a discussion which will be taken up in the following chapter, but for
now it may serve to conclude this chapter by tying together some of its broad themes
and their implications for the theory as practice of International Relations.

Conclusion.
In the first chapter of this work I deconstructed Neo/Realism in terms of seven
stages which -I argue- make up a world-view which we operate within today. To
conclude this chapter I would like to show what the postmodern theorists in IR do to
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these stages by reframing the nature of the discourse and its constitutive objects
and to show what a possible alternative world-view informed by these theories may
look like.
First, the hypothetical state of nature thesis, which is a common apology for
the status quo within mainstream circles, could be enlarged to encompass present day
social configurations. We live in a forever-changing state of nature, which could be
called our social and natural environment. This environment is continually being
shaped and reshaped by interests, identities, necessity, discourse, theory as practice,
perceptions, understanding, and interpretation. These ideas can be seen resonating
through the work of Wendt (with qualification) Connolly, and Walker. These writers
challenge the assumption that there is a fixed and immutable foundation in IR, be it the
state, structure, anarchy or power defined by our interests. What the concept of
reification allows us to acknowledge is that our social environment has a history,
which is not essentially hypothetical, and which, if reinterpreted given the massive
and erudite literature which Walker alluded to could look somewhat different than it
does to mainstream theorists in IR.
Secondly, it is simply dogmatic to talk of a permanent human nature as per
Morgenthau or Niebhur, so too are interests far more problematic than a simple
reduction to a quest for material power as per Waltz and the structural functionalists.
Wendt and Connolly both show that our interests shape our identities and vice-versa
and that a dichotomous distinction of the self and other and a presumed binary
relationship between that is exogenously given by material factors is illogical.
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What we have seen is that social hierarchies and value-laden interpretations of
them have propagated a reified state that does not exist aside from our conception of
it. Thus postmodernism has shown that (quasi) universal complicity in this norm has
produced an international system of states. This, as mentioned above, would not be of
any significance to rational discussion were it not possible to moralise on the
implications such an ideological construct has on the range of the possible in our global
existence.
· George s interpretation of morality via Levinas is also reflective of this point.
By reducing all identities to a binary relationship between self and other we reduce a
complex process of identification to a simple opposition. It could be argued that the
complex interaction between humanity and our natural and social environment
constantly reshapes both elements. Thus whilst our ethical and urgent need for
responsibility for human actions are self evident to all but the most dogmatic in IR, it
is now possible to reconstruct the world in such a way as to facilitate the coordination
of measures such as global inequality, environmental degradation and so forth.
Third, we dealt with the concept of power as discourse in the previous two
chapters. Following from this we can see from the discussion presented thus far that
the traditional concept of power is entirely inadequate to deal with the complexity of
the postmodern interferences in International Relations.

The erosion of the

object/subject dichotomy forces us to realise an ethic of responsibility when dealing
with others and our environment and to think beyond binary power relationships.
Therefore the idea that power somehow has an amoral nature can be rendered
preposterous. Power, traditionally defined as coercive, does not grasp the
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complexities of social interaction. Life is not dictated by a might makes right theory,
but is predicated upon the interaction between identities and interests and the role of
the discourse in shaping both. Postmodern philosophy encourages us to look deeper
into the fabric of our social environment, to locate those areas in which modes of
domination are restricting change defined locally and subjectively, and not via some
universal conception or assumption of the truth . It also allows us to erode the ethic
of non-responsibility that has become enshrined in modern discourse as power.
Fourth, and of central concern for the following chapter, is the way in which
postmodernism problematises the nature of - and the idea of - the state. Further, and I
believe this to be postmodemism s major contribution to International Relations,
postmodernism dares to ask unlike any other theory of International Relations: what
is a state?, and informed by dramatically different methods, categories and concepts,
replies: an idea! . Granted that Enloe discusses the social formation of the state, and
that Ashley must presuppose a thing called a state before it can be rendered
problematic, however it is the vast gap between questioning and taking for granted
which not only renders Neo/Realism problematic, but also any uncritical state
centrism throughout the discipline.
Thus to assume the prior existence of the state before any theorisation of IR
can commence renders all resulting theory problematic as we saw with Wendt and
with George. Wendt was statist before he was a constructivist

and while he agrees

that the state can construct its identity and interests it would be illogical for him to
assume the same for individuals as this would allow them to deny the state and any
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such questioning would erode the applicability of Wendt s theory to the inter-state
realm out there which is also somehow separate to our identities and interests.
Georges lapse is somewhat less easy to define. However, it is again possible
to question why a state should adopt his categories of responsibility at all. A state
bound as it is by its own sovereignty need choose nothing that is not in its interests.
Responsibility being one ethic which would destroy the state internally, I fail to see
why the state would accept it as a binding clause for its existence. To apply
George s ethic of responsibility , I believe it is necessary to circumvent the state, its
institutions and appendages. Moreover, I must agree with Bleiker that the only way
we can possibly hope for a different future and way of applying Georges ethics
would be to forget orthodox theory entirely.
This as Ashley has shown is well under way. To assume IR to be in a state of
estrangement from social theory in general, unable to accommodate the theories that
have proliferated since Wittgenstein, and to be questioning its own raison d etre, is to
assume that things will never be the same again. The Inniterate Condottiere has been
cast loose of its foundation, its sovereignty and the source of all meaning for modem
discourse.
Sovereignty, more than any other idea has revealed the inadequacy of IR to
accommodate change. Sovereignty underpins -albeit implicitly- the whole of IR.
Sanctioned in the UN charter, it symbolises all that is wrong with traditional
international politics. This enshrinement of a principle, and its translation into a brute
fact predetermines the entire range of possible outcomes for world peace or the
saviour of the world from environmental or nuclear annihilation. And yet sovereignty
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is a fundamentally flawed concept. It presupposes and assumes too much. It
presupposes most subjects to have been resolved when in fact they have only just
come into contention. For example, sovereignty assumes a positivist epistemology,
logocentrism, and rationalism. It assumes our global existence to be immutable and
divided into sovereign entities; it assumes sovereignty to be the source of all meaning
internationally when it so evidently is not.
Sovereignty allows us, in tum, to presuppose a state of nature, or anarchy out
there as opposed to order within, it presupposes· multiple competitive centres each
vying to be the ultimate source of rationality, and it also allows us to presuppose
conflict to be eternal. Moreover, to discuss the nature of society in a postmodern
language allows us to see the metaphysical nature of the sovereign state, and in so
doing frees up conceptual thinking space in which we can envisage alternatives to
deterministic Neo/Realist discourse.
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Chapter 6
Beyond Postmodemism?
Introduction.
This thesis has attempted to displace the dominance of Neo/Realism in IR. I
have argued that Neo/Realism holds a dogmatic statist commitment that is largely
untheorised. Moreover, the state in IR is a metaphysical construct, which as Ashley
has argued is a commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific
criticism . 299 The second chapter of this thesis maintained that this was in fact integral
to a naturalistic conception of science in IR. Furthermore, an empiricist epistemology
as applied to state centric international relations demanded that the state be conceived
as a thing in itself so that it could become the object of dispassionate scientific
analysis. Chapter three attempted to demonstrate that despite the mutually
constitutive nature of a statist ontology and positivist/empiricist epistemology, the
Neo/Realist research agendas failed to validate the legitimacy of its largely statist
ontological commitments.
Chapters four and five sought to locate human agency in the social
construction of lmowledge and to illuminate the various discursive hegemonies that
statist ontological commitments precipitate. They also sought to erode a deterministic
conception of life and to demonstrate that as society is fashioned by sentient actors,
these actors should therefore be held responsible for their actions. How then can
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international theory transcend a largely metaphysical conception of the state and still
produce constructive and realistic theory?

This chapter explores the space opened up by the displacement of
Neo/Realism and the inclusion of post positivism. This chapter will be presented in
three sections. The first section will contextualise the postmodern within anarchist
theoretical discourse: of central is a theory of the state. This chapter shows how
similar Ashley s critique of sovereignty (outlined in the previous chapter) is to
Michael Bakunin s short ( fragmented

300

)

work God and the State. It will be possible

here to advance many anarchist themes whilst still remaining true to a post-positivist
position. I will outline here the core connection between the idea of a God and the
N eo/Realist conception of the state; namely metaphysics. I will subsequently discuss
the foundational institution of the modern liberal state system, namely the institution
of private property. Drawing on the work of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, I propose that
not only is the state a metaphysical construct, but that so too is its core institution,
private property. What I would like to demonstrate here is that economics and
politics

are intrinsically tied together, historically and theoretically,

albeit

metaphysically. 301

299
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In the second part of this chapter I will turn my attention to Mutual Aid: A
Factor ofEvolution 302 by Peter Kropotkin. At first glance it would seem that Mutual
Aid is somewhat of an anomaly for this thesis. It is staunchly empiricist and

tentatively naturalistic in its historical methodology. Nevertheless, Kropotkin does
not present his ideas as the definitive alternative to tradition but as the basis of his
social philosophy. Kropotkin sought to dispel the dogmatic belief in the first
principle of self interest and show by zoological analysis that contrary to the core
tenets of social Darwinism, epitomised by Thomas Huxley, a state of nature in
which man fought for the means of existence in an anarchic free for all never existed.
What Kropotkin wished to show was that sociologists confused the metaphor of a
struggle for existence with the reality of the necessity of mutual aid.
By discussing the implausibility of both an ahistorical and universal first
principle

of self interest, I aim to demonstrate that mainstream International

Relations and can no longer rely on a hypothetical and abstract analogy to provide the
basis and justification for its state centric theory.
The third and final section of this chapter, seeks to offer a redefinition of the
state and its role in society, a reconceptualisation which makes use of the vast
literature demonstrating the states less than passive intermediary role in the formation
of civil society. For this task I will discuss the work of Charles Tilly and Roberto
Unger. Tilly s redefinition of the state as an organised racketeering enterprise is
supported by Kropotkin s empirical analysis. This reconceptualisation also serves as
an excellent introduction to the work of Roberto Unger.
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Peter Kropotkin. Mutual Aid. 1972.
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Unger s political sociology supports a deterritorialisation of international
politics by stressing the interdependence of communities, merchants, and the
international relations of overlords and their armies. His methodology is also
groundbreaking in that he seeks to avoid the pitfalls of both a positivist and a deepstructure analysis of social change, thus his post positivist position can discern the
underlying logic of social plasticity whilst also providing narratives to support his
theory. Many of the themes that have been raised in the previous chapters can also be
seen in Unger s work, it provides a framework within which IR theory can be
reconceptualised. At base, this chapter proposes

an alternative theoretical

foundation for the theory of international relations, and avenues for future research,
without finality.

The Origin of Deconstructive Theory.

Anarchism is a marginal discourse. Commonly perceived as the discourse of
chaos it has not been accorded a respectable position within traditional political
science debates. 303 However, the works of Bakunin and Proudhon, and to a lesser
extent Kropotkin, are related to the theoretical evolution of postmodernism. 304
Bakunin s work God and The State anticipated the deconstructive methodology aimed
directly at what has come to be known as logocentrism and sovereignty; two peas in a
modern pod.
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Ritter, 1969.
Kropotkin s analysis of the prison system in Siberia, written as a young officer in the Russian
military, have an uncanny resemblance to the equivalent work by Foucault~ DisciP_line and Punis~.
Undoubtedly, the French Gauche (Left Wing) would have been well versed m most 1f not all anarchist
literature due to its marked popularity in continental political science both at their time of publication
and today. Kropotkins work is however of a more empirical nature and as such it features less in the
more philosophical arguments to follow.
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Bakunin s point of departure is obviously his antipathy towards the blind
faith of a monotheistic religion and the sovereignty of God. Indeed he extends his
critique of sovereignty to the state, arguing that the state also occupies an equal
position to the idea of a God in modem minds. Baukunin uses an early example of
what Ashley has termed the monological reading technique

305

which centres on the

acceptance of the sovereignty of a religious and statist discourse. Baukunin s analysis
also recognises the absolutism of such a discourse, and in his critique of monotheistic
religion and the state, parallels can be drawn between postmodern deconstruction and
anarchist theory. Both Ashley and Bakunin question the possibility of a sovereign be it
an embodiment (i.e. the state) or a deity. Both also question the logocentrism, which
underpins the idea of sovereignty, and the link between a philosophy of science and
the state.
Throughout Bakunin s God And The State the distinction between the state
and God is treated as highly ambiguous. In short God and the State are treated as
analogous. Both, according to Bakunin, are socially constructed and metaphysical
entities used for the suppression of liberty. Bakunin also critiques the logocentric
opposition between a materialist and an idealist philosophy of which the idealists are
the neo-Kantians and the clergy, and the materialists the Machiavellians and the
positive scientific community. 306 In essence however, Bakunin rightly shows that the
opposition between the two seemingly irreconcilable positions are illusory. In fact, he
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Richard Ashley Untying the Sovereign State: A double reading of the anarchy problematique see
above.
306
It may serve to note that Bakunin also derives his definition of materialism from Proudhon. The
objection is not to materialism or realism per se, but materialism or realism founded upon the
unquestioned authority of minority groups like scientific savants , the church, or the state. The reason
for this will become clearer, but the central reason concerns Proudhon s preoccupation with liberty and
authoritarian materialism s opposition to it.
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argues, both are mutually constitutive; one cannot exist without the other due to their
totalising tendencies. We see throughout this work a tendency to question the
absolutist foundations upon which a logocentric position can be held. In effect,
Bakunin operates both a monological and a dialogical reading of the question of the
Church and the State.
This critical technique is symbolic of both Proudhon and Bakunin; indeed it
may also be the reason for its radical and marginal nature. It is confusing and
polemic unless we can make some sense of the vitriol s underlying thesis.
Human indifference stems from the objectivity intrinsic to ignorance, or so
Bakunin argues. For Bakunin, ignorance is the founding principle of objectivism and
reification. 307 Ignorance of mans authorship of our social existence is predicated upon
a contrived determinism with roots in deism (the worship of objective or external
Gods) and the dictates of authoritative institutions. Bakunin argues that it is in fact
the two institutions of God and the State that have stifled human liberty and furnished
those who propagate the ideas of God and State with the means of enslavement of
the ignorant. 308
This enslavement as Bakunin puts it, is predicated upon there being no
absolute separation between God and the state. In fact Bakunin argues that Rousseau
and Robespierre took Voltaire at his word and created the Supreme Being: the state. 309
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Bakunin, God and The State, p. 67.
See pages 40- 42 above for examples of Niebuhr and Morgenthau s religious convictions and
oroscriptions.
~ 09 Ibid, p. 79. Voltaire said, If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him (p 17).
Realising that God did not exist, Bakunin implies that Rousseau did indeed invent him and embodied
the sovereignty of God in the state.
308

160

Bakunin argues that the pastoral imagery3 10 was easily transposed from theology to
statist theory and the rule of God was transferred to the rule of the learned man of
science. The ignorance of the individual man was exploited by reference to the
objective laws of reality and the doctrine of modernisation was founded to give man
something to aspire to, which was not of this time . Look forward and not around
became the central creed. Moreover, man was encouraged to come to know God or
to recognise the state and to privilege both over Socrates

dictate know thyself!
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Bakunin s critique of God, the State, and positive science can thus be read as a critique
of objectivism in general.
Bakunin s contribution to IR theory can be most explicitly stated by reference
to the timeless dichotomy between idealism and realism. Bakunin refers to this as the
opposition between idealism and materialism. He argues that to oppose one to the
other masks certain inherent attributes, which lead both down the same path to
totalitarianism. Idealism by its very definition aims in the materialisation of its ideal
society and a realist or materialist [s]tarting from the totality of the real world, or
from what is abstractly called matter, it logically arrives at the real idealization- that is,
at the humanisation, at the full and complete emancipation -of society.
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The

problem arises when we consider the unity of method: i.e. the sovereignty of objective
scientific authority and which -either way- materialist or idealist, results in inequality

°For a postmodern interpretation of this imagery see Foucault s Pastoral Power in Politics
Philosophy Culture, 1988. See especially p. 39.
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Ibid, pp. 72-73
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Ibid, p. 48.
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and totalitarianism (defined as total homogeneity controlled by legislative reason) or
materialist state centrism as per the Machiavellian Realists. 313
The Idealist pursuit of norms leads to a homogenisation of society (see
Introduction above), which by definition is impossible, nevertheless relies upon the
authority of the scientific community. The materialist pursuit of the emancipation of
mankind through a complete understanding of our material reality, also relies upon
legislative reason to dictate what counts as legitimate and real . This also stifles
individuality and coupled with the institutions of the state, defiles liberty and
equality.
Proudhon comes to his conclusions via a different method. Whilst his
conclusions are not dissimilar to those of Bakunin i.e. that man is not free due to the
authoritarian constraints imposed by those persons who act under the auspices of a
reified, amoral and metaphysical sovereignty; for Proudhon, the role of private
property in the social construction of states is the primary cause of this authoritarian
inequality. Proudhon s method is largely deconstructive and in this sense the links
between Anarchism and postmodemism are quite similar again. Proudhon does not
term his methodology deconstructive , neither does he refer to political economy as a
discourse, nevertheless, his genealogical deconstruction of the concept of private
property, and his textual analysis thereof is strikingly postmodern.
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Ironically, Proudhon -widely viewed as an utopian anarchist- also spoke out against the idealism of
his contemporaries. Alan Ritter writes: Proudhon s realism is inspired by dissatisfaction with his
utopian predecessors. Like Marx, who admired and followed him here, Proudhon subscribes to the
utopians radical ideas but condemns their disregard of repugnant facts. The utopians wanted to
reconstruct the world: in this they were perfectly right. Their error was to perpetuate the religious
dream by rushing off into a fantastic future instead of grasping the reality that crushes it The
Political Thought of Pierre Joseph Proudhon.. 1969, p. 26.
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Proudhon s is a textual analysis of the possibility of private property. He
states that as researchers and writers on the topic are not in unison on the principle of
property rights [t]he error lies in themselves; and since every error has a reality for
its object, it is in their books that we must look for the truth which they have
unknowingly deposited there.
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Proudhon s analysis therefore looks for the inherent

contradictions within the works of Cousin, Ricardo, Saint-Simon, and de Tocqueville
to name but a few, and in the way in which they come to the conclusion that the right
to private property is a universal right of man.
Property laws are not dissimilar to the right to sovereignty, the right of
sovereignty, and sovereign rights. Both sovereignty and private property are
predicated upon an equality of right to both sovereignty and private property, and
the universal recognition of this equality is its foundational principle. The problem, as
Proudhon sees it, is that equality (a just and natural right) destroys private property,
and private property (a legal dictate of jurisprudence) destroys an equality of
conditions. It is this anomaly that Proudhon seeks to explain.
Equality, as Proudhon goes to great lengths to demonstrate, is a rather obscure
legal term. In essence, legal equality means equal rights before the law. 315 Thus we are
all equal before the law; the law, however, is sovereign. Sovereignty is the expression
of the will of the sovereign and whilst it assumes objectivity/impartiality, not only are
these concepts illusory, we can now also come to understand how sovereignty may
qualify as despotism.
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Proudhon. What Is Property? 1994, p. 22.
Ibid, p. 29.
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Jurisprudence sanctifies the institution of private property; it cannot also
sanction the concept of equality (for reasons which will become clearer). For
Proudhon, material equality was our original condition. In essentialist terms, Proudhon
also argues that society seeks this equality once more and instinctively. What
Proudhon argues is that in the aftermath of the French Revolution the Third Estate
sought to vest themselves in the material splendour of the Monarchy. Proudhon
argues that the French Revolution was thus a quest for equality. However, Proudhon
argues that the Revolution was simply progress, not a revolution, as the underlying
principles of society remained the same, i.e. unequal.
To demonstrate that equality is the foundational principle of society,
Proudhon elaborates a theory of society. Society for Proudhon is largely contractual.
It is theorised from his division of labour thesis derived from Rousseau, and its role is

to show how each individual supports every other reciprocally via their task or
emploi. Proudhon uses an analogy to illustrate this fact. He argues that if we begin by
conceptualising a colony of one thousand individuals who are denied foreign trade,
these one thousand people in order to survive must support each other in their
individual capacities. Multiplied mathematically, he argues, his analogy might
represent the human race that are truly isolated.
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The individual man can supply but a very small portion of his needs; all his
power lies in association and in the intelligent combination of universal effort.
Tue division and cooperation of labour multiply the quantity and the variety of
products, and specialization improves their quality.
There is not a man then that does not live off the products of several
thousand other industries; nor a labourer who does not receive from society at
large the things which he consumes and, with these, the means of reproducing
Now, this incontestable and uncontested fact of the general participation
in every kind of product makes all individual productions common, so that every
product made by the producer is mortgaged in advance by society. The producer
himself has the right only to that portion of the product which is expressed by a
fraction whose denominator is equal to the number of individuals of which
316
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society is composed
this reciprocity of mortgages
destroys even
possession
if the product
But, it will be answered, even if that is the case, even
does .not belong to the producer, since society gives each labourer an equivalent
for his product, it is this equivalent, this salary, reward or compensation, which
becomes his property.
Let us not be blinded by a false justice: what is given the labourer in
as a basis for an advance on future
exchange for his product is given him
labour. We consume before we produce
To conclude: the labourer, in relation to society, is a debtor who of
necessity dies insolvent.317

The point, which Proudhon is at pains to stress, is that the state is an arbitrary
interference in the natural workings of society. By sanctioning the right to private
property the institution of the state is the source of inequality and thus is
diametrically opposed to society. Moreover in stepping out of the production
process, the representatives of the state place unnatural burdens upon the workers.
For Proudhon, sovereignty is a cloak covering the inequality enshrined in state theory.
Proudhon elaborates a mono logical reading of the concept of private property.
The first part of the book is dedicated to understanding the constitution of private
property. Private property as an institution is intrinsically tied to the philosophical
separation of subject and object and the domain of the former over the latter.
However,
the law, in establishing property, has not been the expression of a psychological
fact, the development of a natural law, or the application of a moral principle; it
has in every sense of the word created a right outside of its own province. It has
realised an abstraction, a metaphor, a fiction, and has done so without deigning
to look at the consequences, without considering the disadvantages, without
318
asking whether it is right or wrong. It has sanctioned egoism
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Thus, the law, according to Proudhon, has delved into the realm of
metaphysics in an attempt to establish a physical fact. 319 That one can have sovereign
jurisdiction over one s possessions is as metaphysical an argument as sovereignty
itself, as we discussed in previous chapters.
Proudhon s central thesis is that property is theft. 320 However, he notes that
[p]roprietor and thief

have always been as contradictory as the being to which

they refer are antagonistic, and all languages have preserved this opposition.

321

Later,

after lengthy discussions of concerning how the very concept of private property is
logically impossible and materially unproductive, he turns his attention to the very
nature of the verb to steal, and his discussion is quite remarkable. Here he begins by
a translation and a linguistic approach to meaning formation and he deconstructs
meaning from language. Beginning with a translation of the Latin which resembles our
own understanding of the verb to steal Proudhon then turns his attention to the
Greek word for to cover or conceal which, he argues, has similar etymologies to the
verb to steal (derived from the same consonants kleptes from klepto (I steal)).
Further, Proudhon s translation of the Hebrew gannab or thief is similar to the
verb to put away , or conceal expressed by the word ganab . Thus Proudhon s
famous re-translation of the Eight Commandment to you shall not put away
anything for yourself

322

which in Hebrew reads lo thi-gnob.

This deconstruction is typical of Proudhon s sociological approach to meaning
formation. He does not take meaning to be eternally valid or objective, but filtered
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One of the reasons why Proudhon s thesis was rejected on submission (due -according to its
sponsors- to its complicated nature) may be due to these philosophical debates. It may be that
Proudhon had not the vocabulary to express his true meaning and hence his rather confusing style.
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down through historical praxis. Thus he is able to argue that that which is socially
constructed can also be socially dismantled. The prior explanation of the
psychological separation between object and subject (dictated by law) and the right of
the latter to the former being equal to the rights inherent in property (despite the
contradiction) is thus given added weight. He argues that the separation between
object and subject is arbitrary and due to socio-cultural convention, and that the

meaning of this separation cannot be given an objective context, i.e. it is inherent in
our expression of fact within linguistically given contexts.
Given the socio-linguistic nature of the concept of property, Proudhon is thus
able to demonstrate that the right to profit from or to increase ones capital is
sanctified only by legal dictate and makes no logical sense. In essence, by arguing that
a monological reading of the concept of property does not also include the right to
profit from private property -that profit is in fact cultural practice, not logical factProudhon is able to show how the praxis of private property is self destructive, and
that the metaphysical theorising of private property shows that at base, private
property is theft. Two examples may illustrate this observation.
Proudhon s eighth and ninth propositions

323

that 8) Property is impossible

because its power of accumulation is infinite, while it is exercised only over finite
quantities and 9) Property is impossible because it is powerless against property
demonstrate the impracticality and therefore unjust nature of property laws
(specifically interest ), and the theoretically zero sum nature of unhindered
economic practice. The latter proposition is also unjust for Proudhon due to both its
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destructive nature towards property (rendering the true nature of property
impossible) and towards society (resulting in monopolisation and despotism).
The first proposition deals with the concept of compound interest and its
impracticality considered in an ideal economy. Deducing correctly that the right to
profit from a thing is impractical in reality, as the rights inherent to private property
would soon swallow up all property, hence Proudhon s observation that the State is
an unnatural complication of the market. The government is (was) however a national
proprietor, thus both property and government act against their best interests.
Had Proudhon been versed in the arguments about contemporary ecological
crisis, his thesis need not have been so metaphysical. Over consumption leading to
mass waste is eroding the earths fragile ecosphere through the boring of holes in the
ozone layer and the consequent global warming. To voluntarily minimise profit in the
interests of ecology does not make economic sense unless the right to profit without
legal limit is abandoned.
The ninth proposition is further illustrative of the logical impossibility and
impracticability of the right to profit from private property. Profit is the right to take
a reward from the luxury of capital. As such profit must be made out of a transaction
with another person and this profit and loss chain is passed throughout the economic
process. As such,
producer A makes a profit out of producer B, according to the principles of
economics, B must be reimbursed by C, C by D, and so on down to Z But by
whom will Z be reimbursed for the loss caused him by the profit charged by A in
the beginning? By the consumer, replies Say. What a contemptible hypocrite! Is
this consumer any other then, than A, B, C, D etc., or Z? By whom will Z be
reimbursed? If he is reimbursed by A, no one makes a profit, and consequently
there is no property. If on the contrary Z bears the burden himself, he ceases to be
a member of society, since it refuses him the right of property and profit which it
grants to the other associates.
323
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Since the nation then, like universal humanity, is a vast industrial
~sociation which cannot act outside of itself, it is clear that no man can enrich
hunself without impoverishing another. For in order that the right of property,
the right of increase, may be respected in the case of A, it must be denied to Z,
and ~~ we see how the equality of rights, separated from the equality of
cond1t1ons may be a truth. The iniquity of political economy in this respect if
flagrant. 324

One would assume from his reasoning that for Proudhon the institution of
private property propagates inequality on the one hand while it demands equality on
the other. Equality in property rights but not in property; this sort of reasoning
would also lead one to assume that inequality is a prerequisite for prosperity and that
the First

world is/was supported and enriched at the expense of the Third

world. 325
The rapacious and intrinsic self-interest to which Neo/realists and Neo
Classical economists refer is deemed to be the inherent cause of our maladies. As we
saw in Chapter one, the contrived social Darwinism to which this line of reasoning
lends itself is apologetic of our very real human role in creating our social environment.
Typical of a logocentric position of course, the self-interest thesis is opposed and
privileged over altruism. There cannot be a compromise if causation is to be explained.
Of course, the story of human altruism is never told. Mutual Aid: A Factor of
Evolution by the anarchist Peter Kropotkin goes at least some way towards
accomplishing this task, though Kropotkin s methodology is at least as questionable
as those of whom he seeks to refute.
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works match this line of reasoning very closely. Proudhon notes, without force, property is
powerless against property (p. 167) and the historical commentaries given by Frank demonstrate
this to be very much the case in Latin America and, indeed, Africa and the Indian sub-continent.
Without inequality of capacities, and without force, profit could not be charged on goods.
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Evidence.

As we saw in the first chapter, to establish the hypothetical state of nature
thesis is intrinsic to a statist ontology. From the state of nature thesis it becomes
possible to argue the benefits of civil and statist society. The assumption of rational
self-interest as Mans

primary motivator, or a malignant human nature for the

traditionalists, also helps to stress the benefits of the state as an objective adjudicator
and provider of the peace and tranquillity which would otherwise be absent from
society.
What must be stressed, however, is that the state of nature hypothesis is
purely hypothetical and ahistorical and its role as such is to provide a universal theory
upon which an explanation of the nature of society and its mechanisms can be placed.
Of course, it is purely hypothetical; moreover the state of nature thesis is used to
construct an amoral, ahistorical and naturalistic framework within which it becomes
increasingly difficult to apportion blame and culpability, and increasingly easier to
justify malevolence and deceit. As Morgenthau argues, The_ ethics and mores of
politics are generally considered to permit greater leeway than the ethics and mores of
society in general in certain actions such as campaign oratory and promises in
326

general.

It is hypothetical and inaccurate universal statements that allow him to

say this.
There is no evidence, as Wight and Waltz rightly pointed out, that a state of
nature ever existed. And so one must ask the question, why, ifthere never was a state
of nature, and there is a massive and erudite body of literature which describes
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human society throughout the ages, drawn from historical, anthropological and
archaeological evidence, why does state theory and more specifically mainstream
International Relations theory, not take this evidence into account? What would the
inclusion of positive historical analysis do for IR theory?

If one is to include

historical evidence in state theory, is a logocentric statist ontology a legitimate
commitment? The answer would have to be no as I hope to point out. As Unger
argues below, contrary to common conceptions, narratives (not universal statements)
can be drawn from historical analysis.
Kropotkin deliberately excludes all evidence which does not support his
.

central thesis, arguing that as his excluded evidence has been privileged throughout
historical, anthropological, and zoological analysis it does not deserve added
attention.327 Moreover, attempting to demonstrate the prevalence of mutual aid within
species of necessity omits an analysis of factors which work against this principle.
Kropotkin s primary concern is therefore to demonstrate the role of mutual aid in the
creation of society and in the continuing evolution of living species. Where Kropotkin
does discuss struggle and war amongst individuals of the same species, he does so to
illustrate its destructive and regressive effects upon the process of material and
psychological evolution.
What is interesting from a postmodern point of view is Kropotkin s insistence
that zoologists, anthropologists and sociologists do not confuse further what he sees
as the metaphorical struggle for existence -to which Darwin alluded- and the actual
struggle for life experienced by species living in harsh and uncompromising natural
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environments. Further, Kropotkin also alillS to demonstrate that within species,
competition for the means of survival is the exception rather than the rule, and if there
is competition or a struggle it is between species.
Already we can see the implications of such a radical tum-around in social
analysis. If there is no natural struggle between humans for the means of sustenance
and that the natural inclinations for living species is to assist and aid their own kind
rather that the exception to the rule which is to profit from each others loss, then of
what purpose is the state? Before answering these questions, a few examples may
assist in reconceptualising a more historically accurate picture of the evolution of
society.
To begin with, science has established beyond

any doubt that mankind did

not begin its life in the shape of small isolated families

328

,

in fact it has been

demonstrated that the clan or the tribe was the initial and universal mode of social
organisation within which mutual aid and support was practiced out of necessity due
largely to the harsh natural conditions which primitive peoples had to endure. Indeed,
early life was remarkably free of warfare

329

and it was largely a specialised

enterprise not common to all. Further, the idea that primitive peoples were
dispersed and unattached (thereby constituting a state of nature) in pre civil or
state society, is dismissed by the evidence concerning marriage practices. Clans and
tribes were extended families and therefore marriage was disallowed within the tribe.
As with the Kamilroi speaking Australians, husbands and wives had to be taken from
neighbouring tribes and clans, and this ensured not only the vitality of the tribe but
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also their interdependence and mutual support. 33 °Family links also made it decidedly
less likely that communities would fight over disagreements. Indeed, feuds and
grievances usually ended in the grieved parties taking the transgressor into their own
family group.
Thomas Huxley s thesis that primitive man lived in a type of gladiator freefor-all,

331

in an attempt to survive the harsh conditions of a material existence, could

not be further from the historical and indeed present day evidence. The Aleoute
Eskimo population of far North America provide us with the best evidence of why a
rampant state of nature is impractical if life really is such a struggle.
Kropotkin s study reveals that within a population of 60,000 people scattered
across arctic conditions there was but one murder in one hundred years, no common
law offence for over forty years among a community of one thousand eight hundred
people. Despite what we modem people would consider to be the complete and utter
hardships of arctic life, tempers do not flare in Aleoute communities. 332 Quite
understandably, arctic survival necessitates a certain degree of tolerance and
endurability

which would otherwise be quite extraneous in modem society. In

Aleoute society it is quite shameful to die without killing one s enemy, it is considered
proper to practice infanticide, euthanasia and parricide however it is remarked that as
soon as the communities level of subsistence rises these practices are abandoned.
Moreover, to have enemies is detrimental to the vitality of the clan when the day to
day difficulties of maintaining a level of sustenance always takes precedent.
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Kropotkin is equally careful to note that neither is primitive man the
idealization which Rousseau makes of him and which Waltz later elaborates. The
brutality as well as the community, which is evident in early tribal customs, is borne
out of necessity and always executed in the name of the tribe and not by appeal to
higher laws dictated by a sovereign authority. In essence the tribe was all. 333 And,
At no period in man s life were wars the normal state of existence. While
warriors exterminated each other, and the priests celebrated their massacres, the
masses continued to live their daily life334

Further, the historian unconsciously draws a distorted picture of the times he
endeavours to depict because nearly all historical documents deal with breaches of
the peace and not the peace itself. Neither is it possible for us to consider history as
a continual linear progression, argues Kropotkin. History is discontinuous for
Kropotkin335 and as civilizations rise and fall, most often without any concept of their
counterparts elsewhere, the tenacity of the clan, later the village, then the town, then
the city, remained. Underlying these social organisations were communities of peoples
supporting each other, not unconsciously as Proudhon suggests by a complex division
of labour, but through day to day acts of support and care for their neighbours well
being and hence the vitality of the community.
For Kropotkin, this vitality reached its peak in the Eurasian towns and cities
of the later medieval period and in the early years of the Renaissance. It was here too
that the seeds for its downfall were sown. [T]he very peacefulness of man being the
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334

174

cause of the specialisation of the warriors

trade
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unfortunately

specialization also needed to maintain itself. Bands of unruly

this

men roamed the

countryside offering their services as protectors often under the control of a chieftain
or overlord, and the village communities only too anxious to be left in peace
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enlisted their services. Charles Tilly has termed this War Making and State making as
Organised Crime . 338
Tilly s work seeks to reframe the dominant myth of origins in state theory and
rather than subscribe to the social contract , or open market theories and analogies,
which serve as foundational universal statements upon which theories of international
anarchy can be based, Tilly stresses the importance of seeing state formation for what
it really was, and for him, state formation resembled organised crime or protection
rackets with the advantage of legitimacy

339

.

This work is remarkably similar to the

second half ofK.ropotkins Mutual Aid and even more similar to The State: Its Historic
Role also written by Kropotkin. The dominant parallels concern the violent and
paradoxical nature of state formation. Essentially, the bands of mercenaries and their
overlord Kings sought to offer protection for rural communities and were at once the
source of the greatest danger to the very same communities. As such, Tilly argues that
state formation resembled racketeering, overlords were military entrepreneurs, and the
.
rural populations [a]t least for the western European expenence
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Charles Tilly. War Making and State Making As Organised Crime in Evans et al. Bringing the
State Back In. Cambridge. 1985. As Tilly s work is better known than the equivalent by Kropotkin, I
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victims of their own making. As Tilly rightly points out, and as we have seen from the
discussions so far,
Apologis~s for particular governments and for government in general [read

Neo/Reahsts] commonly argue, precisely, that they offer protection from local
and external violence. They claim that the prices they charge barely cover the
costs of protection. They call people who complain about the price of protection
anarchists or subversives, or both at once. But consider the definition of a
racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction.
Governments provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as
racketeering [t]o the extent that the threats against which a given government
protects its citizens are imaginary or are the consequence of its own activities 341

Of course the key issue at stake here is the legitimacy to which Tilly referred
above. How is racketeering legitimate ? Tilly concurs with Stinchcombe, who argues
that legitimacy, in terms of states, means or corresponds less with a higher right or
value than it does with a simple might makes right thesis. Couple this with
competition for the right to be mighty , or the story of the competition for
sovereignty in Western Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and one can
understand how racketeers, once control of a certain portion of the population had
been achieved, then had to maintain this control in the face of competing claims to it.
Kropotkin argues that all (or most) historians note how
populations, once free, and simply agreeing to feed a certain portion of their
military defenders, gradually became the serfs of these protectors; how
commendation to the Church or to a Lord, became a hard necessity for the
freeman; how each Lords and Bishops castle became a robbers nest -how
feudalism was imposed, in a word -and how the crusades, by freeing the serfs
l se to popul ar emanc1pat1on.
. . 342
.
who wore the cross, gave the firrst 1mpu

Tilly continues that, over time, certain lords and overlords became dominant in
a certain area and whilst enjoying the economic tributes which came with military
domination, were also able to extend their spheres of coercion and monopolise the use
of force and the exaction of tribute on the other in a circular and strengthening manner.
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The procedure of becoming and preventing a threat at once was even more evident in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when great maritime states such as British
and the Dutch Empires extended their racketeering all over the known world. Tilly s
thesis is also concurrent with Franks work ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian
Age, in which he argues that monopolistic access to the silver and gold of the newly

discovered Americas and superior European military techniques (principally with the
former financing the latter- though the latter facilitated the former) explains
contemporary European and American hegemony in the global economy more than
neoclassical and/or modernisation theories. 343
However, Kropotkin contests the military theory of the origin of authority
despite his aversion to state authority. 344 Kropotkin s analysis of a symbiotic
relationship between the peasantry and their overlords is more akin to the work by
Roberto Unger: Plasticity into Power. Both writers stress the very real economic
factors that obliged both the peasantry and their overlords to consider external
economic factors in their day-to-day lives. If we were to integrate the theory of
private property of Proudhon with the sociological analysis of Kropotkin, we would
be a step closer to understanding Unger s anti reversion theory of social progress.
Kropotkin, throughout Mutual Aid, is careful to account for the rise in the
institution of private property. In essence of course, he claims it to be detrimental to
the progressive evolution of humanity due to its divisive and individualistic side
effects. Proudhon, on the other hand, shows how private property is impossible and
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that institutions which preserve it (namely the state) will be in constant competition
with its logical side effects: namely the creation of an underclass, and hence state
measures to remedy the negative effects of capital.
Unger s work Politics is his magnum opus. Moreover, compnsmg of three
books it is difficult to synthesise in this chapter, not only because of its length but
also its depth and scope. What follows is a short introduction to Unger s aims,
method and illuminations, and a possible way in which, with the arguments of the
previous chapter in mind, Unger s methodological and conceptual political sociology
could be integrated into the study of IR. 345
Unger s aim is to integrate an anti-necessitarian social theory into practice.
His proto-theory

in False Necessity is thus a framework around which alternative

theories can be built; it also acts as an introduction to his aims, which are more explicit
than the ideas presented in Social Theory, the first book of the trilogy. Here, Unger
asks the reader to distinguish between the deterministic aspect of contexts, structure,
and framework (used interchangeably) 346 and their contingent and malleable nature. In
so doing, Unger argues that post-structuralist and post-positivist social and critical
theory has demonstrated the pliability of our social existence and contra deepstructure

or positivist necessitarianism, human life oscillates between the

institutional and imaginative

the

which suggests that whilst routine can have a

intransigent quality, it is not determined as such indefinitely. 347

344

See Kropotkin, 1972, p. 145.
Many of the themes presented here can be seen in Robert Cox s integration of Gramsci into IR in
A,jproaches To World Order, 1996.
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Unger 1987, False Necessity, p. 33. As Carr noted fifty years prior, ~e ideal, once it.has been
embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and becomes the expression of a selfish mterest,
which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal this is the stuff of politics The Twenty Years
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Plasticity

is the key word here. Plasticity

arises from the recognition of

the contingent nature of history and the indeterminate nature of the stories that can be
derived therein. Plasticity also implies a malleability of identities and interests that
conform mainly to the contexts out of which they arise and into which they are to be
applied. Interests can thus be seen as context transforming or strengthening
depending upon specific interests. As such, there is no sovereign voice or teleological
finality to which reason is but a slave. For Unger, conflict and the empowerment,
which his radical views suggest, make, reshapes, and entrenches our social contexts.
As such, the proto-theorist recognises that we can always
the rules and assumptions of our established settings

act in ways that violate
[and] no statable list of

structures or of underlying laws and constraints can fully govern our structure-revising
and structure transcending activities.

348

Unger s method seeks to reject the determinism of deep structure logic and to
distance his position from the prestigious explanatory methods of the natural
sciences without claiming an unjustified exemption from the responsibilities of
causal analysis.

349

Underlying Unger s maintenance of causal explanation is his

arguments that whilst historical facts and theories may be contingent, the contexts and
formative structures out of which they evolved do lend themselves to causal analysis.
His main effort in de-naturalising necessitarian social theory is to demonstrate the
intrinsic political nature of theory and social practice. It is within the politics of
formative and stable contexts that one can determine causation behind context

Crisis, 1946, p. 94. This could also be read as an introduction to Unger s work and signifies the depth
of Carr s thought.
348
Unger, 1987, False Necessity, p. 37.
349
Unger 1987, Social Theory, p. 170.
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transformative conflict. His method therefore recognises the inherently political, as
opposed to the neutrality, of historical fact and narrative. 350
Unger s object

of study is the recurrent reform and retrenchment that

underpins political and social life. More specifically, Unger seeks to understand the
contextual logic and causation beneath the periodic reversion to natural economy in
agrarian-bureaucratic societies.
Unger s anti reversion thesis demonstrates how the evolution of a cash
economy, concurrent with the rise of enclosures and state appropriation of communal
property, propagated reversion to natural economy by stripping the peasantry of its
means of production and thus, by weakening the states main force (i.e. its manpower
and means of subsistence) the pursuit of a cash economy also reduced a centralised
form of governments ability to wage war and consolidate its legitimacy. Unger argues,
The effective expropriation of a large part of the Italian smallholders had enduring
effects. These consequences ranged from the immediate crisis in military
manpower that served as the background of the Gracchan conflicts to the
consequence that the buildup of fiscal and military demands in later imperial
history left the magnates in many areas of the [Roman] empire as the only class
with the power to resist the exactions of central government and to benefit from
351
its failure .

For Unger, it was imperative that there was a degree of give-and-take in the
roles which certain of the segments of society assigned themselves. Unger s principle
thesis is that the relationship between the peasantry and the state had to be one of
plasticity if reversion was to be avoided. Thus clearly defined roles for both the
rulers and the ruled were impractical.
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Unger is quite right to note that defining the terms he uses in a context free manner necessarily
erodes their utility; he argues that in so doing he encourages the radical nature of the transformative
enterprise in such a way as to avoid false necessity. Social Theory, p. 173-4.
351
Roberto Unger. 1987, Plasticity into Power. P. 19. This condensed review of Unger s complex
and insightful econo-political analysis of the nature of state power of necessity omits much of great
value to this thesis. Nevertheless, a briefreview illustrates in which direction future research can
(indeed should?) take.
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Rural disanning, and the centralisation and monopolisation of violence (to
which Tilly also refers (see pg 180)), which was a central characteristic of state
formation, and the measures which were necessary to implement such overarching
control, demanded a vast amount of material support -in the form of taxes and tributefrom the peasantry at large in the form of labour and property, and usually resulted in
352

reversion.

When it did not, it was usually due to the relative independence of the

rural community from central control. Unger s analysis of the Japanese avoidance of
reversion is illustrative of this point. 353 Close knit communities who were able to
support each other in times of dire economic hardship due to a lack of central
interference, actually aided in the formation of cash economies and states. The
sovereignty of the state was therefore never more than a concept when in practice,
sovereignty of the state would have meant its decline. Thus Unger s thesis could be
put as a general validation of the mutual aid principle. Moreover, the mutual
material interdependence of society to which Proudhon alluded, is also given added

credence due to the above empirical evidence that supports his theoretical argument.
And finally, Unger s post-positivist position354 validates the preceding critique of
statist ontological commitments and all which those commitments presuppose.
How then, might we come to integrate Unger s methodology and
objectives into International Relations? One might begin by asking, without the
trappings of a positivist or deep structure logic, can we determine the cause of

352

This was entirely Proudhons point in stating Property is impossible because it demands
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periodic breakdowns into war in the international system? The answer at first glance
would be a resounding yes . A few preliminary comments may suffice. Without the
trappings of a state-centric ontology, without the false necessity of understanding
facts as context free totalities and by deterritorialising international politics, one might
come to a fuller understanding of the integrative nature of international society. By
attempting to come to a deeper understanding of the institutional and imaginative
contexts that combine to create different societies, and how the interests of elected or
despotic rulers are shaped (without recourse to appeals to the eternal imperative for
state survival ), facts can be better understood in context and the contextual
motivations of particular societies can be accorded their own specificity without the
determinism of such trite equations as interest = power and so forth. Moreover, the
eschewal of universalistic grand narratives also allows us to relocate history within IR,
not the history of metaphor and analogy, but the history as presented to us through
evidence, no matter how politically laden.
By relocating the historical context of facts and narratives, we can come to a
fuller understanding of the technologies of power that underlie particular social events
and cherish the heterogeneity of life for both its transformative and its institutional
qualities. This, as Unger argues, does not prevent generalisations and theories, but it
does preclude the definitive necessity and deep structure logic of Neo/Realism. In
short we must come to see society for what it is, devoid of reification,
anthropomorphism, personification, and analogy masquerading as fact.

354
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Conclusion.
Anarchist theory serves three primary purposes for the theory of IR. First of
all, anarchist theory helps to dislocate the primacy of the state. It does so textually. If
one adopts a postmodern reading stance, there is no finality, which is of necessity
intrinsic to the theories of Bakunin, Proudhon and Kropotkin; they are simply
arguments. Second, anarchist theory serves as a passionately political introduction to
the history of the state devoid of its metaphysical, universal and sovereign cloak. And
finally, via a deconstruction of the institution of private property and its historical
evolution, which is provided by Proudhon and Kropotkin, we can see how historically
and conceptually linked politics, economics and international relations may be.
Historical and political sociology has many valued contributions to IR theory.
Beginning with Tilly s reconceptualisation of the historical role of the state, and
demonstrating its human attributes and failings, and integrating this with Unger s
analysis of the symbiosis between government and society, we could stop viewing
the state as sole a source of protection and stability and put it to work for humanity.
Using Kropotkin s zoological account of the role of mutual aid as a factor of
evolution, and the obsolescence of a primal state of nature, it immediately becomes
possible to eschew the deterministic and pessimistic conception of societies intricate
workings and open up the possibilities for human interaction ad infinatum.
Proudhon s analysis of the institution of private property, the nature of the state and
sovereignty, ties economics and politics together at the root. Both share their
metaphysical aspect and were both originally used as weapons of exploitation.
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From this contextualised platform we might employ the methodological tools of
Roberto Unger and by reconciling his aims with those of those of the discipline of IR
(thereby rejecting his programme but not the spirit) we might be able to understand
localised and contextualised breakdowns in peace and the oft-concurrent -though by
no means pre-detennined- escalations into war.
By shedding the metaphysical and sovereign aspect of state theory we might
come to a fuller understanding of the possibilities available to people freed from
illusory ideological constraints. Given that the presumed constraints imposed by
reified abstractions such as the law , or private property are impossible (as the
previous three chapters have sought to demonstrate) and should the abstract be
replaced by concrete individual human choice and (re)action, we could relate the
motivations for such choices to the social contexts from which they evolved.
Moreover, by understanding the aspirations of actors and the ways in which
aspirations clash -though without reducing society to a gladiator pit -humanity
could work together in fashioning qualified ideals and future idealistic possibilities.
What has been shown is that humanity has an interest in altruism. This mutual
aid precludes universal conflict and renders Neo/Realist state theory obsolete.
Further, self-interest and conflict were prone to those who propagated those very
same doctrines; exploitation from above could only be justified through recourse to
universal self-interest and conflict. This chapter could therefore be read as an
introduction to a broader thesis. This project would, however, be beyond the scope of
this thesis and of its author s capability; it is not, however, impossible.
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Conclusion.
This thesis has been, primarily, a critique of the presumed global reality as
taught to students of International Relations through the canons of Neo/Realism. It
has also been a critique of the hegemonic methodology used by Neo/Realists in an
attempt to reify the state

and the international system.

Moreover, this

positivist/empiricist methodology, it has been argued, has also dictated the way in
which we can come to understand the world and whether or not reality can be changed
or interpreted differently. Since the abandonment of the Verstehen element to
traditional Realism, the deterministic element of positivism has been reinforced and
with it the intransigence of the Neo/Realist conception of reality.
By taking a linguistic turn in philosophical discourse, it became possible to
relocate human agency in international relations and, ultimately, to change our
conception of what constitutes reality and whether or not this reconceptualisation of
reality was in fact, mutable. By building upon less deterministic foundations, and by
shedding the metaphysical aspect of political and economic discourse, I have argued
that it becomes possible to come to a fuller understanding of the cause of war and the
possibilities of peace, though what this understanding may encompass is again open
to interpretation and debate.
Underlying the basic structure of this thesis, between the lines so to speak,
there exist six distinctive threads of argument. First, I was concerned from the outset
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with the role of propaganda upon the minds and ambitions of those who wish to come
to a fuller understanding of international relations so as to transcend the deterministic
aspect of mainstream theory. This began in the introduction with a short account of
the first dichotomy in the study of IR; namely the idealism/realism debate. Here I
argued a major aspect of my thesis: that the power of mainstream ideas-cummetaphysics which Neo/Realists embody through their assertion that reality is not
essentially about collaboration but about conflict and discord is pervasive.
Accordingly, any problem solving enterprise must first recognise the inherent ubiquity
of conflict in international relations. But such is at best only half the story, if not
entirely illusory. The Neo/Realist position relies upon a modernist preoccupation
with determining laws that permeate our social existence. Neo/Realists argued that
these laws are evident to the positivist scientist and are an enigma for the utopian who
fails to take such laws into account.
This hegemonic idea, it was argued, holds sway due to the power of a
paradigm and/or discourse. As I argued in chapter four, according to George a
discourse generates

the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood

and explained. More precisely, a discourse makes real
meaningful.

355

that which it prescribes as

A modem preoccupation with foundationalism as the only worthy

preoccupation, elevated Neo/Realism to the level of factuality primarily due to its
consistent logocentrism and its utility to the policy sector of the dominant western
policy institutions. Moreover, from my discussion of Foucault in the third chapter, it
became possible to offer an explanation for the resilience of power politics in
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theoretical terms, an explanation that corresponds to the Kuhnian concept of
paradigms.
I have argued that N eo/Realism s resilience is due primarily to repetition and
community homogeneity concerning the presumed correct method and objects of
study. Therefore, Neo/Realism is real not because it occupies a sovereign ground or
embodies some eternal truth but because it has successfully disseminated ideas about
the nature of the international system throughout the body politique and academia
alike.
The second half of this thesis was therefore an attempt to displace this
hegemony via linguistic philosophy. Ironically, by explaining the power of language in
terms of meaning formation and in the constitution of a conception of reality, the
exposition of language as propaganda writ large becomes a viable argument. The point
of departure however is to note that within linguistic philosophy there is no
preordained foundation upon which the ultimate ideal can be built and through which
it can be determined, and unlike positivism, there is no denial of the irony of the
philosophical position. Linguistic philosophy, whilst it may lend itself to relativism,
allows us to make and reshape our realities at will; though without the pretence of
objectivity and appeals to higher laws which have historically been the rallying call
of all manner of despots.
The second argument, which resonated throughout this thesis, was the
reintroduction of the concept of responsibility in international relations. The concept
of responsibility could only be reintroduced once it had been established that there is
no higher purpose beneath which, or in the name of which, actions taken are absolved
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from culpability. Thus it was necessary to demonstrate that the concept of the state
employed by Neo/Realists, whilst it was/is generally considered to permit greater
. matters o f eth"ics and mores356, was entirely metaphysical. Furthermore the
1eeway m

Machiavellian politics which Nee/Realism deduced (wrongly) from the timeless nature
of the international system were in fact a cloak for a power politics which had no
rational basis in historical fact, as I demonstrated in chapter six. In fact, N ea/Realists
have confused the role of the state of nature thesis with history. A possible
explanation for this confusion has two aspects to it.
First as Kropotkin argues above, historians in drawing from historical records,
which invariably retell the history of breaches of the peace instead of the peace itself,
confused an eternal state of nature and a first principle of self-interest with the reality
of a prolific incidence of mutual aid. And therein lies the second aspect; in using a
scientific methodology, which, George argues, is

fact

grubbing empiricism,

Neo/Realists would not allow themselves, in the name of objectivity, to reinterpret the
facts as they appeared to historians. The abandonment of the interpretative element of
traditional Realism reinforced this impasse. Moreover, it reified an interpretation of
our historical past to the position of factuality and through the subsequent redirection
of scientific analysis towards deep structuralist logic as per Waltz and the Neorealists.
History was abandoned as a source of information. Instead, students were directed to
live in a type of permanent present

357

,

digest and regurgitate neorealist admonitions

to pay heed to the present s ubiquitous nature and its deterministic logic while
eschewing morality in the name of pragmatism. And thus the rich source of the
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present in all its multifarious forms was subsumed under an ahistorical and amoral
logic, which simply validated a first principle of self-interest and a power politics
doctrine, pertinent only to metaphysical conceptions of reality.
To reintroduce morality and ethics, indeed, to allocate responsibility in the
international sphere, it is necessary not only to bypass the Neo/Realist conception of
the state and its anarchic playground, but also to discover whether technical
rationality and pragmatism can be avoided and conscious consideration of the other
be relocated in the conduct of international relations. This path would entail rejecting
the determinism of Neo/Realist power politics. Thus, I argued, the most constructive
means of reintroducing morality to the international sphere is via recognition of human
authorship of social reality and the unscripted nature of the future . This is where
linguistic philosophy as an epistemology came into its own, and the arguments in
chapter four and five are hopefully conclusive.
The third thread of my argument was to demonstrate the extreme complexity
of human interaction. In the final two chapters, I first sought to identify the symbiotic
relationship between all humans through the social construction of meaning and via
Proudhon s mutuality, which is evident in his conception of a global division of labour
predicated upon mutual aid . in the satisfaction of material needs and services.
Secondly, I sought to demonstrate the interdependence of the state (as a group of
individuals who control a vast amount of material recourses and violence) and the
people confined to the territory

over

which it has control. Enloe s work

demonstrated the self-destructive nature of the types and forms of power it took to
maintain the modernist conception of the state and the ways in which bio-power and
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hierarchy subvert the societal bonds between people. This subversion, as Unger
argued, is counterproductive. Indeed, if society is to avoid retrenchment and regression
there cannot be clear definitions of roles and identities the societal must take
'
precedence, as events in Mexico s Zapatista uprising demonstrated.
Complex interdependence between individuals is illustrated not only in the
social formation of knowledge, nor does it lie exclusively within the confines of
territory. As Bleiker and Ashley argue, the erosion of the concept of sovereignty (and
its attendant assumption of inside vs. outside ) and the concomitant rise of a
deterritorialisation of politics means he idea of the other

erodes. As I argued,

ecological issues far outweigh the petty nature of state sovereignty, and our
interdependence, indeed our survival as a human race depends upon the concerted
effort of governmental institutions to recognise this as a basic fact of life. This issue is
intrinsically tied to the two previous lines of argument above. How for example can
Neo/Realism cope with issues that are intrinsically tied to the discourse of state
sovereignty but do not feature as real problems of international politics, because the
logic of transnational problems such as the environment cannot be translated into
power politics and self interest. Therefore, it is necessary, first of all, as Bleiker
argues, to forget Neo/Realism and then reconstruct reality.
In what sense, therefore, do all roads lead to anarchy as the title suggests?
The answer to this question is also the fourth line of argument, which my thesis
follows and can be seen in each chapter without much difficulty.
In the first chapter, I sought to demonstrate that given Neo/Realist
preconceptions of the state, its personification or anthropomorphic qualities,
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metaphysical and abstract argument has concocted a myth of anarchy in the
international arena . This anarchy is simply conceptual but relies upon a deep-seated
pessimistic and utilitarian ontology. I argued that in an attempt to subdue anarchy and
contingency, Neo/Realism simply moved it out there . Moreover, the dominant
epistemology of Neo/Realism revelled in this metaphysical anarchy and deduced
complex laws and games to enable political scientists to understand and attempt to
subdue anarchy. But it was to no avail. The legislative reasoning that stipulated the
sovereignty of Neo/Realism got it wrong, as chapter three argued. Instead of
N eo/Realism coming up with all the answers and proving its discursive hegemony
through results, quite the opposite has occurred; we still imagine anarchy out there
and there is no way of knowing which is the best theory to explain it. Theories now
compete for supremacy with no sovereign in sight.
Chapter four demonstrated how linguistic philosophy celebrates anarchy in
the form of relativism. However, whilst it was argued that there could be no definitive
meaning attached to any particular statement, that all meaning was synthetic, only
critics, those obsessed with foundationalism lambasted the linguistic tum for the
nihilism it was presumed to provoke.
And chapter five sealed this anarchic obsession. In chapter five, I argued that
as there is no rational and objective source of meaning and order outside of -as it
were- the social construction of meaning, (a realm which cannot logically exist) and by
virtue of the argument that we are all other to somebody somewhere, we should
scrap the modem preoccupation with state sovereignty and move IR as a discourse
either to the borderlines between domestic and international politics, or simply
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forget it and move on. This really was an undercurrent, but for the most defensive of
Neo/Realists, this would have been the chapters underlying logic.
Ironically, the chapter that should have proven to be the most nihilistic, I
hoped to be the most constructive. However, the source of the irony is in a common
misconception of the definition of anarchy. As Proudhon argues, anarchy derived from
the Greek, does not mean chaos or disorder but means the absence of a sovereign. 358
This is exactly where this thesis attempts to direct the reader, to at least consider the
possibility and the possibilities that arise from an erosion of the legislative reason
enshrined in the concept of sovereignty.
Chapter six sought to illustrate the reasons for a radical political project
derived from Unger, and the possibilities that this project holds. Essentially, this
project seeks to determine the underlying motivations and particular contexts for
change and retrenchment. These concepts express no finality, neither do they aspire to
universalism, instead, there begins a recognition of the underlying order in anarchy; to
repeat Proudhon, As Man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in
anarchy.

359

Could we be seeing a way in which this idea, though at first glance

paradoxical, may be true?
The idea of order in anarchy can be traced as the fifth line of argument
throughout this thesis. It is the argument against the determinism that is evident in
Neo/Realism and modernity. This determinism not only involves concepts of
historical stasis and the homogenisation of society via universal legislative reason, but
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also Neo/Realist conceptions of reality as the only real reality there ever was and
indeed, can be.
In questioning the Neo/Realist version of reality and in opening up conceptual
accounts to criticism, I attempted to illuminate the metaphysics of Neo/Realism so as
to demonstrate that any alternative account of reality is as plausible by Neo/Realism s
own scientific standards. By showing how abstract concepts such as the state and
anarchy are metaphysical and by relocating human agency in IR, it became possible
to develop postmodern arguments into an elucidation of Unger s work Politics and his
conception of the various sovereign-less orders that have come to the fore in
international society. For Unger, there is an underlying order; it is not however,
universal in any sense. Orders are anarchic in that they do not follow any deep
structure logic nor are they reducible to the law like determinism of positivistic
science. Instead, contexts, frameworks and structures are made and remade through the
interaction of the imaginative and the institutional , in such a way as to preclude an
overarching order but in such a way as to demonstrate the localised regularities of
social transformation. Much in the same way as anarchist thought seeks the liberation
of man through practical acts of social transformation; Unger s thesis also seeks the
radical project , but without the attendant iconoclasm common to anarchist thought.
Of course, N eo/Realists will brand such radical idealism utopian. It will be
branded utopian in two senses, not only as an imaginative spontaneous ideal which
given current social contexts could not logically arise given N eo/Realist preconditions
and a priories, but also because the ideas presented appeal to change and
transformation. This realism/idealism dichotomy runs deeper than Neo/Realist
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conceptions of determinism and it is also the sixth line of argument that this thesis has
proposed.
The dichotomy between realism and idealism has been the hallmark of
International Relations as a discourse since its inception. This thesis has sought to
confuse the traditional concepts of what constitutes the real and the ideal, first by
demonstrating Neo/Realism s metaphysical nature and therefore its less than real
nature, and it also sought to demonstrate how a linguistic tum could ground idealistic
aspirations in the social constitution of knowledge. I hope that this relocation of
agency can point to the potential for social reconstruction once it is recognised as
Gandhi once said, that means are ends in the making. In this sense, to recognise how
humans created that which we call reality in all its multifarious forms, to recognise
how this was done, both materially, and idealistically, and to show why change is so
imperative, is the first step towards the accomplishment of the ideal, even if it is
nothing like what it was planned to be at the outset. At least in this case, humans
could only have recourse to themselves.
An analogy may serve to illustrate my point a little clearer. Michelangelo could

see his masterpiece in an un-worked slab of coarse marble. The beauty which was
painstakingly chipped out of the marble has stood the test of time and is still of
immense aesthetic value. For Michelangelo, it could be argued that the ideal was the
foundation of the real. It could be argued that Neo/Realism, metaphorically speaking
of course, approached the marble not with hammer and chisel, but with spray paint
and set about the marble concealing its possibilities. For Neo/Realists marble is marble
is marble, for them there could never be a statue of David.
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Finally, to present the seventh argument of this thesis I would like to tie
together the six previous themes and conclude.
The deconstructive aspect of this thesis concerned the displacement of
Neo/Realism as the discourse with a monopoly of truth claims in IR. In so doing I
attempted to demonstrate that within Neo/Realism there were contradictions, and
ironies, which rendered it problematic to talk of Neo/Realism as the real discourse.
Moreover, I have argued that sovereign legislative reason, coupled with common
(mis)conceptions of the ubiquity of the positivistic scientific project have elevated a
metaphysical interpretation of reality to the position of the only possible reality.
The determinism that underpins the N eo/Realist conception of reality was shown to
be predicated not only upon its ontology but also its epistemology; both however
support a largely illusory concept of reality.
In demonstrating that given a different way of coming to understand reality
and life within it, things need not be so determined, I also hoped to demonstrate that
culpability could be reintroduced to the actions of societal representatives
(governments) the world over. My position is based on the argument that social life is
made and remade through human speech and action and that it is interpreted from
history in a subjective and passionate way; that objectivism is illusory and the idea
that we are not in control of our lives is reminiscent of a theological dogma.
In short, this thesis, from Lord Davies proposal onwards argues for a post
positivist and post-modem international political sociology as a more encompassing
theoretical beginning for International Relations. This thesis has also sought to
demonstrate that reality is not necessarily as simple as Neo/Realists say it is, neither
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did it necessarily evolve in the way they say it did, neither need there be one single
way of studying it, nor does the future have to be or consist of what Neo/Realists say
it will. If one thing is certain, it is this.
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